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Abstract 
This study has concentrated upon the decision-making processes used at major incidents 
by the fire service in the United Kingdom rather than the more routine decisions made 
on the fireground. This partly because major incidents are safety critical events, 
involving complex technical or communication issues involving large volumes of 
information and many agencies, and also because the decisions made and judgements 
exercised have to demonstrate a robustness in application that will withstand 
considerable external scrutiny, since often major incidents involve losses that are 
subject to insurance or legal investigations. The research undertaken indicates that 
improvements are possible. 
The research places the current decision system in context. It does this by considering 
the cultural traditions of the fire service together with the managerial and organisational 
arrangements that set the parameters within which judgements and decisions will be 
made. This approach provides an insight as to how the fire service functions at 
operations and importantly the relationship between those decisions and time pressured 
environment in which they are often reached. Practical case studies that were attended 
by the author as the senior fire service commander are used to illustrate these features 
and help provide useful learning outcomes 
This foundation is then used to consider in detail the whole decision support system 
employed and to offer objective improvements. Explanation of the operational practice 
employed is assisted by the provision of a number of tables and figures that illustrate the 
critical parts of the decision system, such as information trees and components and 
observed inter-agency issues, which are summarised in a systethatic decision process. 
Having collated and reviewed these findings it is postulated that command competency 
and situational awareness, the essential pre-requisites, can be improved through use of a 
new paradigm that emphasises the better use of data derived from a wider range of 
sources than are currently used. To assist in gaining this improvement greater 
integration of technology is suggested and options that exploit technology, such as 
electronic data communications, sensing devices, robotics and visualisátion, explored. 
Additional to the main study a number of allied supportive areas of research have been 
undertaken. These have included issues like fire service culture, public reaction to a 
serious fire, emergency action procedures, and toxic plume modelling and fireball 
impacts together with brief commentaries on September 1 1 th and the future fire service 
in the United Kingdom. 
This research contributes to a relatively new area of study, the fire service decision 
process used to command and control resources, at major incidents. 
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1.1 	 Overview 
Decision-making at critical incidents requires fire service officers to exercise not only 
judgement, but to analyse a great deal of information in a time-sensitive environment. 
The decisions made not only have a profound effect upon the safety of the public and 
firefighters, but provide the basis of review in subsequent post-event examinations. 
Since the events may be costly in human or economic terms, it is important that 
decisions reached are the best possible. - 
The research approach adopted is primarily focused upon observation of fire service 
decision-making under crisis conditions, rather than the more conventional scientific 
foundation of experimental work. However, desk research has been incorporated where 
appropriate to confirm or contest its relevance in practice. Observation studies are, 
therefore, integral to the development of the hypothesis referred to later in this 
introduction. 
Personal supervision and contribution has been made both in operational command 
situations and in developing solutions to improve operational fire service decision-
making. Again this is referenced throughout the research. The originality of some of 
this work predates procedures and practices that have now become established standard 
operating procedures in many UK fire brigades. This contribution is verified by 
reference to publications delivered as part of the development phase of the research. 
The process adopted may therefore be described as one of auditing the existing situation 
and then presenting, within context, outcomes. 
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1.2 	 Operating Context 
The background for the research undertaken is focused upon command and control of 
complex incidents. Key case studies are used to identify the practical elements that 
arise under such circumstances. The focus is upon decision-making in stressful 
situations, since it is here that the need to source, manage, deliver, interpret and 
communicate information is of the highest importance. 
A systematic approach to enable dynamic delivery is reviewed and improvements are 
suggested and evaluated for identified weaknesses. It is argued that central to these 
issues are organisational culture and, in the operational situation, the ability within 
dynamic operational scenario to simulate the evolving situation as part of the decision-
making process. 
The importance of two influences, the managed use of information and cognitive 
recognition, is that they are given higher priority in this research than is currently 
accepted within the adopted concepts of fire service decision-making. 
The research is introduced from a perspective and background of historical and 
legislative influences linked to the fire service's own managerial development. This 
background of historical precedent and legislative influence is briefly compared with 
other international examples to test the validity of the UK approach. The research then 
continues to explore decision support systems, together with the availability of decision 
tools, which might improve those systems. Technology, which may also assist the 
critical decision-making process, is then discussed in some detail. Confirmation is 
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made using the key case studies to help illustrate where weaknesses occurred and what 
the possible improvements might be arising from the use of such technology. 
Perhaps because it is a uniformed service, the fire service is often perceived erroneously,  
as having a totally hierarchical management and decision-making structure. The reality 
is a rich mixture of decision-making processes amongst teams of competent and 
technically aware individuals. Translating this modem management thinking and 
utilisation of information technology into an aid for operational decision-making is seen 
as the natural development of the ongoing management changes introduced within the 
service and applied to daily decision-making'. 
Effectively combining these management techniques and technology systems can 
ensure that more relevant information, in rapidly useable form, can be presented to 
emergency workers and the general public at incidents or major emergencies. The 
safety of both groups is paramount and firefighters, in particular, must be able to 
exercise best judgement in prediction and mitigation of impacts. Protection of the 
public, which includes knowing how best to react to any likely off-site environmental 
and health issues, demands the co-ordination and transfer of accurate information into 
the public domain. Improvements remain to be made in this activity. 
Whilst there are considerable technical complexities effective communication is 
essential and given the type of information being conveyed, the dynamic nature of 
major emergencies and the potential fragility of communication systems currently used 
by the fire service, finding solutions rightly demands priority. Communication 
interoperability between the emergency services and public agencies offers 
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improvements and risks in that additional barriers, stresses and demands may emerge in 
parallel with action-prioritised operational activities. The need to know, preferably 
simultaneously, of any event or action to achieve a co-ordinated response has been the 
subject of limited research 2 to which this research seeks to add knowledge. 
Fire service decision support systems are of paramount importance and the development 
of a comprehensive hazard management system is integral to protecting the public and 
the firefighter. Questions concerning cognitive and technical issues also emerged in the 
research. The experience gained in seeking the solutions emphasises the importance of 
a robust and effective information highway between an incident site and any fire service 
control centre to allow interservice co-ordination and the skill of the Incidenf 
Commander. 
1.3 	 Research Methodology 
A considerable literature search has been undertaken. The volume of information 
available in this subject area, given its wide remit, is extensive. A focus has had to be 
made on the decision support system requirements to help ensure the literature pertinent 
to the research was considered in some detail. Common planning and effectuation 
phases are used in systematic process models. Qualitative research of what happens in 
the practical environment is also used. Conventional research methods into public 
response, involving field evaluation of working practices, procedures and equipment 
with deduction based upon empirical observation and reflection at personal experience, 
are also undertaken. The theoretical and conceptual frameworks derived from this 
research activity have then been modelled where this might be useful in helping explain 
those frameworks tested in a practical situation. 
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1.4 	 Hypothesis 
Ultimately a constructed hypothesis has been established, which is that: - 
Fire service critical incident decision-making can be improved beyond its current 
systematic process through the use of decision support systems that incorporate better 
information management and incident simulation. 
1.5 	 Secondary Research 
As mentioned, technologies and tools that help achieve this aim have also been 
evaluated and, using the case studies, possible improvements identified and in some 
cases implemented. 	 - 
The secondary research undertaken is referred to in related areas of cultural change, 
public response in emergencies, gas dispersion modelling and emergency action 
procedures. These subjects are annexed to provide further insight into the range of 
responsibilities and activities allied to the central theme of decision-making. In some 
cases this subsidiary research required further project definition, sample populations 
and, in the case of the public response survey, the development of a series of focused 
questions and data analysis. 
1.6 	 Research Aims 
The key premise and central hypothesis documented in this thesis is that operational 
decision support systems must utilise fully the technology used in the normal business 
environment for management information and decision-making so as to improve the 
highly-focused decision-making necessarily required in crisis management. 
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Therefore within this context, 'information technology' is defined as all those 
technologies that can be used to gather and support the decision-making process. This 
includes text and other data management information systems and visual media, such as 
closed circuit television and robotics, since simulation is emphasised as a key element in 
determining on-site operational strategies. Interpretation is the task of the fire service 
Incident Commander and to assist him it is essential that useful information is given 
when and where it is needed, without overloading or confusing .the individual 3 . 
In seeking to improve operational decision-making consideration is given to integrating 
a number of matters. These have included: - 
(i) legislative concerns, in particular requirements where hazardous materials are 
involved or for other critical incidents where the demand is for very high quality 
safety critical data. 
(ii) the difficulties and requirements involved in assessing risk and gathering data. 
(iii) consideration of any specific needs the decision-making process at incidents 
highlights. 
(iv) practical options available for effective data transfer. 
The audit route followed examines the cultural foundations based in history, legislation 
and managerial development and places them in an operational context with decision 
management tools and support systems. Examples extending the existing management 
process are used to illustrate vulnerabilities and opportunities. Operational decision-
making, information needs and information transfer are then highlighted as essential 
activities for investigation. The model shown in Figure 1.1 outlines this overall structure 
and concepts explored in subsequent chapters. 
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CONCEPTS OF MANAGEMENT COMMAND AT MAJOR INCIDENTS 
1.7 	 Research Objectives 
Gary Klein 4 et at in the USA have developed theories that can be related to urban 
fireground commanders in complex decision-making environments. These theories 
underscore the importance of the need for accurate and appropriate information if 
decision-making is to progress from a model of standard pre-programmed responses, 
into an objective, dynamic and flexible process, i.e. one that has performance-based 
outputs. In order to pursue this ideal, of an effective decision support system, an 
analysis of the information processes used by emergency organisations, combined with 
an investigation of the integrated information needs and incident operating 
requirements, is necessary. A number of specific research objectives have therefore 
been set. 
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The objectives are: 
1. Outline the institutional framework for fire service decision-making from an 
historical and legislative background. 
2. Examine and describe the UK fire service managerial culture that underpins 
operational decision-making. 
3. Compare the identified UK framework and culture with an international sample to 
identify possible alternative approaches. 
4. Illustrate using case studies areas of weakness to enable suggested improvements to 
be investigated. 
5. Define the existing operational decision-making process with its inter-actions so that 
possible improvements might be improved. 
6. Review the existing decision support system to postulate an improved decision 
support system model. 
7. Define new forms of management technological solution tools that assist decision-
making in the fire service. 
8. Present an improved model decision-making process specifically for fire service 
operational use. 
9. Suggest areas for further research. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Historical and Legislative Background 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides insight into the history of the Fire Service and the continuing 
influence of government legislation. These are important to the decision making 
process since history has evolved traditions that are prevalent in the United Kingdom 
fire service of today, and legislation provides part of the overall framework in which 
decisions are made. Background knowledge of these influences, as drivers within the 
decision-making process, is essential in order to understand the central tenets of this 
thesis. - 
Frequently, in health and safety matters, the demonstration of compliance or reasonable 
behaviour in the care of employees or the public depends upon effective audit trails that 
show statutory requirements have been followed. Audit trails require contemporaneous 
information to be stored and enable the fire service manager, at a later date, to show 
how those decisions made at that time were determined. The pressure and time frames 
of operational incidents can make the recording of such information a secondary priority 
and difficult to achieve. 
The three cases reviewed indicate that the decision-making process is as a consequence 
vulnerable to subsequent criticism when, the importance of information that existed and 
was used during the incident, was not recognised. 
+ Case studies will be used to underscore this critical factor 
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The clear legislative impetus demands the use of the latest management techniques and 
information technology to both record and present information to the Incident 
Commander. A functional area that demonstrates this risk is that of managing 
hazardous material incidents'. 
2.2 A Brief History 
The culture of the modem fire service has been developing since the nineteenth century. 
Prior to this, no municipal organised fire brigade had existed in Britain since the time of. 
the Romans. The first signs of a municipal UK fire brigade began to emerge in the City 
of Edinburgh in 1824, where James Braidwood was appointed to organise a fire brigade. 
In 1832, the Insurance Companies of Alliance, Atlas, Globe, Imperial, London, 
Protector, Royal Exchange, Union and Westminster all agreed to join with Sun to form 
a combined fire brigade for the protection of Londont 
This brigade, the London Fire Engine Establishment, also had James Braidwood, as its 
first leader after he travelled from Edinburgh. In London, he took command of 80 
professional wholetime firemen and 19 fire stations and immediately began to create a 
sense of organisation and efficiency which continued for 38 years until he was killed, 
when part of a building collapsed during firefighting operations, at a significant fire in 
Tooley Street, London, on 22 June 1861. Interestingly, Braidwood had identified 
Tooley Street as presenting one of the worst fire risks in the city. 
+ Again this point is illustrated later when consideration is given to essential first responder information, 
which shows when the activity of using emergency action codes is scrutinised that even in this weLl-
defined activity weaknesses exist. 
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Management in the London Fire Engine Establishment was through a superintendent 
with subordinate officers, foremen, who controlled the firemen. In 1865 the 
Metropolitan Fire Brigade Act led to the establishment of professional brigades 
throughout the country. A London Brigade officer called Tozer, who subsequently left 
London to establish other metropolitan fire brigades, used the London management 
style and skills, so leading to other brigades embracing those management techniques. 
In 1875 the Public Health Act required every urban authority to make provision for the 
efficient supply of water for firefighting and most municipal authorities then undertook 
to establish municipal fire brigades. London appointed a Captain Shaw who began to 
produce routine orders and technical documents designed specifically to structure the 
good management of what he called "the business". His influence remains today, since 
many of his attitudes and opinions have been absorbed within the culture of the fire 
service. 
Shaw 2 
 summarised his perception of the fireman's roles as: - 
"A fireman, to be successful, he must enter buildings; must get in below, above, on 
every side, from opposite houses, over back walls, over side walls, through panels of 
doors, through windows, through loop-holes, through skylights, through holes cut by 
himself in the gates, the walls, the roof, he must know how to reach the attic from the 
basement by ladders placed on half burnt stairs, and the basement from the attic by 
rope made fast to the chimney. His whole success depends on his getting in and 
remaining there, and he must always carry his appliances with him, as without them he 
is of no use. 
Judged by this standard, the business will be seen to be dependent almost entirely 
upon the man and not on the gear, and all the best experience has abundantly proved 
that, however good the machinery and the appliances may be, they cannot work 
themselves, and without active, energetic, intelligent, and fearless men, are virtually 
useless 
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Two components of this quotation are of particular importance. Firstly, Shaw referred 
to firefighting as a business, a matter of continuing interest today, since it was apparent 
that he intended to operate the brigade in a commercial manner. Even so he was in 
frequent difficulties over the funding of the fire service. Secondly, Shaw made specific 
reference to machinery and appliances and he subsequently developed the subject in 
numerous articles and writings. 
The London Fire Engine Establishment had continued to grow and Shaw realised that to 
manage the organisation he needed to create a sense of unity. In 1876, Shaw 3 stated 
that: 
"In a force situated as ours is, with small bodies scattered over a large area, the 
difficulties of producing the necessary unity of management and action for instantly 
dealing with emergencies of every kind, both great and small, are sometimes almost 
insurmountable, and the strictest discipline is absolutely necessary; but discipline 
alone is not enough, there must also be that confidence and fellow feeling between all 
ranks, which makes the failure or success of individuals a source of regret or 
congratulation to the whole body... 
Shaw thus identified the need to have a vigorous form of management. Equally, he 
recognised the need for firefighters to have skills and training, which he envisaged 
being achieved through discipline. In order to accomplish this aim Shaw utilised a 
building at Southwark, (which Braidwood had built), as the major training 
establishment of the brigade. In his approach he concluded that: 
"real efficiency cannot exist, unless seniors of each rank are competent to perfonn, not 
only their own duties, but also the duties of the rank next above them" 4 . 
This form of approach endured, became traditional within the fire service and some 
would say still remains. 
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In 1899, coincident with Shaw's retirement, a Parliamentary Select Committee met to 
consider how best to regularise local authority fire brigades. Little was done however, 
until a serious fire occurred at Queen Victoria Street, London, which resulted in the loss 
of nine lives. This landmark tragedy led to the formation and management of fire 
brigades as disciplined and organised bodies. Concurrently, by the turn of the century, 
the various aspirations of firefighters were beginning to emerge with the formation of 
trade unions and the establishment of their professional body, the Institution of Fire 
Engineers (in 1918). 
During the early part of the twentieth century without central or governmental control or 
regulation many urban authorities developed their own independent fire service 
arrangements without regard to their neighbouring authorities. In 1921 a Royal 
Commission on Fire Brigades and Fire Prevention was instituted to solve the problems 
that were being caused by such an ad hoc approach. The Government did not enact the 
Commission's report recommendations. 
In 1938, the Fire Brigade's Bill received the Royal Assent. This required the 
establishment of 1,440 separate statutory fire authorities in England and Wales and 228 
in Scotland. Its introduction, however, was slowed due to the outbreak of war. On 5 
August 1941, the then Home Secretary introduced regulations, which effectively 
nationalised the fire service forming the National Fire Service (NFS), and took 
responsibility from local authority brigades on 18 August 1941. 
Immediately the 1,668 existing fire brigades in the UK were re-constituted to become 
36 fire force areas under 12 regional commanders. The structure and management of 
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the service had dramatically altered overnight. The NFS rapidly needing to secure 
adequate standards of operation converted an empty hotel at Saltdene, near Brighton, 
into a large training establishment, effectively the first Fire Service College (FSC). 
The primary aim of Saltdene was to produce good officers with ideals and standards that 
would be appropriate to both leading and developing esprit de corps throughout the 
service. Secondly, the college attempted to raise technical standards within the NES. 
The existence of the NFS also enabled the Home Office and Scottish Office to issue 
advice and orders to the 12 chief regional fire officers, who rapidly translated them into 
use to speedily improve the efficiency of the service. It was necessary for the NFS to 
standardise equipment and vehicles, one result for example was the introduction of a 
standard 400-gallon fire appliance water tank which remains today as a basic design. 
Nearly 500 NFS orders were issued forming a comprehensive series of instructions, 
very similar in style to those used by the armed service, and explaining in part the 
continuing existence of a very strong national service tradition. 
The Home Secretary in 1941, Herbert Morrison, made a promise that once the war was 
concluded fire brigades would return to local authority control stating: 
"that they should not be permanently run by the state, but should again become a local 
authority service "i. 
Importantly, what was not said was how many local authorities it was intended to return 
control to, and it became apparent that the government was determined that it would not 
be the original pre-war figure of 1,668. 
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At the end of the War the Association of Municipal Corporations made vigorous 
representation to the Home Secretary for the return of fire brigades to local control and 
new legislation was approved, the Fire Services Act of 19476. 
 The result was that 151 
statutory fire authorities came into being; some of them merging with adjacent 
authorities so that ultimately 147 fire brigades were formed. The Fire Service College 
also became formally established and a Central Fire Brigades Advisory Council 
(CFBAC) came into existence. The CFBAC continues to provide guidance and 
standards, such as risk area categorisation, to fire authorities. 
During the intervening period until 1965, because of the perceived threat of the Cold 
War, these brigades also discharged a civil defence responsibility through the Auxiliary 
Fire Service (AFS). The AFS retained many of the standards introduced into the NFS. 
Indeed, whilst the Fire Services Act of 1947 was being established, major flooding 
occurred in East Anglia, which resulted in AFS deployment of over 2,000 firefighters 
with 650 pumps, for several weeks, reinforcing the need for common standards. Mutual 
aid arrangements for civil defence were designed to meet major attack, especially 
following the closing stages of the war when atomic bombs had been used. In 1965, the 
AES was disbanded, in line with the Government's assessment of the improbability of a 
future war. 
In 1974, local government re-organisation produced further change in the structural 
organisation of the fire service and between 1996 and 1998 further developments led to 
the introduction of larger and fewer brigades. There are now only 54 fire brigades in 
the UK. The impetus for change has invariably been political in that fire service change 
has consistently followed local government reviews. Furthermore, the impact has been 
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to require the adoption of new forms of management and control within the service to 
manage organisations of greater scale, activity, funding and complexity. 
These changes are currently exemplified by the practices now evident in Brigades as 
they seek to meet financial accountability and performance standards driven by Central 
Government policies directed to improve public sector performance. Income 
generation, publicised performance indicators, business planning strategies and 
collaborative ventures are all part of the current service ethos. 
It is evident from this brief review, that the fire service has a very strong traditional base 
which has been greatly influenced by a centralist style of command management and 
has equally seen management structure changes as a result of political and service 
imperatives. The hierarchical style of management, which existed for numerous years, 
is disappearing, being replaced by business management processes and efficient 
command and control at operations. These are discussed in the next chapter but it is 
concluded that these traditions and values of the service remain extremely strong. 
2.3 Relevant Legislation 
An important element of the information framework available to the fire service must be 
to help ensure that the service activity satisfies the legislative requirements placed upon 
it. Significant legislative change has occurred during the last 20 years and will continue 
with the ongoing influence of the European Union. For example, the legal foundation 
of the service, principally the Fire Services Act, 1947 as amended by the Fire Services 
Act, 19598, 
 has been significantly and substantially modified to take account of 
workplace directives issued by the European Union, and incorporated into UK 
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legislation 9 under the principle of subsiduarity. 
Against this general background, the objective of this section is to assess how the law 
affects the management and command of fire service attended incidents in order to 
assess the relevant information requirements, whether through direct fire service 
arrangements, general legislation affecting employment or European Legislation with its 
emphasis on workplace and public safety. The Incident Commander is required to 
operate within the law and the practical consequences of, for example failing to ensure 
personnel were adequately protected, would not only be hazardous but unlawful. There 
are also corporate responsibilities that the Incident Commander must discharge, as the 
servant of the employer, and again these can be onerous, especially if significant 
economic loss or injury to the public or firefighters were to result from failure to satisfy 
the legal requirements. It would be impractical to ask the Incident Commander to recall 
the detail of specific legislation at an incident but this does not remove the implicit need 
to have a sound working knowledge and for all procedures to help by ensuring the 
requisite legal provisions have been incorporated in their design. 
In the United Kingdom, law operates across the three separate jurisdictions of England 
and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, each with a distinct focus. UK law also has 
two different bases. The first is the concept of common law, resting upon 
interpretations developed from the old common law courts and based on decisions of 
judges; the second, statute law derived through Parliamentary legislation, initially 
through principal Acts and their subsequent regulations. 
It] 
More recently the trend in 15K legislation has been towards "enabling and reforming 
legislation" that avoids having to pass and enact new principal Acts of Parliament, 
which can be a time consuming and politically fraught process. The new approaches 
generally enable the responsible Secretary of State (in devolved assemblies and the 
Scottish Parliament this may be a specific minister or other person) to make regulations, 
whilst allowing currency to be maintained in the law and for changes to be implemented 
speedily. 
The legislative committee approach is central in the development and scrutiny stages of 
regulations given ascent by this route as evidenced by the Regulatory Reform Order 
2003, which is purposely designed to reduce the extensive extant fire safety legislation 
and place accountabilities for compliance upon the person responsible. This form of 
legislative process therefore requires efficient management arrangements for both those 
who are controlled by, or enforce those regulations. The fire service is part of this 
process, as regulations, orders and by-laws frequently contain significant details that 
affect procedures, practices and operations within the service. 
2.4 Fire Service Arrangements 
The principal establishing legislation for municipal fire services are the Fire Services 
Act 1947 and the Fire Services Act 1959. The first section of the 1947 Act, entitled 
Provision of Fire Services, places a series of duties upon every fire authority. The 
impact of Section 1.(1)[d] is especially relevant, as it includes the duty to gather, 
analyse and present data for use on the fireground, something which this research seeks 
* Fire authority in the terms of the Act [Section 4] was every county and County Borough Council. This was 
subsequently amended by local government legislation and may now include Metropolitan areas, Fire and Civil 
Defence Authorities and within Counties, Combined Fire Authorities or County Councils. Separate arrangements 
apply in Scotland and Northern Ireland. 
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to improve. Table 3.1 outlines some of the relevant sections of the Act. 
Section I. (1) of the Fire Services Act 1947 states 
"it shall be the duty of every fire authority in Great Britain to make provision for 
firefighting purposes and in particular every fire authority shall secure: - 
[a] the services for their area of such a fire brigade and such equipment as may be 
necessary to meet efficiently all nonnal requirements; 
[b] the efficient training of the members of the fire brigade; 
[c] efficient arrangements for dealing with calls for the assistance of the fire brigade in 
case offire and for summoning members of the fire brigade; 
[d] efficient arrangements for obtaining, by inspection oc othenvise, information 
required for firefighting purposes with respect to the character of the buildings and 
other property in the area of the fire authority, the available water supplies and means 
of access thereto, and other material local circumstances; 
[e] efficient arrangements for ensuring that reasonable steps are taken to prevent or 
mitigate damage to property resulting from measures taken in dealing with fires in the 
area of the fire authority; 	 - 
[f] efficient arrangements for the giving, when requested, of advice in respect of 
buildings and other property in the area of the fire authority as to fire prevention, 
restricting the spread offires, and means of escape in case offire." 
Through this enabling section, primary legislation requires fire authorities to secure the 
resources for the range of duties expected by the public. Subsequent sections include 
supplementary powers and arrangements such as those which allow the fire authorities 
to recover costs, use others to discharge their functions, gives power to obtain a supply 
of water for firefighting, as well as arrangements to administer brigades and control 
staff levels. 
As previously mentioned, Section l.(l)[d] of Fire Services Act 1947 is especially 
relevant to this thesis. It is here that the power and duty are given, which enables the 
fire service to gather information on buildings and other properties for the purpose of 
ensuring that brigades can operate efficiently. There are, of course, controls to prevent 
misuse of information gained by the fire brigades whilst conducting their duties. 
A fire authority may have hundreds of 'risk' premises in its area. It is responsible for 
the interpretation of thousands of items of information on, for example, hazardous 
substances. It is required to apply the statutory limitations and controls in force to 
safeguard its employees and the public and to deliver a fire service that satisfies rapid 
deployment criteria. 
The fire service not only has to gather information, it must deliver it when and where it 
is most needed (during firefighting and rescue operations) in a manner that conforms to 
a wide range of requirements, including the legal necessity to increase safety. Failing to 
manage this information is not considered an option, and examination of the ways and 
means to meet the information needs of the service in the most testing of circumstances. 
The Fire Services Act of 1947 amended by the Fire Services Mt 1959 remains a 
comprehensive document, even though it is now some 50 years old. Some of the more 
important responsibilities under the Fire Services Act, 1947, are shown in Table 2.1. 
2.5 Fire Safety Legislation 
Fire safety legislation, which is now quite developed, has, to a significant degree, 
evolved as a reaction to UK tragedies. This history of 'stable door' legislation is 
illustrated by the examples given in Table 2.2. Developing legislation in this way 
inevitably creates a series of complicated and interwoven legal requirements. A 
separate approach exists for the construction control and fire protection of buildings and 
• Section 36 (14) (2) (e) of the Fire Services Act, 1947 provides for fines and imprisonment if 
information is disclosed outside that required by duty. 
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that is found within the building codes, the primary control for the UK being the 
Building Regulations 10 . It is worth noting here that Codes do not have the same legal 
requirement for compliance as Regulations, which are derived from a principal Act. 
Codes can be supported by Guidance, again voluntary and not enforceable. 
The complex nature of UK fire safety legislation resulted in the development of a 
consolidation initiative during 2000 under the then new approach of regulatory reform. 
Section Arrangements 
1 Provision of fife services 
2 Arrangements for mutual assistance 
5 Voluntary combination schemes 
12 Discharge of fire authority duties through other authorities or persons 
13 Duty to ensure adequate firefighting water supply 
14 Power to ensure water undertakers supply water 
18 Appointment and promotion schemes 
19 Approval of establishments 	 - 
21 Requirement to train and equip 
23 Establishment of a training centre 
24 Inspection of fire brigades 
26 Creation of a pension scheme 
29 Creation of a Central Fire Brigades Advisory Council 
30 Power of entry for firefighting 
TABLE 2.1. PRINCIPAL SECTIONS OF THE FIRE SERVICES ACT, 1947 
The approach was new in that it enables Ministers to amend primary legislation [Acts] 
without following the conventional Parliamentary process of placing draft legislation 
before both Houses of Parliament within the conventional timescale and committee 
arrangements. That new approach was used for the first time in the UK to bring 
The 1959 Act largely gave power to a number of changes relating to administration and regarding 
conditions of service whilst recognising the use of fire brigade resources at incidents other than fires such 
as road accidents or dangerous substance releases. 
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together and amend fire safety law and has now resulted in the publication of the 
Regulation Reform Order 2003 
Fire Number of Consequent Legislation 
Deaths 
1956, Eastwood Mill, Keighley 8 The Factories Act 1961 
1961, Henderson's Department 11 The Offices, Shops and Railways 
Store, Liverpool Premises Act 1963 
1961, Top Storey Club, Bolton 19 The Licensing Act 1964 
1969, Rose & Crown, Saffron 11 The Fire Precautions Act 1971 
Walden 
1985, Bradford City Football Club 56 The Fire Safety and Safety of Places of 
Sport Act 1987 
TABLE 2.2. EXAMPLES OF "STABLE DOOR" LEGISLATION 
In 1972, through the European Communities Act", the United Kingdom became a 
member of the European Community and in 1973 became committed, through the 
Treaty of Rome' 2 , to all Community Treaties. This requires the UK Government to act, 
and to be seen to act, through statutory controls in support of the European Parliament's 
Directives or their interpretation by the executive within the European Commission and 
European Court. 
Consequent upon the introduction of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 
significant fire service responsibilities fall within the areas of occupational health and 
safety, which directly relate to working standards. This Act remains the central UK 
legislation relating to workplace safety. The EC, in 1986, added through special 
regulations (derived from article 1.1.8a of the Treaty of Rome), controls designed to 
improve workplace safety. The impact of occupational legislation will continue to 
expand with increase in European influence, such as the impact of Treaty of the 
European Union negotiated in 1989 at Mastricht t3 and subsequently adopted. 
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Both English Statute Law and Common Law use substantial precedents derived from 
judgements. This is a significantly different approach from the general Napoleonic, 
European law that has a more prescriptive basis. The Mastricht Treaty established the 
principle of subsiduarity ensuring Member States could interpret Directives into their 
own legal framework. This is a somewhat complex arrangement that results in varying 
interpretations and, in the UK case formal resolution of matters of dispute is through the 
courts. Guidance, rather than legal requirements, is therefore commonly issued by 
enforcing bodies, such as Fire Authorities or the Health and Safety Executive, often 
referred to as the 'Competent Authority'. 
The approach is different to UK criminal law. In criminal law, the case must be proved 
"...beyond reasonable doubt..." whereas in civil cases it need only be "...on the balance 
of probabilities...". Where an injury does not relate to a standard of behaviour, civil law 
is applied and negligence and incompetence use the principle of 'res ipsa loquitur 
apropos negligence' - negligence is assumed (that is a want of care occurred) if an 
accident happens but if a third party's fault can be demonstrated as being responsible for 
the accident, the defendant may not be judged to have been negligent; this is an 
interesting example of being proved guilty until proved innocent. Civil law often relates 
more to compensation for personal injury, caused by a breach of contract, and therefore 
tends to be about negligence or incompetence and may include strict or conditional 
liabilities 
General fire safety enforcement now rests within the Fire Precautions Act 197114 
 with 
Negligence, in simple terms, is taken as being that a person knew that there was a better way of doing 
something and didn't do it - incompetence, on the other hand, is when the person never knew how or 
what to do. An employer has a duty to assess individuals and avoid employing incompetent persons. 
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emphasis on adequate means of escape t and fire safety protection. Under this principal 
Act, regulations, through designation orders, can be made to encompass various 
premises controlled by a regulation process of certification. The Act's features include 
inspection powers and the need for occupiers to secure adequate safety arrangements. 
The Act' was amended by the Fire Safety and Safety of Places at Sport Act, 198715, 
 to 
offer protection to venues used for sporting occasions following a series of major 
tragedies. 
Originally, Government or Crown premises were exempt from the two principal Acts 
mentioned. This was seen as a serious anomaly and exemption- was subsequently 
removed by amendments introduced in the National Health Service and Community 
Care Act of 199016 
 for a series of premises, notably in the National Health Service. 
One very positive outcome of the fire safety legislation is that certificated drawings 
exist for many high-risk premises. The ability to retain, and deliver when required, this 
information, which includes detailed floor plans, is one simple but important example of 
the need to have an integrated information system within the fire service. 
* Means of Escape. This common term is used by the fire service to designate the methods and routes 
used to escape from a fire. A widely accepted definition is "Physical means by which a person may move 
to a place of safety by their own unaided efforts" 
* Premises designated can include those relating to treatment and care; providing sleeping 
accommodation; used for entertainment, recreation or instruction and those used for teaching, training or 
research. Premises to which the public has access or places, in which they are working, can also be 
designated. In the event, only two designation orders have been made. These are hotels, boarding houses 
and premises such as factories, offices, shops and railway premises, which had previously been subject to 
their own legislation. 
* Fire certificates detail means of escape, methods of fighting fires and giving warning in case of fire 
together with those means needed to ensure the safe means of escape are secured. 
'The Secretary of State responsible for fire service matters announced at the Fire '98 Conference held in 
Glasgow on 9 September 1998 that the Government were supportive of a new Fire Safety Act. 
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2.6 General Employment Legislation 
The Health and Safety at Work Act 197417 ensures that everyone involved with work, or 
who is affected by it, is effectively protected by systematic isolation or mitigation of 
risk in their general health and safety. The approach is to impose a series of general 
duties designed to cover all hazards, and a requirement on employers to improve their 
organisation and systems to ensure safety' 8 . It further places a requirement on all 
employees both to protect themselves' 9 and to work constructively with their employers 
having received information regarding the risks that may be present. Enabling health 
and safety is an important feature 2° of fire service operations, and includes a process of 
inspection by an independent inspectorate and a framework for developing and updating 
detailed safety law. Table 2.3 details the principal provisions. 
The Health and Safety Act is used as the foundation Act from which many regulations 
are derived, often supported by codes of practice or guidance notes, which have 
significant relevance to the fire service. Table 2.4 illustrates a number of those 
regulations including those arising from the European Union's Framework Directive 21 . 
Not only is the fire service not exempt from health and safety regulation, it operates 
within an environment that is physically demanding 22 and where there could be 
significant post incident effects 23 such as post-traumatic stress disorder. To meet such 
operating difficulties 24 a generic risk assessment approach 25 and the concept of 'The 
Safe Person' has also been developed by, amongst others, the Fire Service 
Inspectorate 26 . 
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2.7 Major Hazard Premises Legislation 
Major industrial hazard controls in Europe exist through a European Council 
Directive2728 issued on 24 June 1982 in response to two major emergencies which 
occurred at Flixborough 1974 and Seveso 1976. Subsequent emergencies at Chernobyl 
1986, Schweizerhalle 1986 and Allied Colloids 1992, resulted in a further Directive. 
This Directive is known as the Seveso I Directive; a later one, the Seveso H Directive, 
was issued in 1996. 
Two of those incidents were particularly notable. The first occurred in 1974 at 
Flixborough 29, United Kingdom, and involved a vapour cloud explosion of 
cyclohexane used in the manufacture of nylon, causing considerable damage to a 
chemical plant and the deaths of 28 people. The second occurred in 1976 at Seveso, 
Italy, which resulted in the release of clioxins and had considerable biological impact on 
both humans and animals. 
Each Member State has established arrangements for regulating major hazards 30 . In the 
United Kingdom these were the Control of Industrial Major Accident Hazard 
Regulations [CIMAH] 1984 as amended31 32 
 and now the Control of Major Accident 
Hazards [COMAH] 1999 
A safety case concept 34 '35 , forming part of the Regulations, is used to direct attention to 
safety management with requirements based upon notified chemicals and inventories 36 
Reviewed by the competent authority the safety case guides the local authority in the 
* C6H 1 2 A colourless liquid. Flash point - 18 ° C. Auto ignition temp. 259° C. UN Number 1145. 
Specific gravity 0.78. Vapour Density 2.9. 
Local authorities in the UK context are Municipal, Unitary and County Councils. 
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preparation of safety plans for both on and off site. Land use controls, which prohibit 
building in designated areas, minimise the likelihood of the local population being 
effected by major accidents and ensure notification is given to those local populations 
that may be affected. This is an annual requirement canied out in addition to alerting 
communities at the time of an accident. 
The process of notification 37 
 and further requirements under a Seveso II Directive 38 
extend the original Seveso Directive through the Control of Major Accident Hazards 
[COMAH] 1996 4'. 
Local authorities use a range of powers to exercise planning control over major hazard 
sites, a great deal is derived from war related legislation 39 ' 4041 ' 42 . Encouraging cor 
operative planning for major hazards in a similar way to disaster planning has helped 
ensure the rapid and accurate flow of information so important for effective response at 
incidents such as the Clapham train crash* in August 1989. 
Recently the Health and Safety Executive has unified major hazard law so that COMAH 
1999, IRR 1999 and the amendments proposed to PIRERR 1992 44  regulations all 
follow a common format. This is especially relevant in terms of safety case presentation 
and risk assessment. 
' COMAH requires more explicit safety reports and emergency plans. Land use planning is more firmly 
established with public information and guidance being more explicit and transparent. COMAH 
continues to apply a two-tier major hazard approach [adopted in the Seveso I Directive and CIMAI-I 
regulations]. This two-tier methodology, using inventory threshold levels, allows those installations 
having lower risks to apply a simpler set of rules. 
• The Clapham rail crash occurred in 1989. The subsequent inquiry [Investigation into the Clapham 
Junction Railway Accident 1989 (Comd.820) Department of Transport] criticised the lack of integration 
between services at the scene in that no one had responsibility for knowing how many rescuers were on 
site at any time. 
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PART 1 
HEALTH, SAFETY ANI WELFARE, IN CONNECTION WITH WORK 
Section Provision 
1 (a)  Securing the health and safety of persons at work 
1 (b)  Protecting other persons from the effects of work 
1(c)  Controlling flammable, explosive or dangerous substances 
1(d)  Controlling noxious emissions 
2 Employers to protect employees 
3 Protection of persons other than employees 
4 Protection of persons who use premises other than employees 
5 Control to prevent emissions 
6 Requirements on suppliers of articles and substances 
7 Employer to be responsible for own and others safety 
8 Prohibition on interfering with anything provided for health and safety 
9 Prohibition to charge employee for anything done for safety 
10 
- 14 The Health and Safety Commission and the Health and Safety Executive 
15 
- 26 Regulations, codes of practice and inspection 
27 Obtaining information 
28 Disclosure of information 
29 
- 32 Provisions relating to agriculture 
33 Offences 
TABLE 2.3. HEALTH AND SAFETY AT WORK ETC ACT 1974 
• The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) acts as the Competent' or Statutory Enforcing Authority for a 
wide range of regulatory issues related to health and safety maintaining inspectors and policy advisors 
across the spectrum of industries. A National Industry Group (NIG) for the fire and police service exists. 
HSE have enforced action against fire brigades on a number of occasions including Improvement Notices 
requiring better risk information systems 
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EXAMPLE STATUTORY REGULATIONS 
1 The Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 
2 Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations 1998 46 . 
3 Lifting Operations and Lifting Equipment Regulations 1998 
4 Health and Safety [Display Screen Equipment] Regulations 1992 
5 Personal Protective Equipment at Work Regulations 1992 49 as amended 
6 Control of Lead at Work Regulations 1998 0  
7 Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 1999' 
8 Control of Asbestos at Work Regulations 198752 
 as amended 
9 Electricity at Work Regulations 1989 
10 Noise at Work Regulations 1989 
11 Dangerous Substances [Notification and Marking of Sites Regulations] 1990 
12 Notification of New Substances Regulations 199356 
13 The Construction (Health, Safety and Welfare) Regulations 1996 
14 Control of Substances Hazardous to Health Regulations 1999 
15 Chemicals [Hazard Information and Packaging] Regulationsl993 59as amended 
16 Health and Safety [Safety Signs and Signals] Regulations 1996 60 
17 Reporting 	 of Injuries, 	 Diseases 	 and 	 Dangerous 	 Occurrences 	 Regulations 
19956 1,62 
18 The Confined Space Regulations 199763 
19 The Work in Compressed Air Regulations 199664 
TABLE 2.4 HEALTH AND SAFETY AT WORK 
EXAMPLE STATUTORY REGULATIONS 
2.8 Summary 
The historical perspective demonstrates that a hierarchical decision process is 
institutionalised within the fire service. What is also evident is that changes, that have 
already occurred and will continue, now influence how the fire service manages 
decisions. Arising from a mixture of historical and legal development this is 
summarised as having created a service with a traditional public service ethos but 
operating in a contemporised legislative environment. 
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The legislative section demonstrates that a comprehensive system of legal controls 
exists, which demands well-founded and auditable decisions. In critical safety areas 
these decisions are unlikely to have the benefit of time considered judgements, as the 
later case studies illustrate, yet do require that all information pertinent to the decision 
made be recorded. However, whilst this regime does have a legal basis to gather 
information before the incident occurs it does not contain a method or controls to 
provide an Incident Commander with readily accessible key details together with all the 
necessary legal safeguards. Again this deficiency is discussed following review of the 
case studies later in this thesis. 
There is also the practical difficulty for the fire service that existing hazardous material 
control legislation, so applicable to static sites, is less effective for occurrences off-site 
although the consequences may be as severe or worse than at a controlled 
manufacturing or storage facility. This escalation of risk may be a simple derivation of 
local factors, such as population or environment, present at the accident scene or the 
inter-action of harmful materials, which at a controlled facility would be segregated if 
likely to be hazardous. 
The basic legal structure remains however of principle legislation placing requirements 
upon all employers, whether the fire service or any other to protect employees and those 
at risk, and the growing importance of trans-national, European, direction. 
Implementing action through any management process, especially in the wider context 
of society becoming more litigious, places the individual in considerable jeopardy and 
the organisation at risk of corporate failure if decision-making is not systematic, robust, 
well informed and capable of showing professional judgement. 
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The development of the fire service over the past 100 years and the continued increases 
in legal controls have not always necessarily sat well together due in part to an 
internalised command system for decision-making that has had an assumed acceptance 
of being correct rather than being a decision system capable of wide external scrutiny. 
Whilst it is sensible and appropriate not to subject the judgement of individuals under 
considerable time and lack of information pressures to the same questioning and tests as 
those operating under normal constraints of decision-making it is equally unacceptable
-
to deny those same individuals the best access to information that is available. 
Information access is however only part of the process. Culture and management skills 
inherent within an organisation greatly affect how well any information will be used to 
deescalate risk and it is these areas that are explored in Chapter 3. 
Finally, very recently in 2003, the UK Government has proposed substantial change for 
the fire service. A summary of the proposals is detailed in the Appendix 'The Future 
Fire Service'. 
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Management Systems Development and International Review 
3.1 Introduction 
The historical and legislative background discussed in the earlier chapter provides only 
part of the cultural and managerial influences, which are so important in creating an 
organisations' decision-making framework. This chapter briefly reviews the influences 
exerted by external industrial and commercial environments and, from outside the 
normal environment of the United Kingdom, compares variations to the UK fire service 
practice. 
In particular it considers the Incident Command System (ICS) of the USA, which was 
recently tested to extreme levels. It also explains, using a case study of Cheshire Fire 
Brigade, how these external developments can have a positive impact on the decision-
making process. 
3.2 Industrial Development 
Whilst the early fire service was developing, a more scientific approach to the study of 
management was also evolving. The concept of management principles, identifying 
five functions: planning, organising, commanding, co-ordinating and controlling, was 
established by Fayol' (1841-1925), a French industrialist. Fayol added a further 14 
principles, one of which was the scalar chain, which he conceived had a direct 
supervisory link from the highest to the lowest employee. Taylor 2 (1856 - 1915), 
working in the United States, introduced the concept of job analysis by which 
productivity could be increased. In so doing he sought to implement a series of 
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production methods. One of his colleagues, Oantt, introduced a process of managing 
production, which has subsequently survived as the Oantt chart 3 . 
It is impossible to know whether the work of these individuals had any influence upon 
the development of the early fire service. However, personal observations in the later 
1960s, suggest that management principles were becoming acknowledged within the 
fire service, and during the 1970s, management procedures such as those discussed by 
Adair4 in his book Effective Leadership 5 , and by Prior, in his publication Leadership is 
not a Bowler Hat6 , were introduced. Consequently, fire service personnel found 
themselves becoming acquainted with concepts such as task-based working, leadership, 
analysis and development. In comparison with previous fire service management, these 
ideas illustrate that the fire service was observing the external environment, recognising 
social and cultural changes and responding to the political and economic climate that 
was manifested in the changing local government scene. 
Furthermore, the service was also utilising other industrial ideas such as those related to 
motivation7 . Management by Objectives was being adopted and other theories such as 
those advocated by Drucker in The Practice of Management8 led to the fire service 
experimenting with task role analysis, job descriptions and the use of learning cultures. 
Writers, such as McGregor9 and Mintzberg' ° who dealt with the systematic process of 
management" had an impact on the service as it moved forward. Strategic planning for 
the lasger brigades that emerged after the changes in 1974 became an integral part of the 
fire service approach. Organisational principles began to find favour and concepts such 
as authority and responsibility, particularly in areas of delegation, became subjects of 
discussion on progression courses for fire service officers at the Fire Service College 
[FSC]. 
During the 1980s the author compared and contrasted the management techniques of 
one multi-national company with that of five fire brigades' 2 . The findings of this 
limited survey indicated that industry was far more likely to incorporate widespread 
delegation than the fire service. This result, it was decided, arose because the fire 
service retained a strong hierarchical system and a disciplinaryculture derived from the 
military, suggesting a disparity between the organisational cultures of brigade and 
industry. 
It is postulated that prior to the 1980s, the debates within the fire service tended to 
ignore the public or organisational relationships. Consequently, highly centralised 
brigades were operated on an armed service basis. The work of Adair, with group and 
individual needs, suited the fire service style of team working. There were also signs 
that managers were seeking to harmonise personal and organisational goals, as opposed 
to separating them, in tune with McGregor's theory' 3 . Managers recognised that 
individual firefighters were keen to contribute to the organisation for intrinsic rather 
than materialistic reasons. It was noted that firefighters welcomed this involvement and 
were motivated towards a broader understanding of what their brigades were trying to 
accomplish. 
At the time, some Chief Fire Officers actively considered moving to the Likert' 4 style of 
management, away from the exploitative authoritative style towards a benevolent 
authoritative type. 
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Consultative actions were new in the 1980s and participative group working had not as 
yet found its way on to the fire service management schedule. Debates amongst senior 
officers continued, and by the end of the 1980s a definite move from a directive form of 
management towards that of a staff consultative manager began' 5 . 
The service, however, remained strongly task structured in terms of Fiedler's 
variables' 6 . It would be false to assume that there was a failure to consider the 
individual. Certainly at this time Maslow's hierarchical identification of needs were 
well understood 17 . This was witnessed in officer development training undertaken at 
the FSC. 
In the early 1980s further developments in work organisation and democratic 
arrangements' 8 and the cultivation of problem-solving and decision-making strategies 
were witnessed in discussions at the FSC and its inevitable influence upon fire service 
officers analysed. 
During the 1980s, the importance of technology was again recognised by the fire 
service. Computers had been introduced towards the end of the 1960s. However, they 
tended to be used for statistical analysis only and did not have a significant impact in 
the operation of the majority of fire brigades. Following the reorganisation of the fire 
service in 1974, communications were perceived as the central key to the new 
organisations. Consequently, the importance of information systems and information 
technology was finally recognised. This is especially relevant given the statutory duty 
placed upon Fire Authorities to gather information for firefighting purposes'9 
Whilst this general management approach was evolving, the fire service observed, 
particularly in the United States, an introduction of specific fire service management 
guidance. It has to be remembered that within the US, there are a considerable number 
of fire brigades, around 32,000. Many of them are small departments and some are 
quite isolated. The value, therefore, in having a systematic approach to management, 
which could be published and disseminated, was considered to be of particular 
importance. 
Indeed, in 1969, the first of many books written for the fire service management in the 
USA was produced by Professor Favreau 2° at the State University of New York in 
Albany, at the request of Fire Engineering magazine and became widely circulated. 
	 - 
Favreau introduced what he termed a scientific approach to management, incorporating 
specific fire service needs. He defined the management cycle at length and began to 
study the behavioural sciences in terms of motivation, group behaviour and styles of 
management. He also argued strongly for executive development coupled with the need 
for education and research. He failed, however, to provide a methodology other than to 
argue that the chief executives of fire departments needed to adopt a scientific approach 
to their management. This work may have prompted other Americans like Brunacini 2 ' 
to develop command management and decision systems. 
It is suggested that the past 25 years have therefore seen a sea change in the use of 
management techniques and that fire service managers are far more adapt at using these 
techniques and skills - a range of working situations. 
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3.3 Cultural Change 
A personal review of cultural change conducted 20 years ago 12 
 confirmed then that 
changes in fire service culture would be required if it was to achieve the benefits 
available to a more flexible organisation. By 1985, changes in fire service management 
and a wider culture of empowerment* 
 were already beginning to take hold. Moves 
towards the empowerment of staff tended to recognise that organisations had to 
constantly improve if they were to be successful. This ability to adapt to new demands 
required utilising all the abilities of staff and depended upon a relaxation of the 
hierarchical structure. Important studies by the Audit Commissiont 
 reinforced the need 
for managers to be flexible 22 The Commission had suggested that whilst the fire 
service was "notably well managed"; it was also falling well short of reducing the 
 
impact of fire by not delivering "prevention rather than cure". 
Enthusiasm and motivation, it is suggested, follows empowerment 23 and the more 
traditional methods of seeking motivation, through rewards, would be achieved at lower 
cost but in a way that was better suited to a fast moving world 24 . The challenges of 
continuous improvement also demanded that authority had to be placed where it was 
most needed and that this, in business terms, tended to be "closer to the customer", a 
phrase that was much used at the time. The majority of fire service managers 
recognised that the use of all staff knowledge, as expressed by Drucker 25 , was necessary 
if the organisation was to be pro-active. 
Empowerment is a general term used to convey the principle of individuals being given the authority 
and resources to enable them to exercise judgement and action at the lowest possible managerially 
responsible level. 
The Audit Commission is a statutory independent body responsible in England & Wales (the 
comp&able body in Scotland is the Accounts Commission) for auditing the financial effectiveness of 
local government. 
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Linked to these ideas was the emergence in fire service thinking of Total Quality 
Management [TQM] 26 and the introduction of relevant British Standards27 28 
 which 
sought to justify the need for effective audit systems applied to the process and 
manufacturing industries. These concepts were rapidly adopted generally and produced 
significant cultural change within organisations. Quality was valued just as much as 
speed of production and consequently the TQM 29 concepts were used more broadly than 
originally envisaged. 
This, in turn, demanded an understanding and mutual co-operation between teams and 
groups of people working within organisations 30 . The concepts of devolved authority or 
empowerment created the idea that individuals should push the organisation as far as 
possible to achieve its stated aims until they were actually stopped by rules which had 
been put in place to protect the corporate body 31 . This notion of pushing at the 
boundaries allowed innovation and response to become pro-active as opposed to 
reactive. It also demanded that the organisation created a 'first principle' form of 
approach, often encapsulated in some form of mission statement, although many 
organisations subsequently went beyond this and began to talk in terms of a 'vision' for 
their organisation 32 . Empowerment within the fire service demanded lateral cross-
functional working and the removal of top-down structures, replacing these with a 
concept of process 33 . This process of empowerment also created the concept of a 
"learning organisation", that is one that constantly seeks to improve by internal 
learning. 
The Cheshire case study illustrates an example of cultural change within a brigade 
highlighting that operational or traditional decision-making can be effectively reformed 
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with positive benefits through the introduction of a modified business management 
culture. 
Progressively these changes have continued, generally because of external influences 
like the introduction and application on local government and the fire service of regimes 
designed to achieve better resource utilisation, like 'Compulsory Competitive 
Tendering t and 'Best Value'. The inherent management culture retained has however 
continued with many facets of a traditional and composite highly 'service' based style. 
The management evolution of the past 25 years has recently been scrutinised 34 and the 
review's authors concluded that "we did not realise.., just how much potential for 
reform exists in the current fire service". They argued that the fire service had fallen 
behind best practice in the private and public sector and were especially critical of what 
they termed "an old-fashioned, white, male-dominated, manual occupation". Examples 
cited included unsatisfactory industrial relations, a weak management system and lack 
of ownership. This latest review is the subject of considerable debate in what is 
colloquially referred to by fire authorities and government as a 'modernising agenda'. 
There is therefore clearly in one group of external reviewers' eyes some way further to 
go in terms of cultural and organisational reform. 
3.4 International Comparisons 
An international review was conducted to assess if it is the culture of the fire service 
itself or the defined national context and institutional approach that determines how 
* The CCT regime had a legal foundation requiring external tendering for designated services and 
contract values with the result that some local government services were outsourced. 
§ Best Value has a legal foundation similar in some respects to CCT with the added ability to interpret 
service contracts in a holistic way to meet local circumstances and within a policy and resource 
framework. 
decisions are made. The established context for major incident response was reviewed 
since others have previously examined the role adopted and compared the UK with 
other international arrangements 35 and it is recognised that the US has developed 
specific responses 36 . 
To examine the value of these comparison studies the Netherlands and Sweden were 
chosen for their strategic, high hazard and integrated emergency response features and 
the US system of incident command reviewed. Other international agencies, such as the 
United Nations, which of necessity adopt systematic evaluation and management 
criteria in major disasters, were found to have useful records of iccidents involving 
hazardous materials [See list of selected accidents involving hazardous substances 
(1970-1998) worldwide, available from the Awareness and Preparedness for 
Emergencies at Local Level (APELL) program at www.unepie.org/apel1/accidenthtml], but 
these references did not extend to offering any useful comparative information on the 
requirements of Incident Commanders. 
3.4.1 Netherlands 
The Netherlands has similarities to the UK containing a number of major risks located 
within highly populated urban areas with a well-organised fire service 37 . Serious fires 
such as the Enschede fireworks factory explosion also illustrate that urbanised risks 
exist. A seminar visit made in 1996, allowed the opportunity to discuss common 
difficulties with others involved in emergency response from around the world. 
The Netherlands legislation provides public safety protection, which includes a 
responsibility on municipal authorities to secure a fire service. Each authority also has 
• The Minister of Internal Affairs governs with powers from The Fire Services Act of 1985, the Disasters 
Act of 1985 and the Act on Medical Assistance in Times of Disaster 1991. 
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the power to employ the organisation that manages the fire service to undertake further 
disaster management responsibilities, for example, to draw up contingency plans and to 
provide medical assistance at the time of such disasters. Since some municipalities are 
too small to maintain their own service or equipment, arrangements exist for mutual aid 
through Provincial Co-ordination Plans. Final command of disaster management lies 
with the local Burgomaster. In normal circumstances, it is the local municipal fire 
service commander who initially takes operational command. The municipal 
commander also has responsibilities to the regional fire service commander within the 
limits set by the Burgomaster. Should the event or disaster escalate, the authority of the 
Queen's Commissioner, who has wider co-ordinating and management powers, may be 
invoked. The Minister of Internal Affairs can give advice and instruction to the 
Queen's Commissioners as to how the response to the emergency shall proceed. 
Regional alarm centres are established for the command of operational services whilst 
the Burgomaster establishes a municipal disaster control centre, activating all of the 
services, and issuing warnings to fellow local Burgomasters and the Royal 
Commissioner. Once these disaster control organisations are operational, the overall 
incident management becomes a co-ordinated activity between the two control rooms, 
one led by the operational services, directly commanded by the Incident Commander, 
and the other led by the municipal disaster centre staff. 
In many ways, accepting the different political control, this is comparable with UK 
practice, where police, fire service, medical services and health authorities would take 
action at an executive level to ensure that the necessary responses were properly co-
ordinated. 
However decision-making in relation to the hazardous incident is a fire service rather 
than the police function. In order to affect this role, there is a range of locally based 
response groups, including trained volunteers. In comparison to the UK the brigades 
involved are often smaller in scale, since in the Netherlands they are based upon 
individual municipal areas, and this may cause problems of response, capacity and 
integrated working 39. The information system requirements recognise this devolved 
management process using 'teams' to achieve co-ordination. The cultural background 
of many fire service senior staff is engineering based and the use of multi-disciplinary 
teams and decision trees are widely accepted. Little conflict appeared to exist in co-
ordinating response under these arrangements other than the ability to 'scale up ' 
decisions from a local to regional event. 
3.4.2 Sweden 
An international event, Exercise Europe .9640, 
 combined with information gathered at a 
seminar in Ludwigshaven, Germany41 , earlier that year, enabled a comparative view to 
be gained on the Swedish approach to major incident management and utilisation of 
information to be studied as to its effectiveness. The approach is centrally developed 
and the Swedish Rescue Agency, Raddnings Verket, seeks to train and co-ordinate the 
activities of all the County Administrative Boards throughout the country. The Agency 
also trains fire service officers, often with an academic engineering background, to 
undertake crisis management and decision-making in multi-discipline teams. This 
centre enables a co-ordinated national response to be made to any major disaster that 
occurs within Sweden, and it also acts as a co-ordination group to ensure local 
authorities and emergency services operate in a uniform way. A group discipline is 
therefore established within the multi-discipline team. 
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The initial response in Sweden is made through the local fire service and the fire service 
officer retains command, assisted by the County Administrative Board who are 
remotely located [sometimes at significant distances given the geography of the 
country] and whose principal role is to support the local response. The fire service 
Commander therefore takes responsibility for local decisions relying on information 
transfer by radio. Part of the County Administrative Board's responsibility is to assess 
the local situation and to determine whether the municipal rescue services are likely to 
be overwhelmed. Under such circumstances, the County Administrative Board can take 
a decision to intervene and assume overall command of the situatithi. Since remoteness 
of location is a factor this does not occur for most emergencies, the response remaining 
local. No advanced technologies to aid information transfer were observed. 
A unique past of the Swedish response system is the use of an independent agency, SOS 
Alarm42, which provides notification to all the various agencies involved. In practice, 
municipal fire services may deploy their own resources, after being alerted by SOS 
Alarm, since they have one of their own staff present in the alarm centre as an advisor, 
although SOS Alarm routinely make responses. This organisation is well established, 
but it does create a different situation to that in the UK, since the alarm centre acts as a 
despatch organisation for many agencies. Importantly this arrangement also allows an 
early integration of response is undertaken albeit that Police resources, like the fire 
service, can be deployed independent of the centre with messages and requests from the 
incident made to local service controls. The Swedish system to operate and function 
correctly therefore requires a local incident site co-ordination centre. 
The Swedish system is therefore centrally co-ordinated at inception through the 
training, development and support of local Incident commanders yet operates in a 
localised and sometimes geographically very remote environment in practice. 
Observation suggests that having the central learning foundation and common support 
system enables the information and decision process to work effectively. Central 
despatch and incident co-ordination through joint control rooms reinforces these 
features helping ensure all the players work to the same script. 
The capacity to handle information and make decisions across a broad spectrum of 
likely incidents again emerges as an issue, in a similar way to the Netherlands. 
However, the independent despatch organisation is a new phenomenon. Observations 
did make it apparent that a distinct separation between the control centre organisation 
and that of incident command existed. During a practical exercise it was also observed 
that the fpcus for the incident was firmly in the Incident Commander's mobile 
headquarters, a vehicle that was equipped with radio and data information sources. The 
practice suggests that experts attended at the scene rather than attempting to influence 
outcomes from a remote headquarters. 
It was concluded from observation that there were difficulties in conveying information 
between all the agencies involved. The difficulties were particularly apparent at the de-
briefing session following the exercise, where it became obvious that the Central 
Controller had a differing view of the casualty requirements to the Incident 
Commander. 
Again one common feature in Sweden was that, like the Netherlands, it is the Swedish 
fire service that assumes responsibility for incident co-ordination within a locally based 
municipal system, supported by the regional authority. This is the obvious structural 
difference between these two countries and the UK together with the engineering 
foundation of many senior staff and frequent multi-disciplinary working. Culture is 
therefore important, although clarity of command exists through the designate of the fire 
service as the lead authority. 
3.4.3 Incident Command System, United States of America 
In the USA following development in California, a system of command, referred to as 
the Incident Conmiand System [1CS] 43 , has long been favoured. ICS was introduced 
particularly for wild land firefighting 44 where large numbers of volunteer fire 
departments, which are not routinely involved with large incident command, are 
required to provide mutual aid [There are around 35000 fire departments in the USA 
and very few are of the UK scale]. Co-ordinated decision-making in such an 
environment is therefore difficult 45 , as the crews are not familiar with each other's 
operating practices. The primary component of ICS relates to a common terminology 
where all major functions are pre-designated so enabling all the various organisational 
elements to be standardised. The following activities are envisaged: - 
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Function Description 
The size and complexity of the incident is allowed to dictate which 
Modular Organisation functions need to be staffed so that the operation can expand or contract as 
necessary. 
The plan is to establish various radio networks such as command, tactical 
Integrated and air-to-ground networks with clear text or plain language messages 
Communications 
Since a multi-fire department response is involved, all departments must 
Unified Command unify under one Incident Commander 46 so that maximum use can be made 
Structure of all resources and all tactical operations can be co-ordinated. 
A consolidated action plan is the objective of the unified command system 
Agreed Plan where all the strategies are inter-linked. 	 Defined spans of control are 
introduced so that individual responsibilities do not become over extended. 
The approach required to manage the incident includes the basic activities 
Designated Incident of establishing a command post and an incident base together with various 
Facilities staging areas or sites where equipment could be stored so that there were 
facilities to meet the need. 
All resources are pulled together either as single items e.g- bulldozer or as 
Firefighting Resources task forces and strike teams. 
A 	 logistic 	 organisation 	 is created 	 to control 	 the status, 	 i.e. 	 assigned, 
Resource Management available or out of use, of all equipment and resources. 
TABLE 3.1 FUNCTIONAL TERMS USED IN USA INTEGRATED 
COMMAND SYSTEM 
ICS also determines organisational elements: the cornniand-person, or persons, 
responsible for information and safety-liaison; commanders in charge of all ground and 
air resources to identify incident development and resource availability together with 
technical support and logistics officer[s] who provide for all the services, 
communications and the general facilities needed. Finally cost administrators, who 
maintain records of all time allocated by the various fire departments, are engaged to 
ensure that subsequently the cost of any claims or procurements can be financially 
resolved. Similar system development has occurred for community response 47 . 
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Elements of ICS could, therefore, be helpful if incorporated into the UK system. The 
value of a brigade being a "Learning Organisation" would assist incorporation. 
ICS is therefore a recognisably systematic approach to incident management, similar to 
that used by many operational organisations 48 . The management process in the UK, as 
already described, expresses command and control in three distinct levels of decision-
making. The ICS approach could, it is hypothesised, be envisaged in a UK environment 
as five inter-related tasks: - 
1. The operational task being conducted within the areaof activity. 
2. The co-ordination of resources to support the operational task activities. 
3. The functional organisation i.e. the fire brigade responsible, providing the 
infrastructure and corporate resources. 
4. The mechanistic activities of monitoring what are happening, dynamically assessing 
the risk and potential for change in the operating environment and considering 
alternative strategies. 
5. The review or audit process that ultimately looks at the situation, the effectiveness 
of the operations conducted and designs practice or procedure modifications that 
consequentially influence or change fundamental operational policies. 
3.3.4 Review of ICS in Practice 
Uniquely the ICS decision process was subjected to the events of 11 September 2001. 
Two fire departments, The City of New York Fire Department [FDNY] in its response 
to the World Trade Centre, New York City, New York State, and Arlington County Fire 
Department [ACFD] in the State of Virginia, at the US military facility, The Pentagon, 
were involved. The nature of these events, with the unprecedented scale of the World 
Trade Centre structural failure and extensive scope of command interactions, has 
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allowed preliminary evaluation, since far more detail than is publicly accessible would 
be required, of ICS in practice. Details are described in the Appendix. 
Importantly both events have been subjected to external investigations and personal 
comment has been obtained from the Chiefs of both departments affected to allow 
evaluation of the effectiveness of the system in action. This is very valuable since both 
incidents took ICS beyond the more usual mutual aid operations of wild land or 
structural fires. Since ICS adopts a systematic decision process it offers a foundation 
for postulating improvement in the UK fire services' operational decision-making. The 
following comments on both incidents identify weaknesses that need to be addressed in 
any improved system. 
Following the World Trade Centre the McKinsey Report 49 and Chief Cruthers 5° of the 
NYFD reported that the New York State mandated command system, which has 
variations to the ICS processes described, did function effectively. ICS strengths were 
common terminology, manageable spans of control, modulated organisation and 
integrated communications. Chief Cruthers believed the local variation of having one 
leader rather than unified command was preferable. Fire Department deployments on 
site were undertaken using magnetic boards and grease pencils, although the department 
is now experimenting with a prototype ruggidised computer. 
Military assistance in logistics, communications and technology, like robots and 
geographic information systems, greatly aided operations. Aerial and thermal 
photography and use of global positioning systems also proved invaluable in the very 
extended post incident phase when identifying and accurately plotting locations on the 
extensively damaged and very large site, to support tasks such as recovery of human 
remains, was required. 
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ICS was seen to need more institutionalisation within routine operations with better 
preparedness [training, preplanning, hazard assessments] and improved scalability 
[matching the dynamics of such large scale events by maintaining critical decision and 
safety systems]. The ability to conduct risk assessments in real time, matching 
personnel accountability, information management, incident communications [radio 
traffic, staff deployments, logistics] and inter-agency functionality [unified command, 
mutual aid, information sharing and inter communications], were crucial learning 
outcomes for the decision-making processes. 
The McKinsey Report emphasises these communication difficulties concluding that 
they hindered the fire department's chief officers as they co-ordinated the responst 
Initially little reliable information was available and some portable radios failed to work 
within the high rise structures due to repeater malfunctions [repeater systems amplify 
and rebroadcast the radio signal]. There was a lack of information to the chiefs on what 
was happening in and to the structures so, for example whilst television was 
broadcasting extensive coverage, some officers within World Trade Centre 1 were 
unaware of the incident's progression. Consequently they had little precise background, 
such as the second aircraft hitting the second tower leading to the fire and ultimate 
collapse of that tower, with which to manage their assignments. The complexity and 
quantity of information flows, compounded by the difficulties of inter-agency working 
[there was spasmodic police and fire communication and a significant uncoordinated 
response of volunteering mutual aid, for example], resulted in serious resource 
management problems. 
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NYFD outcomes recognise that ICS use therefore needs expansion. This will target 
support for Incident Commanders so that crucial decision functions can be undertaken 
in a comprehensive, well-defined and flexible way. McKinsey also suggests that highly 
trained specialised teams may be needed to manage the larger and more complex type 
incidents with the Department's Operation Centre being extended into a fully 
functioning emergency operations centre. Planning is also seen as an essential 
component and so are improvements in communications infrastructure and the 
deployment of technology. 
The After Action Report [AAR] 5 ' prepared on the response by Arlington County to the 
September11 terrorist attack on the Pentagon, as well as describing the activities of a 
number of agencies, identifies a number of learning points. Importantly Chief Plaugher 
of the ACFD reported 52 and the AAR concurs that the ICS and unified command was 
understood, implemented effectively and operated successfully. This is notable given 
some participants, for example the military, were unfamiliar with ICS yet were able to 
work closely with the identified Incident Commander, who was then able to offer 
explicit information in support of an holistic response. 
However difficulties did emerge in communication support operations, central to ICS, 
in that the ACFD did not have a dedicated mobile command unit and, from initial 
response to tactical operations, almost all aspects of communications were problematic. 
Cellular telephones and radio channels became saturated and even handheld portable 
radios were not interoperable [between fire departments and other emergency 
responders]. Logistically the scale of the event was overwhelming with short-term 
shortages occurring in critical high demand items like breathing apparatus. Mutual aid 
helped overcome these logistic issues as the incident progressed. 
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Other areas worthy of improvement were found to be better control of those individuals 
or organisations who responded on their own initiative to the incident, improved 
physical facilities to harden and better equip control and communication centres to 
handle emergencies; better interoperability in field communications, stronger and more 
organised logistics management; and improved co-ordination in managing health related 
issues, including emergency medical services and receiving hospitals. 
It can be postulated that although these incidents, particularly in New York, had unique 
features there is clear evidence that the well-defined command decision-making process 
was essential in maintaining action impetus in what could have- been chaotic and 
disestablishing situation for the fire service. What is also evident is the decision system 
is dependent upon an equally crucial and reliable information communication system. - 
3.5 Summary 
The current overall fire service management approach might be characterised as 
progressively using modem business management and organisational concepts, 
including recent developments in information technology, in all operating environments 
including the fireground. 
Although the service remains highly focused and task oriented with a ranking system 
for managers designed around the hierarchical processes of the fireground and the 
requirements of command and control, there are clear indications of a culture that uses 
conventional and appropriate business methods. 
External commentators have however indicated that this existing culture is still inhibited 
in making progress. That change has occurred is also recognised by those same 
commentators who most recently recorded that 'excellent examples of change and new 
working practice exist'. 
One such example is illustrated by the Cheshire case study shown in the Appendix in 
which the achievement of the Investors In People and Charter Mark awards 
demonstrated that cultural change can be accomplished and benefits derived for the 
management of incidents. 
The international comparisons also show that it is practical to have working alternatives 
to the current decision making processes. One alternative, the USA ICS approach, 
operates throughout a range of differently scaled fire departments and has been 
subjected to the most demanding of operational scenarios. These arrangements are now 
under intensive evaluation following the tragedies of September 11th. - 
The international review also illustrates that the culture and managerial organisation can 
be at variance to that existing in the UK and still result in effective incident 
management. The risk of creating a less effective decision-making system by moving 
towards a normalised business or commercial operating style is not so great as some 
traditional fire service managers may caution. This leads to a conclusion that there is no 
one or perfect way, rather evolution and experimentation with established best practice 
options from a range of industries and services is practical and may offer a more 
optimised arrangement than currently exists. 
Transferring these conclusions into a UK context allows the examination of options to 
improve critical decision-making. Three case studies are reviewed in Chapter 4, which 
reflect the observed weaknesses in the fire service systems used in the UK. Combining 
the common features found internationally and in the UK is then used to help postulate 
an improved operational decision-making system. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Key Case Studies 
4.1 Introduction 
Earlier chapters have outlined both from an historical and legislative background the 
importance of auditable decision-making and how that decision making process might 
be improved using modem business methods. To illustrate the importance of these 
factors three case studies are cited to exemplify and demonstrate areas of weakness. 
The author was present as Incident Commander at each incident. In addition, since all 
three involved hazardous materials, commonly used emergency action procedures are 
considered and reported upon separately in the appendix. - 
In one case, that involving Associated Octel, the incident narrative supplied by the 
author has, together with five other contributions from experienced police, prison, 
military and an airline commanders been academically examined as part of a specific 
study related to the psychology of command as an aid to developing command skills for 
aspiring commanders'. 
4.2 Shell Stanlow, 
Chiorofluoroaniline (CFA) Reactor Explosion 
At 03:24 hours on Tuesday 20 March 1990 Cheshire Fire Brigade Control 2 was advised 
that an explosion had occurred at 03:22 at the Shell Stanlow (CFA) Plant. Standing 
instructions3 
 required a pre-determined attendance of 15 pumping and other special 
appliances. The fire resulted in a number of injuries and ultimately one death, with 
considerable damage to the CFA Plant. 
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The plant control room staff had noted a rapid rise in temperature and pressure in the 
batch reactor and despite their action in applying additional cooling an explosion 
occurred causing extensive damage to the plant and injuries to six staff. In particular 
the control room was extensively damaged and key staff in the room injured and 
confused. The impact of a control room loss is significant as the inquiry into tragic loss 
of 167 lives on Piper Alpha in 1988 reported4 . 
Figure 4.1 Fire at Shell, Stanlow Refinery (Aerial View) 
Aerial view showing destruction of reactor area. 
The batch reactor was in an open range petrochemical production plant consisting of 
reactors, process and distillation vessels, with associated pipe work over ground and 
four upper operating platforms to a height of 30 metres and covering an area of 25 x 35 
metres. The plant produced chemical intermediates for use in the pharmaceutical and 
agricultural industries. 
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Arriving fire crews found a serious fire already spreading to adjacent plants by radiated 
heat, running burning liquids and fragments from the explosion. The top of the reactor 
was found 220 metres away and the barrel of the reactor was completely flattened. A 
major firefighting attack was mounted using national foam concentrate stocks from a 
specialist company located some 80 miles away from the site. Environment Agency 
monitoring of the off-site effects from firefighting water was a further requirement 
The explosion itself had extensively damaged the plant contrbl room. The loss of the 
control staff, due to injury, left firefighters without essential information because no 
prior detailed information existed on the number, types and quantities of chemicals 
involved. This was partially due to the plant involved being used for batch rather than 
continuous manufacturing and the consequent hazards presented to health both on and 
off-site could not be obtained. In addition knowledge of the exact stage of chemical 
reaction could not be defined since instrumentation had been damaged and key staff 
injured and removed from site. Local information immediately available indicated that 
firefighting uniform, with gloves, were adequate and that personnel committed into the 
plant and directly exposed to the chemicals should additionally wear breathing 
apparatus and a protective chemical suit. There was little detail on the site's general 
risk information card, partly because of the complex nature of the site. 
• Environment Agency - Successors to the National Rivers Authority, Her Majesty's Inspectorate and 
Pollution and Waste Regulation Authorities - River House, Waterside, Drive Aztec West, Almondsbury, 
Bristol BSI2 4UD 
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What was quickly established was that large quantities of Xylene* 
 and  Toluene*  were 
freely flowing into pipe tracks that run around the site. The fire was ultimately located 
as having commenced5 at a reactor, number R7601, which was not involved in a 
continuous process, but was used for individual batch processing. Some of the 
chemicals involved in the reaction process were subsequently, after the fire, found to be 
6618 kg of liquid dimethyl acetamide, 37.5 kg of solid trimethyl ammonium chloride, 
3375 kg of solid potassium fluoride and 4850 kg of liquid dichloronitrobenzene. Thus, 
unknown to the fire service, a significant carcinogenic hazard had existed. Table 4.1, 
compiled by the author, illustrates some of the range of washes, solvents, catalysts and 
products involved and illustrates information that should have been available prior to 
the incident. - 
During the firefighting operations a number of personnel were committed close to the 
plant to apply cooling and foam making jets. Subsequently, all personnel were 
subjected to medical surveillance, which required them to provide blood and urine 
samples. In the weeks that followed the incident, a number of personnel indicated they 
were suffering various symptoms as a result. One month after the incident one 
firefighter suffering from a chest complaint had an X-ray that showed a shadow on his 
lungs. Five personnel complained, over a week after the incident, of mouth ulcers. One 
member of staff subsequently died suffering a heart attack following surgical 
complications to treat a fractured leg. A study, post-incident, revealed that the cause of 
• Xylene. Mixture of Xylene isomers C 6H4 (CH3)2 and ethyl benzene C 6H5C2H5• Colourless liquid. Flash 
point 22.8°C. Auto. Ignition Temp. 464°C. UN number 1307 Specific gravity 0.86 to 0.87 Vapour density 
3.66 
Toluene. C6H5CH3 A colourless, flammable and toxic liquid. Flash Point 5 °C Auto. Ignition Temp. 
535 °C UN number 1294 Specific Gravity 0.87 Vapour density 3.18 
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the explosion was a previously unknown exothermic reaction and that there was an of f-
site impact. 
CAS No. SUBSTANCE B.P. °C F.P. °C 
611-06-3 2.4 DICHLORONTTROBENZENIE 258 112 
127-19-5 DIMETHYL ACETAMIDE 165 70 
75-57-0 TETRAMETHYLAMMONHJM CHLORIDE 
- - 
7447-40-7 POTASSIUM CHLORIDE 1420 - 
108-88-3 TOLUENE 111 4 
67-56-1 METHANOL 65 12 
367-21-5 3 CHILORO 4. FLIJOROANALINE 230 149 
25167.93-5 MONOFLUORINATED CHLORONITROBENZENIE - - 
TABLE 4.1 CHLOROFLUROANILINE [CFAJ PLANT PRODUCTS 
This was an incident where, after the event, a substantial amount of relevant information 
was uncovered and demonstrates that for petrochemical plants it is extremely important 
to maintain a robust record of information that will be available for firefighting crews 
immediately upon arrival even if the central control room is damaged or destroyed. 
Lord Cullen who led a formal inquiry into the Piper Alpha disaster noted that on the 
platform the initial explosion put the main power supplies and control room out of 
action. The system for control in the event of a major emergency was rendered almost 
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entirely inoperative. He suggested that even though remote but potentially hazardous 
events had been envisaged there remained a need for a systematic assessment, in the 
form of a safety case, to help demonstrate potential major hazards risks had been 
identified and appropriate controls provided. In the Piper Alpha incident control room 
staff were also injured and confused by the initial explosion. One was knocked 
unconscious to the floor and the other thrown violently across the room. The control 
room itself was devastated with debris and damaged equipment. The designated 
emergency operating system, which included a general alarm to all staff and immediate 
response by a team of key personnel, was consequently almost entirely inoperative. The 
loss of the system meant little command or control was exercised over the movement of 
personnel. - 
Parallels exist to the Shell Stanlow incident. At that incident again it was the plant staff 
that had primary knowledge of the current state of the batch process and, more 
importantly, the hazards from the substances involved. However, since they were 
injured and were removed from the site the valuable knowledge they had and the safety 
control system for the plant was rendered inoperative. This demonstrates that not only 
must all the necessary information be protected and available, it must also be in a user-
friendly form for other, expert and non-expert users. Without that information and 
control and command system decision-making is extremely difficult and safety critical 
events have a real potential increase in risk. 
The provision of information for such plants where unexpected and unusual events may 
occur is, of course, extremely relevant to brigades. In this case, had a fuller range of 
product information been available and the hazards likely to be encountered by a 
M. 
significant number of firefighters known, this would have resulted in a significantly 
different tactical approach. This case study confirms the findings of the HSE report of 
the fire at Brightside Lane, Sheffield, in 1984, where significant information failures 
were identified 6 
 including the difficulty of recording actual decisions made at the 
incident and demonstrates that, in this respect, little had changed between 1984 and 
1990. 
At Brightside Lane a very large warehouse and transit shed were destroyed over two 
days with several hundred firefighters being engaged for over six days. Rapid fire 
spread, the inability to identify what materials were involved, lack of communications 
and information about water supplies and health concerns subsequently raised by 
firefighters all contributed to an operation that was not best controlled. The HSE report, 
which also looked at off site asbestos risks to the public arising from the smoke plume, 
identified that owners or occupiers of similar large buildings needed to obtain 
appropriate information about potentially hazardous materials and make this readily 
available to the emergency services. 
The HSE had noted that the fire service acted with apprehension and uncertainty 
unaware as to what was exactly involved. Better information would have helped the 
decision process since in some cases the information held was six years old and did not, 
for example, reveal the inadequacy of the water supplies. In addition despite exemplary 
provision of equipment there were identified failures to follow accepted designated 
fireground tasks and widespread departures from breathing apparatus practice. 
Command, control and communications appeared to fail and linked to the lack of up-to-
date information this created the serious difficulties identified. 
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The need to enter any 'at risk area' to gain information on hazardous materials or 
weaknesses that might allow fire development through close visual observation, which 
are required for decision-making, poses considerable physical risk to the personnel 
involved. Reducing this risk using other visual reconnaissance methods, which are 
available, such as consideration of remote and robotic vehicle information gathering is 
discussed in a later chapter. 
4.3 Warrington Gas Works Terrorist Explosion 
Shortly before 04:00 hours on Friday 26 February 1993, close to Warrington Fire 
Station a loud explosion 7 alerted firefighters to a fire that had occurred at the adjacent 
gas works. Over 709 telephone calls were recorded concerning the incident. 
The site was of 7.6 hectares containing on one side three low-pressure gasholders of 
total capacity of 5,660,000 cubic feet of natural gas, and on the other side in a fenced 
compound, ten high-pressure [350 psi] natural gas* 
 storage cylinders and distribution 
valves containing a total of 500,000 cubic feet of natural gas. The premises themselves 
were listed as a major hazard [CIMAH 8] site because of the volume of stored gas and 
remote monitoring facilities installed. Opposite the high-pressure units was a public 
housing estate, which included the multi-storey homes of elderly residents. 
Immediately after the arrival of the firefighters one of the low-pressure gasholders 
suffered a catastrophic failure of the roof with the gas venting vertically. Whilst 
• Natural gas. Methane 88-97%, other hydrocarbons, carbon dioxide and nitrogen 3-12%. Molecular 
weight mean 17:1 8g/mole. Lower flammability level 5.0 upper level 15.0. Boiling temp. 109 ° K. critical 
temps. 19 1 °K. Heat of combustion 50,01 Old/kg. 
lEt] 
substantial, the radiant heat caused no injuries, and only the blistering of the surface of 
the adjacent and relatively undamaged gasholder that was half full. 
All three of the low-pressure gas holders on site were of the common telescopic 
construction, whereby gas is contained within the holder by means of a water basin 
housed in a below ground pit. The severely damaged holder subsequently rapidly 
descended into its pit after the complete evacuation of the gas into an aerial fireball. 
Investigations revealed that an explosive device had been placed on the upper part of 
this vessel. 
Figure 4.2 Warrington Gas Works (Roof Failure) 
A further device had been placed under the high-pressure storage vessels. Damage 
caused by the explosion of this device resulted in the severe deformation of the high-
pressure storage vessel holding cradle but no structural failure occurred. 
Advice regarding the determined safe evacuation distances around this particular high 
hazard site were obtained from the safety plan, developed from an industrial accident 
scenario not an act of deliberate sabotage, indicated that little hazard was predicted to 
exist beyond the site boundary. Despite this preplanning assessment the Incident 
Commander determined that the risk posed from a sudden release of natural gas in a 
fireball was significant enough to order an evacuation of adjacent properties. During 
the incident, information was not available of engineering assessments of the level of 
hazard when malicious explosions were the initiating event. On this occasion the 
absence of such advice was noted as an information shortfall for future reference. 
Subsequently, further research that was undertaken, by both a private consultant 9 and 
the University of Central Lancashire' ° , to identify the appropriate levels of evacuation 
in the likely worst-case hazard scenarios. Details of this study are contained in the gas 
dispersion appendix. The first survey indicated that the additional hazard posed was 
much greater than that advised initially by British Gas to satisfy the then CIMAH 
regulations and it was clearly possible for a relatively modest breach of containment to 
create a jet flame capable of causing damage well beyond the site boundary. Table 4.2 
indicates the scale of a likely critical breach from either of the two low-pressure 
gasholders on site. There was also a clear possibility of a fireball of significant energy 
being formed. A separate and a distinct area of concern to fire brigades are the risk 
created when flammable gas is released into the atmosphere. Dispersal patterns, under 
these circumstances, place the gas within its flammable limits. 
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Gasholder 1 2 
Maximum total volume, [m3] 12,687 16,935 
Critical diameter of the breach, [m] 4.7 5.1 
Total area of the critical breach, [m2] 16.3 19.8 
Critical volume of the gas, [m3] 6,090 8,130 
Critical mass of fuel, [kg] 2,820 3,765 
Total outflow time for critical breach, [s] 15.6 17.1 
TABLE 4.2 PARAMETERS OF A CRITICAL BREACH [UCLAN' °] 
The second element of the research project undertaken by the University of Central 
Lancashire took these conclusions further. This report considered not only a terrorist 
attack on a natural gas holder but also on a liquefied propane or butane storage vessel. 
Again, the studies revealed that there could be the development of a considerable 
fireball and that under such circumstances a risk did exist of deaths occurring some 
distance away from the storage vessels. This information has been developed and 
incorporated within a further study relating to fire service plume monitoring. This has 
added to the available body of information and resulted both in a reconsideration of 
effective evacuation distances for such storage vessels and the redesign of site 
operations. 
If the vapour cloud is ignited immediately, it may burn as a rising sphere, usually 
referred to as a "fireball". Rapid combustion of vapour clouds as fireballs has been 
observed in a number of incidents. The fireball is usually formed if the flammable 
cloud is fuel-rich, so those non-premixed regions of it burn in a diffusion regime. 
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The main parameters to be predicted for assessment of hazards from a fireball are: 
• Fireball diameter 
• Fireball duration 
• Thermal flux at the fireball surface 
• Heat radiation from fireball at different distances 
• Hazardous zones corresponding to various thermal fluxes 
Three cases were chosen for further analysis with the gasholder supposed to be filled to 
its full capacity before the accident, after which it telescopes dowñuntil all the gas is 
released into the atmosphere: 
• Case 1. Fireball of total fuel mass of S tonnes. This corresponds very approximately 
to the lower limit of possible flammable fuel quantity after the rapid release. 
• Case 2. Fireball of total fuel mass of 10 tonnes. This corresponds to severe damage 
to either gasholder with all the fuel released into the atmosphere. 
• Case 3. Fireball of total fuel mass of 20 tonnes. This is the worst possible case 
when both gasholders are damaged simultaneously. The separation between the 
gasholders is small compared to the typical fireball diameter (about 100 m), so it is 
supposed that fuel clouds escaping from both gasholders form a single fireball. 
The characteristics of the fireball are summarised in Table 4.3. It can be seen that in all 
cases the fireball diameter exceeds lOOm and fireball duration is about lOs. 
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Case 1 2 3 
Mass of NO, [kg] 5,000 10,000 20,000 
Maximum fireball diameter, [m] 103 129 162 
Total fireball duration, [s] 7.5 9.0 11.0 
Height of the fireball centre, [m] 77 97 121 
TABLE 4.3 PARAMETERS OF THE FIREBALLS IN CASES 1-3 {UCLAN' °] 
Using these results the impact of the fireballs were then calculated and are shown in 
Table 4.4. Translated into practical fire service personal risk values, the original reason 
the information was requested at the Warrington incident, the hazard becomes evident. 
This data show that the fireball constitutes a very serious hazard because its thermal 
radiation can be dangerous for people at distances of up to 160 - 350 metres. Radiation-
induced ignition of wood can occur at distances of up to 90 - 155 m. 
The information available to the fire service at the time of the incident was seriously 
flawed in estimating the likely worst-case scenario, and the company, at the time of the 
incident, had difficulty locating an engineer qualified to consider possible catastrophic 
failure of the storage vessels. Powerful lessons from previous experience underlie these 
comments. Again Lord Cullen after the Piper Alpha disaster in 1988, when 167 lives 
were lost following fire and explosion, not only recommended changes to the entire 
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Distance from centre of gasholder, [m] 
(Heat flux, [kW/m21) 
Zone Expected effect Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 
(5,000 kg) (10,000 kg) (20,000 kg) 
1 Woodignition 91 118 155 
(26.7) (26.6) (26.4) 
2 75% lethality - - 35 
(69.3) 
3 50% lethality 
- 31 65 
(65.1) (57.2) 
4 25% lethality 23 54 90 
(63.3) (53.7) (46.5) 
5 10% lethality 43 72 109 
(51.6) (44.6) (39.4) 
6 1% lethality 66 99 144 
(38.0) (33.0) (28.9) 
7 First degree burns 126 179 252 
(16.9) (14.5) (12.4) 
8 Pain threshold is 165 250 345 
reached for unprotected (10.0) (8.5) (7.0) 
skin by the end of the 
exposure 
TABLE 4.4 HAZARDOUS ZONES SIJM1VIARY FOR NATURAL GAS 
FIREBALLS [UCLAN' °} 
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safety organisation for the offshore industry but also emphasised the critical nature of 
the safety case and overall control process at major emergencies. The use of predictive 
information in such a scenario as this is clearly of the utmost importance for public 
safety. Information on fireballs, which could be directly used in this type of case, is 
readily available from primary scientific sources. The need for the fire service to have a 
relevant database that allows it to be involved and contribute meaningfully at the pre-
planning stage is also evident from this incident. 
4.3 Associated Octet, Ethyl Chloride Reactor Spilt and Fire 
	 - 
On the I February, 1994 at 20.23 hours, a reactor solution, see Table 4.5, was released 
from a re-circulating pump at the base of a 25 tonne ethyl chloride reactor vessel at the 
Associated Octel Company site in Ellesmere Port, Cheshire. 
CAS UN LIQUOR PRODUCT EAC B.Point F.Point 
75-00-3 1037 ETHYL CHLORIDE 90-95% 2WE 12.5 -50 
7647-01-0 1050 HYDROGEN CHLORIDE 2% 2RE -85 - 
16603-84-2 1756 ALUMINIUM CHLORIDE 0.1-1.5% 4X - - 
TABLE 4.5 LIQUOR PRODUCTS AT ASSOCIATED OCTEL [HSE11 ] 
A dense white cloud was produced which began to move off-site. The fire brigade 
attendance was initially directed to provide cooling around the reactor vessel and to 
project water sprays to help dilute vapour. At 22:08 hours the flammable vapours of the 
ethyl chloride ignited, causing a major spill fire, which was extremely intense around 
the base of the reactor. This fire continued to burn for a considerable period of time and 
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was extremely hazardous to all the firefighters involved. Adjacent to the reactor site 
was a chlorine plant and within the general arrangements on site, were sodium and 
chlorination plants and a lead alkyl plant manufacturing tetramethyl and tetraethyl lead 
used with associated compound blending materials to produce anti-knock products for 
the petrochemical industry. There was a considerable exposure hazard with 17 
pressurised vessels containing chlorine, the nearest vessel being approximately 40 
metres away from the ethyl chloride reactor. 
Figure 4.3 Fire at Associated Octel (EC Reactor) 
On arrival, firefighters using information from on-site personnel dressed in chemical 
protection suits and breathing apparatus, entered the cloud and sought to isolate the 
plant and stop the flow. Subsequently, at 21:10 hours, a manager arriving on-site 
recommended that foam should be laid to inhibit vapour release. Whilst this process 
was underway the ethyl chloride ignited and flashed back to the pump area alongside 
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the reactor. This fire burned extremely fiercely with three large vessels containing 
quantities of reactants remaining within the burning area. One of these vessels had an 
intumescent cladding designed to withstand fire engulfment for about two hours. At 
23:00 hours, as a further precaution, a partial shut down of the entire factory was started 
and neighbouring factory sites were given advice to start removing personnel from 
nearby areas. 
Off-site a full procedure was already underway to try to alertindividuals to the possible-
risk as the plume continued to grow from the combustion. There were, subsequently, a 
small number of complaints of ill health and some staff did display s9mptoms consistent 
with exposure. Far more importantly there was considerable public alarm, which 
resulted in the Health and Safety Executive [HSE] conducting a full enquiry into the 
occurrence. The subsequently published HSE report" indicated that the risk assessment 
process had not considered the particular dynamic elements that had occurred. In 
addition, undue focus had been given to one major hazard (the risk of an environmental 
toxic cloud) and this over-concentration had created the situation where other hazards, 
such as the highly flammable nature of the solvent, were overlooked. In particular, the 
HSE concluded that there had been improper use of the Hazchem code [2WE] [See 
Appendix for further explanation] for a storage facility. This code is intended for 
material being transported and here resulted in the use of water spray on a pool of 
highly volatile flammable material with a boiling point close to ambient temperature. 
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4.4 Health and Safety Executive Report into The Chemical Release at the Associated Octel 
Company Limited - Action by the Cheshire Fire Authority. 
One outcome, particularly relevant to the fire service, was that having witnessed and 
assisted in the investigation on behalf of the Cheshire Fire Authority a series of ten 
actions to improve operational response to major industrial incidents were proposed. 
These are contained on page 45 of the official HSE report and reproduced below. 
The Cheshire Fire Authority's previous concerns about the handling of industrial major 
hazard emergencies were reinforced by this incident. These concerns centered on the 
provision of information, firstly to the public and secondly for - those involved in 
handling the emergency. The Chief Fire Officer has taken the following actions: 
(a) lessons learned from the incident have been discussed at a liaison panel providing 
an opportunity for the Fire Service to discuss initiatives with members of the Cheshire 
chemical industry and others involved in the planning and provision of the emergency 
response; 
(b) having reviewed the policy of evacuation or shelter for the local population, the Fire 
Brigade has produced a leaflet and video promoting a shelter policy and explaining the 
action to be taken in the event of a major accident The video is for use in schools and 
the leaflet is being distributed to all residents within North Cheshire and to those near 
similar major hazards elsewhere in Cheshire; 
(c) introduced a new electronic mailing facility which will allow the Fire Brigade to 
quickly update local TV and radio stations, who have agreed to broadcast the shelter 
message and other information during an emergency; 
(d) secured agreement to use the Cheshire County Council "information point" system, 
11I 
which is a staffed 24-hour telephone contact point, as an emergency "hotline" which 
will allow callers to obtain the latest information personally; 
(e) following successful trials, there are plans for electronic mailing to link the 
emergency services, DOSEC and the site operator; 
run trials involving a lap-top computer in the cab of the fire fighting vehicles, on 
methods of storing and quickly retrieving hazard information for fire fighters. More 
detailed technical information is required for complex major hazard sites and Cheshire 
Fire Brigade have initiated a research programme into what can be provided. Currently 
available expert management and hazard information systems have already been 
reviewed and new systems may be developed; - 
(g) given consideration to introducing a "tiered" Brigade response to industrial 
incidents to encourage site operators to call the Fire Brigade more readily. The tiers 
suggested are: 
[ijincidents occurring on-site with no potential to go off-site; 
[ii] incidents with the potential to go off-site but without major risk of harm to the 
public; and 
[iii] incidents which are likely to go off-site with potential to harm the public. 
There are both advantages and disadvantages, which are to be carefully weighed before 
implementation; 
(h) reviewed the current site warning arrangements and is encouraging the use of sirens 
throughout Cheshire to a standard specification to avoid confusion by the public 
(i) begun to review, with a number of agencies, Cheshire Fire Brigade's overall 
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response to environmental risk incidents and will shortly enter a joint partnership with 
the National Rivers Authority for dealing with waterborne pollutants; and 
(j) he has commissioned the Defence Research Agency to create an operationally viable 
robotic vehicle for use in major incidents. 
4.5 Evaluation of Case Studies 
All three case studies occurred on hazardous sites subjected to legal enforcement and 
demonstrate a range of difficulties concerning information flow. In each case there was 
information available but it was not in a suitable form to aid fire service decision-
making. Some information accessed was not understandable or did not arrive in time to 
be acted upon in terms of the development of the fire process. Some information was 
inaccurate and had a real potential to harm. Most of information available was 
unsuitable for public and fire service use simply because it was not in a user-friendly 
format when presented on a fireground. These case studies, derived from personal 
experience of specific incidents, together with the support for the conclusions offered by 
externally independent reports, suggest decision-making and data support for the fire 
service can be improved. This supports the hypothesis that to improve the management 
of the fireground a staged change and technically improved communication strategy is 
necessary within the organisational culture. The necessity of a balanced information 
flow, which does not overload the Incident Commander but ensures that he is in 
possession of all major relevant facts (here, this could include procedures for providing 
information to correct the miss-labelling of materials), is developed further within this 
thesis as part of its findings and recommendations. 
In evaluating the case studies a number of key themes emerge. Overall these may be 
characterised as the missing of safety critical information at times when positive action 
is essential if risk is to be reduced. The information loss itself may occur either at the 
pre-planning stage or during the actual incident. Similarly, information loss may arise 
because of an absence of good analysis, poor presentation of available data or the failure 
to predict all likely events. These losses may result from weaknesses in understanding 
the specific circumstances involved and hence the potential hazard or from weaknesses 
in understanding the products, processes or materials involved. Research and the 
consequent systematic assessment and identification of risk controls systems are also 
likely contributors to information loss if they are not effectively conducted. 
The complex nature of some hazards does require expert interpretation, using for 
example chemical or engineering scientific foundations, and there is a requirement for 
subsequent translation and communicatiop into suitable presentations for non-expert 
users or alternatively robust provision of that expert advice. The ability of the decision 
management system to withstand catastrophic events like explosions and acts of 
terrorism is also exemplified, and this extends the requirement for worst case planning 
scenarios to go beyond the normally predicted industrial failures. 
Many such events are often fast moving and the immediate observed hazards can create 
false priorities suggesting inappropriate responses with the real risk being far less 
apparent and the visual signals misleading. There is also the real danger of 
misinterpretation when events that appear to be similar to previously experienced events 
have in fact originated from completely different causes and may therefore evolve in a 
completely different way. 
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Once engaged in operations, decisions need to be recorded and communicated 
efficiently so that scenario planning is updated and remains accurate. Maintaining 
recordable decision sequences for subsequent audits is an important feature given the 
stated legal responsibilities. These arrangements also assist command and control, as 
systems are constantly being evaluated and monitored. 
The offsite impacts, with the allied public interactions, also need effective evaluation, 
again based on systematic worst-case scenario planning, so that responses designed to 
mitigate or prevent harm are efficiently applied. The whole process can be aided by 
technology subject to it being able to withstand the rigours of operational demands and 
present information in logical, timely and easily recognised format. - 
It is suggested from this evaluation that improvement in the operational decision-
making process could arise if the following specific summarised activities received 
greater attention. 
High quality risk analysis 
• Methods to effective presentation of all available data 
• Accurate event prediction 
• Sound understanding of the data and manufacturing processes involved 
• Accurate evaluation of actual incident circumstances 
Identification of potential hazards both prior to and during incidents 
• Pre-planning with effective data research 
• Continuous systematic assessment of risk 
• Identification of risk control systems 
RYA 
Engagement of sector knowledge specialists 
• Translation of specialist knowledge for various end users 
• Provision of a robust information system 
• Matched dynamic response to evolving event situation 
• Process based identification of misleading information 
• Accurate prioritisation of actions to meet evolving scenarios 
• Avoidance of responses based upon superficially similar events 
Recording of command decisions and circumstances 
• Continuous monitoring and evaluation of command communicatipn system 
• Effective offsite environmental monitoring 
• Effective transfer of information to external agencies and the public 
Examination of these issues is therefore uhdertaken in the context first in the decision 
support systems used in the fire service in Chapter 5 and then with possible decision 
management tools in Chapter 6 including enhancement of management decision-making 
using technology in Chapter7. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Decision Support Systems in the Fire Service 
5.1. Introduction 
Accurate information is a key requirement for effective decision-making. This Chapter 
explores decision support systems. Already the legal requirements placed upon fire 
brigades and Fire Authorities under occupational health legislation' and through the 
extant principal Act 2 have been described. Each requires the, sccuring of information to 
enable the decision-maker to identify hazards rapidly and formulate possible attack 
strategies on arrival at the fireground. The provisions of Section 1, Subsection (I), 
Paragraph (d), of the Act provide direction for, and place a duty on, the gathering of 
such information. The process, by which specific information on premises is gained 
under these provisions, is consequently referred to as a 1(i)(d) inspection. 
The process of assembling, analysing and presenting risk information to the firefighter 
is at the heart of the entire operational approach. Guidance on what constitutes good 
practice is not detailed; rather it remains the responsibility of the individual brigade. 
This appears unlikely to change. Various practices have consequentially emerged, 
which reflect, in part, the varying area requirements. Premise information stored and 
supplied depends upon assessments made by firefighters during 1[i] d inspections, thus 
the volume and quality of the information stored is largely determined locally. 
An Incident Commander at the fireground will also use qualitative risk assessment 
methods. Qualitative, rather than quantitative analysis, will be used not because of lack 
of time or facilities to make the necessary calculations but because dynamic risk 
assessment in fire service practice is used primarily as a basis for decisions. 
Quantitative methods are used elsewhere in the fire service to demonstrate, for example, 
that a particular safety or reliability criterion has been reached in, say, an alarm system. 
This is a practice that may change as more qualitative data emerges under the process of 
integrated risk management. 
Incident Commanders already use some quantitative information regarding, say the 
amount of toxic vapour escaping into the atmosphere, as and when required. In the fire 
service risk based assessment has previously been considered in the context of the 
fireground, as is the setting of priorities for the assignment and the allocation of 
resources. Determining the appropriate procedures required to reduce and control risk 
whilst acting dynamically in line with the developing situation generally produces 
decision-making characterised by naturalistic decision-making strategies. These have 
been recognised by the Home Office and are now included in the Home Office Fire 
Service Manual 3 . 
5.2 Risk Assessment 
The identification of hazards and the environment in which the fire service operates 
provides the basis for risk assessment with the overarching priorities to reduce or 
control risk and achieve the "as low as reasonably practical" [ALARP] principle 
adopted in the UK towards risk management. 
• Integrated Risk Management [IRM] is progressively being introduced during 2003 in the UK. It seeks 
to move away from prescriptive attendance standards [time bases on area categories with defined 
numbers of appliances] into assessed intervention or preventative actions designed to reduce fire deaths, 
losses or property damage. It therefore requires higher data inputs because the emphasis is on human 
losses, which have qualitative foundations for example in social and economic factors as well as historic 
previous activity data. 
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The present approach to risk assumes three broad stages. Firstly area categorisation is 
used to develop and overall provision throughout a brigade area. This has tended to 
focus upon the built environment although there are elements of specialised risk 
analysis for non-fire or large fire situations. Secondly static sites and transient modal 
movements are assessed and if judged to have potential are subjected to specific risk 
assessment. Thirdly the dynamic nature of the incident or the precise circumstances 
actually occurring or likely to occur are continuously assessed in a dynamic way to 
ensure the decision process reflects actual requirements. Each of these three elements, 
area, specific or dynamic needs a system of quantified analysis to support decision-
making. 
Generic guidance is helpful in this regard as it enables the matching of scenarios to safe 
systems of work, practices or equipment, such as the evaluation of operational tactics 
with the options of adopting offensive or defensive firefighting for example. However, 
since operations are often site-specific the requirement is for information within this 
context. Information overload at complex buildings is a real danger especially in the 
crucial first moments after arrival. Some premises, notably those involved in the 
manufacture, storage or handling of harmful materials, may hold significant and 
essential safety data that requires assimilation within the assessment process by the 
Incident Commander on arrival at the incident. 
Specific risks related to transportation also require consideration. It is also essential to 
review scenarios relating to acts of terrorism. In the recent past, post September I1th  in 
New York, these risks and the subsequent planning has been referred to in the UK as 
New Dimension [ND] activity to reflect the new dimension of planning for large scale 
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acts of destruction in which the terrorist is prepared to accept personal suicide. The 
hazards involved include major structural collapse of building and weapons or 
improvised devices capable of inflicting harm on large numbers of people from 
chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear [CBRN] attacks. Confronting likely ND 
events that present CBRN hazards and the consequent need for mass public 
decontamination has re-emphasised that fire service decision systems must have intra 
service and inter emergency service interoperability. These planning issues are further 
complicated by those dynamic changes, ongoing in any fire or at any incident, such as 
the release of chemical products or the products of combustion or new substances 
evolved through chemical reaction or physical decay of structures and materials. 
Personal and public protection and decontamination of property and structures requires 
considerable effort in the post attack phase where the engagement of other professions 
and services can be rapidly expanded. The decision and data support systems are 
vulnerable at this time unless robustness has been prepared and exercised. 
All this activity produces information some of which the Incident Commander needs to 
assimilate if he is to be able to continuously evolve the operational plan, a plan 
formulated in the knowledge that the data may contain inaccuracies and/or omissions, 
and that the set of circumstances faced may be unique. The need is for continuous 
updating without overload of non-essential material. 
The strategy, tactics and operations* adopted on any fireground are therefore usually an 
extension of existing practices, methods or procedures. Each is designed to counter the 
* Strategy is planning and directing the organisation to meet its objectives. Tactics are the deployment of 
resources to achieve the strategic aim. Operations are the plans, procedures and tasks undertaken to meet 
the tactical plan. 
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hazards met in, for example, chemical emergencies by the use of appropriate equipment, 
such as breathing apparatus 456 
5.3 Area Risk Assessment 
To assess likely operational scenarios, recorded information either on a 'Risk Card' or 
Vehicle Data Mounted System [VDMS] carried on a first attendance appliance will be 
reviewed en-route to the incident. The brigade, according to national guidance 7, will 
have carried out area risk assessment when categorising the initial standard of response. 
Hitherto UK fire brigades, either in hard copy or electronically, adhered to prescribed 
national standards, which reflected predominant risk in up to 5 categories of geographic 
area with an initial response in terms of the pre-determined first attendance defined by 
the number of appliances, up to 3, and the time in minutes of their arrival at any 
incident. As already mentioned this whole risk assessment process for fire cover is 
currently the subject of revision within a process of integrated risk management. 
5.4 Pre Response Risk Assessment 
Prior information provided to the Incident Commander is critical to the operational 
decision making process. His assessment and management are key components in 
avoiding or minimising risk to himself and his crew. Adopting a logical approach to the 
assembling and testing of acquired planning data is central to this task. Figure 5.1 is a 
decision tree approach to risk assessment, modified from a system developed by 
Cambridgeshire Fire and Rescue Service, which aids this process. 
Operational judgement is used, in conjunction with national guidance, to identify the number of 
personnel and type of appliances that should be sent to a premise as the first fire service attendance to any 
fire. This is referred to as the PDA or pre determined first attendance. 
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FIGURE 5.1 RISK INFORMATION DECISION TREE 
[MODIFIED BY DAVIS FROM AN ORIGINAL BY CAMBRIDGESI-IIRE FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICE BRIGADE] 
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The type of decision tree process detailed requires information to be assembled and 
assessed as likely, or not, to meet immediate needs of the service. Verification visits or 
further information is requested until a determination can be made, following risk 
analysis, as to whether the risk presented is low or medium to high. If the risk is judged 
in either of the higher categories then the details of the hazards are not only recorded but 
also essential elements, important to crews on arrival, are also transferred to the risk 
information system on appliances. The information stored can be promulgated to other 
anticipated users and a practical verification exercise conducted, to confirm planning 
assumptions. The process also requires evaluation of safe systems of work to meet 
projected hazards. Any deficiencies found in the evaluation will be addressed either 
through training, procedures or equipment so providing a designed attack strategy to-
meet the ALARP principles. This logical and evaluative process offers improvement 
over the generalised advice nationally available and introduces system reliability and 
quantification into the overall risk assessment procedure. 
This risk assessment process begins when, prior to the inspection, specific information 
about the premises, available through, for example, fire safety enforcement, is reviewed 
for relevant hazard data and co-ordination with prescribed operational procedures such 
as HAZMAT*,  is undertaken. Recorded data is also gained from the occupier of the 
premises or through inspection and is then referenced in a premise specific document 
generally referred to as a 1[i}[d] information. 
• HAZMAT is the term used in the UK and the English-speaking World to manage or refer to incidents 
involving HAZardous MATerials. 
+ 1[i][d] is a direct reference to the section within the Fire Services Act (1947) that provides the power to 
inspect premises for risk information. 
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Consideration of hazards identified during inspection according to a pre-agreed and 
determined procedure using the Health and Safety Executive process 8 allows priority 
criteria to be established for any particular premises and provides a systematic 
framework for the assessment of risk. This will reduce undesirable decision variations 
at the time of stress for the incident Commander, i.e. immediate arrival. Firefighters 
will then be aware of the hazards present during firefighting operations and allow 
decisions to be prioritised. For example, it is important to consider the likelihood and 
severity of fire spread. This will require identification and quantification of factors such 
as the probability of occurrence, the vulnerability of lives at risk, unusual or complex 
building construction and the storage or manufacturing of materials that are of a 
hazardous nature or require special procedures and strategies. - 
Occupiers and owners also provide essential information in various forms. A good 
example is the placarding systems referred to in the Emergency Action Code Appendix. 
The relevance of these systems developed for transportation and trade cannot be over 
emphasised. They offer in the foundation data considerable advice as to product 
behaviour and necessary personal protection. In a modified format some brigades, 
London and Cambridgeshire for example, provide static information for arriving crews 
in the form of notices on a range of harmful substances from biohazards to radiation. 
Information is gathered in the following broad areas: 
5.4.1 Buildings and Materials 
Fire safety inspection knowledge often includes layout plans and drawings. Many of 
those drawings may be stored using computer aided drafting (CAD) systems that is 
especially helpful to responding firefighters who may use them to aid rescue and 
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firefighting operations. The capacity to gain, store and deliver these plans to a laptop 
computer on site with the capacity to produce hard copy is of great significance in large, 
complex buildings. Development in this field has been rapid and examples exist, such 
as Strathclyde Fire Brigade's use of three-dimensional CAD property layouts, using 
coloured zones, to show hazards or important equipment like sprinkler system controls. 
Pre-planning centres on the understanding of the performance of building materials and 
construction and recognising from previous experience how different materials interact 9 . 
5.4.2. Manufacturing Processes 
It has already been stated that the contents within a building or the fire load will have a 
profound effect on the likely fire intensity and spread. A warehouse fire in Chester' ° 
demonstrated how a substantial fire loading could give rise to a rapidly developing fire 
front that produced considerable radiated heat and direct flame impingement at a 
distance. In this case the fire crossed an 18-metre wide street, ignited buildings on the 
opposite side of the road and produced thermal heat fluxes in excess of the 20kW/m 2 . 
Exposure to these radiation levels carried a lethality risk. Firefighters also need to know 
of the presence of any hazardous material or storage configuration, which may present a 
risk, for reasons of both personal safety and to allow them to devise an operational 
strategy. This point is well illustrated by the key case studies. 
Recording such information and recognising its value is an extremely important part of 
protecting both the individual and the wider environment. It is therefore necessary to 
ensure that, within any information system, the specific details of methods or structures 
designed to help containment of harmful products such as specially constructed bunded 
floors or interceptor systems for water spillage are given together with their method of 
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use. This approach affords the Incident Commander the opportunity to consider tactics 
of which he might otherwise be unaware, and therefore be more effective. The brigade 
should seek to ensure that full and complete records are kept on all sites and that these 
are available to the first response appliance on arrival. Sometimes this is practical at a 
site Security Lodge for access by the fire service on arrival. However at many sites, the 
Warrington incident is a case in point, this is not a viable or reliable option and access to 
data using risk cards or VMDS is the only robust option. 
5.4.3. Hazardous Substances 
Chemical emergencies present firefighters with special and specific health and incident 
management difficulties as the key case studies illustrate. Most UK and American 
standard reference documents, which list common chemicals and hazardous materials, 
are held in control rooms. The Emergency Action Code Appendix covers these issues 
in some detail. Provision also exists for fire control rooms to access the UK National 
Chemical Emergency Centre electronic data library held at Harwell. Industrial support 
through the CHEMIDATA" 12 system also assists. 
However, CHEMIDATA is neither the only nor, possibly, the best of the chemical 
databases. Individual brigades, such as Cambridgeshire Fire and Rescue, have decided 
to develop bespoke databases such as Phoenix. Klein' 3 outlines many other valuable 
sources, including Sax' 4 , a commonly held publication. In addition there will be 
available within fire control rooms, access to a wide spectrum of locally-generated 
information as well as that generally appropriate to incidents involving, perhaps, 
cryogenic liquids and many other materials stored at low temperature and high pressure. 
Other UK relevant systems are DOSE (Dictionary of Substances and their effects from 
the Royal Society of Chemistry) and CHEMBANK, both are Silver Platter information 
products' 5 
The behaviour of some materials may determine how and where they are stored. Some 
materials clearly must not be stored adjacent to, or within the same enclosure as an 
incompatible item 0 . Other materials, for example, agro-chemicals, require segregation 
and special storage facilities to avoid possible environmental contamination*tt7 
There is extensive guidance available from HSE on the storage of incompatible 
materials' 8 . This is essential support material. 
A system also exists for handling incidents involving radiation. These provisions, made 
under the National Arrangements for Incidents Involving Radiation [NAIR] 9,  ar 
intended to cope with circumstances such as road traffic accidents, or where individual 
members of the public find a radiation source, where radiation may cause a hazard to 
the public. The fire service has basic radiation monitoring equipment to deploy at 
incidents under a RADSAFE scheme. The present arrangements have worked but there 
are proposed new arrangements, made under the Radiation Emergencies Preparedness 
Public Information Regulations (REPPIR), to replace the old PIRER 2° regulations. The 
integration of these with brigade information systems should be undertaken in a 
controlled manner to ensure maximum safety of all concerned. 
• Oxidising agents and flammable materials would not be stored together. 
+ There are specific arrangements in existence, through trade and regularity controls, to bund and register 
specified stores containing agro-chemicals. 
tADSAFE brings together previous schemes such as the Nuclear and Industry Road Emergency 
Response Plan [NIREP) and the Irradiated Fuel Transport Flask Emergency Plan [IFTFEP]. The key 
principles of RADSAFE are early provision of general advice; guaranteed response, support to manage 
the media and ownership of the clean up actions. Three levels of response exist and the scheme helps in 
all transport related circumstances. 
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5.4.4. Chemical Decontamination 
Linked to chemical substances is the procedure of decontamination initially undertaken 
by the fire service. Personal protective equipment (PPE) is categorised for use by its 
degree of impermeability to chemical penetration. Development of protective clothing 
is taking place in most developed countries, to provide protection from new materials, 
to provide better protection from known hazards and to provide greater comfort and 
ease of use 21 . 
Within the fire service there is a considerable amount of information available on a wide 
range of decontamination procedures. For example, the use of breathing apparatus, 
chemical protective clothing, 22 ' 232425 ' decontamination 26 ' 27 ' 28 , and the use of foam, as 
well as many other extinguishing media. This is a complex and continuously 
developing area and it is important that new developments are incorporated within 
information systems as routine practice. 
5.4.5. Human Behaviour 
Human behaviour remains a developing area of understanding. It has obvious relevance 
to successful operations in, for example, understanding how individuals attempt to take 
refuge in the event of becoming trapped in buildings 29 . Further research is now 
apparent in the aviation, retail and nuclear industries although current knowledge and 
guidance still includes a study that was published in 1946, namely the 1946 Post War 
Building Studies 30. New studies have been commenced post September 11th 
 by the 
Office of the Deputy Prime Minister. Research initiated by the author 3 ' has also 
demonstrated the effectiveness in raising safety standards through increasing public 
awareness and education. 
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5.4.6. Climate and Geography 
In considering the location of any particular risk, it is necessary to evaluate the local 
microclimate and geography. This is necessary because of the very localised variations 
that do occur. Premises may be constructed upon a relatively porous material base 
presenting environmental risk should loss of containment occur for a particular harmful 
chemical or combustion product. At an elevated site a major spillage will create a risk 
if, for example, the site is adjacent and above residential accommodation. 
Understanding the impact of this local geography is extremely important and reference 
needs to be contained within a risk information profile of the local geography and the 
way it will impact a hazardous occurrence. The microclimate likewise requires 
recognition, especially when harmful releases [including smoke] occur 32. - 
The local microclimate may also differ markedly from the general climate, the most 
noticeable factor usually being wind direction or temperature 33 . This information may 
be a major factor in determining whether or not a particular incident is hazardous to a 
large number of people. Understanding local variations in climate and how that climate 
will interact with any hazardous material release may be important. By way of 
example, a marine environment may, with a slightly higher wind and relatively dry 
aspect, lower the airborne pollution risk. Conversely, if subject to a sea mist and low 
wind speed the situation may be particularly dangerous, as it allows hazardous gases to 
concentrate into a dense, slowly moving plume. Systems such as CHEMINET' are able 
to predict the general effects of meteorological influences, identify local conditions and 
• CHEMNET is the free scheme provided by the UK Meteorological Office to the emergency services 
that will offer immediate and supportive advice on the likely impact of weather conditions upon clouds or 
plumes of hazardous airborne materials. 
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inter-relate those local conditions to the circumstances being faced, and as such have 
distinct operational advantages. 
5.4.7. Reconnaissance 
An essential element of all dynamic operations is the reconnaissance conducted by the 
Incident Commander. This activity provides the background data to all assessments 
relating to operational actions. The reconnaissance is not always conducted personally, 
both due to scale and other responsibilities, but it is essential. 
5.5 Operational Decision Making in Practice 
Whilst a hazard may remain constant, and hence may be assessed and documented, it is 
the circumstance in which that hazard is encountered by the firefighter that ultimately 
determines the actual level of personal risk. Risk arising from a hazard may change 
significantly with circumstance and there is now considerable guidance 34 ' 3536 ' 37 in the 
UK on risk assessment at the fire ground. To meet changing hazards the fire service 
introduced a dynamic assessment process for use on the fireground 38 and a summary of 
this inclusive approach is shown in Figure 5.2. 
Probability and prediction remain notoriously difficult to quantify in the fire service-
operational environment partly because there is little real documentary evidence or 
historical fact upon which combinations of hazard and circumstance can be subjected to 
recorded analysis as exists in other industries. This is demonstrated by the earlier key 
case studies and it is clear that the risk assessment process requires a hazard information 
system capable of further expansion, particularly where the same chemicals in different 
combinations pose very different risks. Klein 39 suggests that it is because of these 
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inherent unknowns that experience and personal protective equipment assume such 
importance for the fireground. 
EVALUATE THE SITUATION, TASK AND ASSESS THE CHOSEN SYSTEMS OF WORK 
PERSONS AT RISK Assess the chosen systems of work. 	 Are the risks 
Consider questions, such as: proportional to the benefits? 
• 	 What operational 	 intelligence is 	 available e.g. • 	 If YES proceed with the tasks after ensuring that: 
Risk Cards, t(l)(d) sheets, fire safety plans; is it • 	 Goals, 	 both 	 individual 	 and 	 team 	 are 
current and reliable? understood. 
• 	 What tasks need to be carried out? • 	 Responsibilities have been clearly allocated. 
• 	 What hazards are there in carrying out the tasks • 	 Safety 	 measures 	 and 	 procedures 	 are 
in this situation? understood. 
• 	 What risks are associated with these hazards to • 	 If NO continue as below 
firefighters, other emergency service personnel, 
the public and the environment? INTRODUCE ADDITIONAL CONTROLS 
• 	 What resources are available e.g. experienced Eliminate, 	 or 	 reduce, 	 any 	 remaining 	 risks 	 to 	 an 
personnel, appliances and equipment, specialist acceptable level if possible, by introducing additional 
advice? control measures, such as: 	 - - 
• 	 Use of PPE e.g. safety glasses, safety harnesses 
• 	 UseofflA 
• 	 Use of specialist equipment e.g. HP, TL 
• 	 Use of Safety Officer(s) 
SELECT SYSTEMS OF WORK RE-ASSESS 	 SYSTEMS 	 OF 	 WORK 	 AND 
• 	 Consider the possible systems 	 of work and ADDITIONAL CONTROL MEASURES 
choose the most appropriate for the situation. If any risks remain, does the benefit gained from 
• 	 The 	 starting point 	 for consideration 	 must be carrying 	 out 	 the 	 tasks 	 outweigh 	 the 	 possible 
procedures that have been agreed in pre-planning consequences if the risks are realised? 
and training. • 	 If the benefits outweigh the risks, proceed with 
• 	 Ensure that personnel are competent to carry out the tasks. 
the tasks that they have been allocated. • 	 If the risks outweigh the benefit do NOT proceed 
with the tasks, but consider viable alternatives. 
FIGURE 5.2 DYNAMIC RISK ASSESSMENT 38 
Upon arrival at the fireground, and subject to dynamic risk assessment, the Incident 
Commander formulates a basic operational strategy and determines required resources. 
This strategy is fundamental to the successful control of the incident. Basic knowledge 
and guidance is available in the Manuals of Firemanship, supported by local standard 
operation procedures and enhanced through competency-based training. Safety remains 
a key component throughout the incident with continuing dynamic risk assessments 
conducted to take account of the changing working environment. 
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Activities like finding the most common fire-fighting medium, water, also used for 
decontamination is an example of where a standard operating procedure is supported by 
technology. Water supplies are subject to routine hydrant inspection (in which hydrants 
are examined for ease of access, occasionally flow tested and repaired if damaged, all 
being recorded). Water and River Authorities routinely use geographic information 
systems [GIS] extensively for describing layouts of mains and valve positions, such as 
hydrants, and management of land drainage and as a method of forecasting flooding and 
avoiding environmental risk. The fire service already finds these GIS systems helpful 
for routine inspection management. Incorporating GIS registers into operational data 
systems has clear advantages since these can be further enhanced with other 
information, such as water pressure, to allow early determination of the number of 
additional pumps required at larger incidents. This entire aspect of mapping overlays 
has rapidly developed and many organisations and commercial systems exist, many 
containing useful fire service data. These systems aid decision making by reducing 
variables and confirming likely resource requirements. Many other standard operational 
procedures exist. Some are routine, such as those related to the use of breathing 
apparatus and well understood others, such as ship firefighting, are used infrequently. 
Even routine procedures, railway safety and access for example, can become 
unpractised and require a system of information support. Importantly each supports the 
decision process by ensuring a well rehearsed and practical series of working evolutions 
can be undertaken with a realisable and predicted outcome based upon resource inputs 
that empirically have a demonstrated success. 
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5.6. Data Support Systems 
The identified sources and requirements need to be incorporated into any decision 
support system. Table 5.1 details a range of information system components already 
mentioned. For information to be useful, it has to be delivered in an appropriate and 
timely way. The volume of information involved will vary between areas and from 
brigade to brigade e.g. the number of premises recorded. However, many common 
elements exist given the national characteristics of the UK fire service where much of 
the procedural, tactical, equipment and hazard information systems are developed and 
promoted nationally. The comprehensive use of information - technology, it is 
hypothesised, represents a practical approach available to the fire service for managing 
the data bases considered. Significant loopholes, such as data applicability, apply and 
raising the integrity of data quality is a required step in how these are closed. 
The strength of the risk assessment process, which forms an accepted part of fire service 
procedure is that crews should be familiar with the system they have helped compile 
and the hazard data is presented in user friendly and relevant way. However there is an 
observed weakness that despite having data in the cabs of responding fire appliances it 
does require frequent updating and on occasion is overlooked. This is especially true of 
hard copy data due to their physical location or the difficulty in reading them en route to 
an incident. The significant improvement of Vehicle Mounted Data System [VMDS] 
computers is that the risk information is routinely updated automatically and copied into 
the brigade control room, so that it can if desired be activated by the turnout instruction 
and presented in a format that is easily read under various light conditions whilst on 
route. 
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Data Component Available Remarks 
Risk Assessment Nationally defined system framework Systems 	 used 	 on 	 the 	 fireground 
capable of strategic and dynamic use. require 	 an 	 interactive 	 process 
involving communication between 
all of those agencies involved. 
Hazards Risks to firefighters, occupiers, the The source data is varied between 
environment and premises identified procedures, practices and hard copy 
by inspection and data collation. recorded 	 data. 	 Some 	 IT 	 links 
(CAD) exist but not many. 
Identification Systems Statutory 	 marking 	 of 	 hazardous Changes occur frequently. Failure to 
materials 	 and 	 substances 	 both 	 in identify 	 correctly 	 may 	 introduce 
transport and static models. exceptional harm. 	 Many systems 
are hard copy with limited radio 
transfer of additional information to 
the firegiound. 
Operational Practices Highly 	 defined 	 and 	 frequently The recall of essential elements is 
practised 	 operational 	 practices 	 are critical to firefighter safety. 
	 Hard 
sometimes complex and infrequently copy limits usefulness. 
used in real environment. - 	 - 
Buildings and of The 	 built 	 environment 	 with 	 fire Building materials and construction 
Materials safety 	 management 	 services 	 and are critical factors in fireground risk 
systems is highly regulated but not assessment. 
transferred 	 to 	 operational 	 pre- 
planning and therefore not readily 
available. 
Manufacturing Subject to risk inspection process and Manufacturing processes may fail in 
Processes headline risk information gathered. abnormal circumstances and require 
detailed knowledge to ensure safe 
operational tactics. 
Hazardous Substances Wide range of proprietary and Effective action phase codes but 
specially designed systems of limited detail for protracted 
support. operations. 
Fire Science Well documented but limited Knowledge of combustion products 
practical use to firefighters due to including heat flux and toxicity 
small scale of tests. needed to assess risk to firefighters 
and general population. 
Climate General synopsis easily available. Local factors may have a profound 
Plume models IT based. effect. Models are not routinely 
translated into local operational 
environment. 
Geography Improved mapping, GIS and IT Useful for identifying features 
systems now available, concerning spread of pollution and 
media supplies such as water. 
Human Behaviour Not well-documented or available for Practices, educational messages and 
fireground use. review essential for public safety. 
Reconnaissance Currently conducted at risk by A high priority requirement for 
firefighters with little visual successful incident management. 
monitoring. 
TABLE 5.1 INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENTS [DAVIS] 
Table 5.1 summarises the main information system components derived from this chapter. 
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Another advantage offered by VDMS technology is that it requires a centralised 
compilation process that introduces a structured review of the information gathered with 
appropriate quality control procedures so adding considerable integrity. For example, 
with the extensive guidance available on the transportation of hazardous materials 4041 , 
and the complexity of industrial technologies it is becoming increasingly important to 
have systems available to the firefighter on the fireground which contains a large 
amount of fire safety information in a comprehensive and user-friendly form. Hard disc 
and CD ROM storage formats have proved to be realistic methods of carrying the 
amount of information required, with ruggidised laptops offering a practical accessing 
device. In addition because the electronic format is more easily managed, headquarters 
or control room staff can routinely copy loca)ly produced information for wider 
distribution thus sharing information and increasing options for emergency service 
interoperabi lity. 
5.7. Command Process 
The purpose of command*  and control is to ensure adequate command of operational 
resources and safe and expeditious control of operations 42 in circumstances that might 
involve considerable stress 43 . The key person in the entire command and control 
process is the Incident Commander 44 . This individual may be a part or full time officer 
since it is the scale of the incident that usually determines the rank of the Incident 
Commander, although the complexity of the problems faced may require different 
ranges of skills. Considerable responsibility is placed on the Incident Commander, 
irrespective of the incident size or the scale of any operational resources, as the fire 
* Command - the authority for an agency to direct the operations of its own resources. 
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senior fire officer present, must exercise full responsibility for the safe and expeditious 
management of the incident until he is relieved of that command by a more senior 
officer. 
Integrating the information support system to ensure effective command also requires 
an efficient communication pathway. It is along this pathway that information essential 
to tactical decisions or tasks and designed to limit events and lead to a return to safe 
conditions, will be passed. Effective control, however, requires knowing what. 
resources0  are available and how they may be assembled quickly to aid the operation. 
The control process, therefore, requires the gathering of all - relevant resource 
information, including the current status or deployment of any resources. Figure 5.3 
shows the more important features of the command process developed in 1996 for use 
in Cheshire Fire Brigade45 . This process was successfully introduced and used 
effectively at a number of major incidents prior to the publication of national guidance. 
5.8 Command Organisations 
Command is exercised through organisation of personnel on the incident ground 4 . For 
example the Police secure an outer cordon and the fire service record all individuals in 
the inner cordon, see Figure 5.4 developed by the author. 
+ Control - the authority to direct strategic or tactical operations in order to complete an assigned function 
and include the ability to direct the activities of other agencies in the completion of that function. 
o Resources in this context are not those solely within the control of the fire service i.e. appliances and 
personnel. They include other physical and human resources available from other services or agencies, 
e.g. sandbags, specialists or lifting equipment. 
* Incident ground or fire grounds are common terms to describe the working area in which operations are 
being conducted. The area is usually physically denoted but not necessarily indicated. It may therefore be 
a house with the immediate environs of the street outside or an open space like a forest. Identification 
may be marked using tape or simply be the yard of a factory. It each case entry will, however, be 
controlled for safety and operational freedom reasons. 
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FIGURE 5.3 COMMAND PROCESS [DAVIS] 
5.9 Logistics Support 
The Incident Commander is assisted by an established organisational support and 
decision structure through the appointment of designated officers. See Table 5.2 
compiled by the author. This indicates that logistics management is a key feature in 
determining a successful outcome at a major incident. This challenges the assumption 
observed in the current UK approach of seeking to use only operational i.e. firefighter 
trained rather than specialist or support staff at incidents. Whilst questions of technical 
interpretation and extended availability do arise in using non-firefighting staff this sort 
of human resource related issue is managed in many other organisations operating in a 
continuous service environment. Integrated communication technology permits the 
wider use of supportive logistics from remote suppliers and could be further exploited to 
assist in this activity 
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FIGURE 5.4 INNER AND OUTER CORDON [DAVIS] 
The control of the inner 'at risk' cordon by the fire service and police supervision of the outer 'secure' 
cordon helps provide a safe and unrestricted operating environment. 
Close liaison is maintained with the other emergency services' and with competent 
authorities, like the Health and Safety Executive and Environment Agency, since these 
are the statutory enforcing authorities for individual areas of major incident related 
legislation. 
'The police, for example, who use the designations of gold, silver and bronze to identify their individual 
responsibilities for strategic, tactical and operational command. 
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Incident Commander Responsible overall for Fire Brigade operations at the incident. 
Forward Control Responsible to the Incident Conm -iander for all operations within the Inner 
Officer Cordon. 
Support [Control] Responsible for co-ordinating all resources including personnel and support 
Officer tasks. 
Sector Officers Responsible for direct executive command and control over operations and 
safety procedures for a geographical sector of the incident. 
Safety Officer Responsible for the overall safety of all persons operating within the Inner 
Cordon. 
HAZMAT Officer Advises the Incident Commander on all matters relating to special procedures, 
the gathering of information and safety at hazardous materials incidents. 
Water Officer Ascertains water requirements; identifies supplies and initiates action to deliver 
the required amount. 
Foam Officer Ensures that foam supplies and equipment are readily available in order to 
commence and sustain a foam attack. 
Marshalling Officer Identifies a suitable rendezvous point at which appliances, equipment and 
personnel can be assembled prior to being committed to the scene of operation. 
Liaison Officer Establishes contact with other emergency services and outside agencies in order 
to give advice and guidance on fire brigade operations and to assist a co- 
ordinated and combined response. 
Communications Establishes and maintains data and voice communication between the Incident 
Officer Control 	 with 	 Brigade 	 Control 	 and 	 seeks 	 to 	 establish 	 reliable 	 voice 
communication between the Forward Control, Support Control and Incident 
Commander and those other fireground officers identified. 
BA Officer All actions concerning breathing apparatus activities. 
Fire Investigation All matters relating to the investigation of a cause of fire, the compilation of 
Officer reports, and interviewing of witnesses. 
Salvage and Damage Organises staffing, equipment and any other measures that are necessary to 
Control Officer prevent or mitigate damage to property, materials etc. by carrying out damage 
control 
Press and Media Advises the Incident Commander and prepares statements for press and media 
Officer representatives relating to the nature and scope of the incident, progress of 
operations, and other such approved information. 
Ships Stability Officer Establishes liaison with ship's master and harbour officials and monitors all 
aspects of ship stability arising from fire fighting operations. 
Pollution Control Initiates action by fire brigade personnel, and secures liaison and assistance with 
Officer other agencies aimed at preventing pollution of the environment 
TABLE 5.2 DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF OFFICERS [DAVIS] 
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At large incidents there is frequently the need to divide the incident ground into 
sectors46 , for example the rear and front of a building. These divisions introduce further 
leadership levels, help in managing the Incident Commanders span of control and allow 
retention of strategic control of operations, leaving individual officers at the actual 
scene of operations to action any necessary initiatives. To remain efficient any 
responsibility overlaps created must avoid confusion, duplication of effort and wastage 
of resources. Sector officers must understand the overall aims within their individual 
operational sector of responsibility if there is to be a comprehensive and cohesive 
operational plan. Effective, fast and robust communications help avoid unauthorised or 
inappropriate action and provide an integrated incident management process. 
It is important to highlight that the dynamic nature of incidents requires the same 
principles of command and control to operate at small and major incidents. 
Examination by the author of major incidents and the sequential escalation of both the 
population affected and resource inputs utilised provides the type of continuum 
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FIGURE 5.5. INCIDENT COMMAND CONTINUUM [DAVIS] 
5.10 Working with other Agencies 
In the United Kingdom there is no one agency that is charged with total delivery of 
'civil protection', although the Home Office leads civil protection planning 47 . This is 
not the same in all European countries. The consequence is that, when accidents or 
disasters occur, there has to be co-ordination and, to an extent, interoperability in 
communication systems whereby all those organisations, which can contribute to the 
safe resolve of the emergency, can work together effectively 
The fire service role predominantly involves the rescue of casualties and the utilisation 
of special skills to extinguish fires or deal with hazardous or chemical materials. 
Essentially, its role is to render areas safe and to recover casualties. Military aid may 
also be available to local authorities under the provisions of Military Aid to the Civil 
Community. 48 A significant number of other agencies are also involved in various 
aspects of emergencies such as the Maritime and Coastguard Agency and the 
Environmental Agency which may be the statutory enforcing authority for a particular 
area. As described in the previous chapter provision also exists for brigades to access 
specialist advice and information on hazardous materials. In addition, non-governmental 
or charitable agencies and volunteer groups, e.g. the Salvation Army and the Red Cross, 
often give support at major incidents. Industrial support may be available, particularly 
in cases involving hazardous sites, airports 49 or widespread pollution where, for 
example, the petrochemical industry may offer assistance. 50 
This multi-disciplinary approach at major incidents can result in complicated patterns of 
communication of information between all the active agencies 52 and the consequential 
decision system. For example, in a town centre terrorist attack, all emergency services 
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will be gathering information concerning individuals who may be lost or injured. 
Creating one access point, the Casualty Bureau, to handle that need and to respond 
sensitively to public requests demands specific technological and management 
techniques. The pattern also emerges of dependant decision-making where the actions 
and decisions of one organisation impacts upon those other agencies involved at the 
incident. The concept that has evolved and is now incorporated into practice is that of 
the crisis team 'big table' meeting at which all the senior representatives meet 
throughout the event to consider action phases and future strategy. In this way the 
multi-disciplined team is unified in command, contributes or is involved in essential 
information exchange and participates in decision making. 
On the incident ground responding emergency services invariably co-locate mobile 
incident command units at one incident control point to aid joint working. Control of a 
major incident is usually retained under police supervision, either in the Force 
Headquarters or at some pre-agreed location such as local police station. Difficulties 
can arise if, for example, reliance is placed upon the capacity and capability of the 
normal communication system to withstand the heavy traffic pressure generated by an 
incident. Pre-planning tries to compensate by cross messaging between the various 
services' own information networks. This preparedness for major events, such as 
Chernobyl 53 , has continuously evolved over a period of fifty years into a defined 
response now referred to as "integrated" 54- a process in which individual agencies plans 
fit into a collective area plan using the individual services' day-to-day response as a 
foundation [This allows the response to be constantly tested, requires limited special 
resources to implement and can be regarded as robust]. 
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The integrated response is structured to offer a mutually supportive response involving 
all the emergency services, appropriate departments in Government and local 
authorities, voluntary agencies 55 , commerce and industry. Home Office guidance as 
detailed in Dealing with Disasters (Dealing with Disasters Together in Scotland) is 
specifically drafted to aid this planning process, which is co-ordinated under the 
chairmanship of the Chief Constable for the area concerned. The practice is to establish 
a Senior Emergency Liaison Committee, which periodically meets and discusses issues 
of common concern and involves senior officers of the various emergency functions and 
local authorities. In the UK there is also significant input from Public Health 
organisations, such as the National Health Service and Hospital and Ambulance Trusts. 
The current arrangements have developed from the philosophy that emergency response 
should be an escalation of day-to-day activities whereby those resources, which are 
generally available and used routinely may be utilised and expanded rapidly at times of 
extreme need. Again the outcomes of September 11th  has questioned this conventional 
wisdom and in the USA a separate co-ordinating department, Homeland Security, has 
been created by the Federal Government to lead overall strategic planning. In the UK 
the Government has reviewed civil contingency planning at the UK level and is 
considering new legislation to enhance control and inter agency working. These 
reviews are vital since experience has now shown that any graduated response assumes 
continuation of existing systems, like telecommunications that failed in New York. 
Experience therefore suggests special arrangements are needed to safeguard inter- 
For example extensive planning was undertaken to avoid failure of electronic systems during the 
millennium date change in 1999/2000. 
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governmental and emergency service communications, through the ECN 4 and satellite 
mobile and terrestrial telephone networks. These emergency arrangements also include 
access to television and radio broadcasting, providing an information route to the public. 
If frequently used, all these systems give a higher level of integrity to communication 
infrastructure. This interagency activity places considerable pressure on any fire service 
decision system yet is essential. Technology, although itself vulnerable, does however 
appear to offer the only realistic option. 
'Emergency Communications Network. The ECN is a Government terrestrial telephone system that is 
hardened against significant damage and provides a secure, if basic, communications path between 
essential government and emergency services. 
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5.11 Observed Lessons of the Integrated Response 
Arising from field observations over many years Table 5.3 summarises factors that have 
been routinely identified as creating some decision making tensions: - 
ACTIVITY OBSERVATION 
Central Co-ordination Information is needed by a range of users and collected from a range of 
sources. Regardless of the fire service role, i.e. whether it has primacy of 
control or not, the Incident Commander is unlikely to be in the same place 
as all the data. The data available is unlikely to be routed through one point. 
Incident Complexity In complex incidents the time-scales as the incident develops, event 
parameters and individual service response or needs, are unlikely to 
coincide in a way that enables a simplified information system to be 
sustainable. The action phase may be intensive or protracted or both, the 
available resources and skills may be adequate or overwhelmed, and 
separation and lack of an effective communications system may confuse the 
transfer of data between groups even within the same service. 
Decision Making Discretion to determine action may be local and immediate, or require 
reference to remote commanders. Other users of service resources, e.g. 
health using fire, police using fire, fire using local municipal authority, etc.,- 
can give rise to tensions (who has priority), duplication (the resources have 
other commitments) and responsibility (typically for expenditure, control 
and legal consequences). Creating framework protocols to enable practice 
to be effective on the ground requires teamwork, knowledge and 
experience. 
Collective Response Strategy and co-ordinated tactics and operations require that balanced 
judgement is exercised by all of the participating players. Declaring 
implicitly or explicitly which service has ultimate decision primacy is 
important. The issue that then arises is whether the "controller" has access 
to all relevant information. If the controller is remote this questions the 
validity of whether decisions determined in the analytical environment of 
the remote control centre be implemented and will incident outcomes be 
accurately relayed back to enable effective strategy evaluation. 
Public Evacuation An important consideration when the public are at risk is whether to 
evacuate an area. Practical considerations argue for a shelter policy, rather 
than evacuation since moving people, especially the old and ill, raises 
considerable collateral risks. It is concluded generally that staying in a 
known location with communications and support unless directly threatened 
or until planned evacuation arrangements are in place is the better public 
policy. 
TABLE 5.3 FIELD OBSERVATIONS OF INTERAGENCY ISSUES [DAVIS] 
• This was in the early 1990's a novel conclusion requiring a higher degree of public understanding. This 
was addressed through organised public events 2 and education using purpose-designed material, such as 
the 'get out, stay out and call us out' developed by the fire service for fire safety in the home. Validation 
was required since two messages would be presented to the public by the fire service. The first, for fires 
in the home, demanded evacuation of the home, the second for a toxic Leak required people to stay in their 
home. The research concluded 2 that receiving two messages, one relating to evacuation and the other to 
shelter, did not confuse children of primary school age. 
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5.12 Summary 
The fire service decision process described is multi-faceted and engages many agencies. 
Whilst some decisions may be pre-evaluated, being based upon information researched 
and pre-recorded with prescribed procedures and practices in place, a great number of 
decisions can only be made after arrival at the incident. The decision process must 
therefore have an effective support system. 
The information sources required for those decisions may be. simple to assemble and 
assimilate, or conversely dispersed and complicated to understand. The dynamics of the 
event therefore require flexibility and robustness. Easily accessible and reliable 
communications are therefore an essential component. To illustrate the decision process 
a simple flow diagram has been constructed [Figure 5.6]. The information gained will 
be shared both with other agencies and the public. Firefighters cannot function 
effectively without this integrated involvement yet they need to avoid overload and have 
timely based inputs. The data capture process is crucial, as are how the outcomes are 
presented and the audit trail preserved. 
The flow diagram illustrates that the operational decision is dependant upon features 
like liaison with other agencies; the fire service pre response activity e.g. specific data 
gained through the described inspection process, and dynamic assessments at the 
incident; information held by the other agencies both before and during the incident; 
resource dispositions [currently based upon area based risk cover and now changing to 
integrated risk assessment]; and the pre-planned responses of the fire service and other 
agencies integrated through command communications. The need to meet public and 
media information requirements is also evident. 
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FIGURE 5.6 A SYSTEMATIC APPROACH TO DECISION-MAKING [DAVIS] - 
Policy review through incident debriefing is also characterised. That policy process 
itself contributes significantly through standard operating practices and co-operative 
assignments with other organisations. The policy process also evaluates resource 
effectiveness as informed by the audit process and will also ensure the integrated 
personal development training system, designed to improve individual competency, is 
informed. 
Effectively this integrated mechanism confronts the established organisation in a 
number of ways. Earlier discussions have illustrated the importance of business culture, 
itself a product of traditional history and legislation. These shifts in management style 
can be profound introducing at one level new technology or at another devolved 
decision-making. Each contributes to an expectation of how decisions are to be reached 
and what form of data analysis or decision system is most appropriate. 
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This overall expectation and the nature of the established support system is central to 
how decisions are reached at a time when the individual Incident Commander is at his 
most vulnerable-when confronting a confused and life threatening situation. Current 
fire service organisations have evolved, rightly using empirical knowledge, but not 
necessarily with a critical or analytical objective in focus. That must now change to use 
technology in a more supportive and interactive way. 
Similarly those tensions observed in inter agency working and the need for good central 
co-ordination, together with recognition of the time and data analysis pressures on 
decision takers are unlikely to be sustained by simple communication networks. New 
working protocols and refined decision support systems are required with clearet 
understandings between all the involved players. As one illustration the decision to alert 
the public and advise them what to do in an emergency situation requires interpretation 
of technical data and a major public information activity by a considerable number of 
emergency service and other specialists. 
The accepted relationship between information management and information 
technology, now well established in using captured information in relational databases, 
it is postulated can be extended further with technology providing a support system to 
assist decision making through simulation and data manipulation, enabling the fire 
service to manage its intervention in a more proactive, rather than reactive, manner. 
• The importance of this task in demanding a first priority decision and therefore dominating action using 
resources and time must be recognised. The contribution of the policy to 'shelter' rather than evacuate 
can therefore relive the Incident Commander from significant demands. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
A New Decision Management Tool for the Fire Service 
6.1 Introduction 
Central to this study is the concept that operational decision-making can be improved. 
Understanding how command decisions are reached is therefore a pre-requisite to 
enabling that improvement both through command competepes and to understanding 
situational awareness. Presenting data so that the Incident Commander and his team 
might use it effectively depends on recognition of the relevant information and its 
presentation in a useable form and volume. 
Knowing how the data is used in dynamic decision-making is important and there are 
interesting parallels in military systenis, as US research demonstrates', where 
integrating information technology systems into command and decision-making 
processes aided the process thus confirming earlier observations regarding the 
importance of organisational culture, i.e. the continuous learning concept. 
6.2 Data Overload and Relevance 
Information overload is always a possibility for the Incident Commander who is faced 
with gathering data and planning operational strategies. Time pressured decision-
making heightens stress, which can degrade analytical skills and hence decision quality. 
Ehrhart describes the importance of the modem military command centre in supporting 
force level data fusion so that it can meet contingency operations and also indicates that 
it is extremely important for any command centre to pursue a layered approach of 
information presentation, so that the essential information regarding the battle in 
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progress, in the case of the armed services, is given with the minimum amount of 
necessary detail. This can be tailored to match the decision requirements of any 
individual preference. 
Ehrhart's work and that previously done by the US Airforce 2 contends that it is 
important to ensure that senior decision-makers working in a time sensitive infonnation 
environment only consult detailed information when it is required for a concurrent 
decision. He also notes that in certain areas, technologies, are under-exploited since 
system designers are unaware of the potential to assist command. 
Andride 3 in "Handbook for Decision Support Systems" emphasises the need for any 
decision support system to have its defining requirements specified in terms of the 
users, their tasks and the organisational context in which the decisions are to be made. 
Research by Lt. General Nelson of US Airforce 4 confirms the requirement to avoid 
overload, stating the importance of avoiding what he refers to as a "blizzard of options 
with complex selection trees" and focus instead on the simplicity required at the point 
where the information is to be used. 
This US research also relates to the interaction referred to in earlier chapters concerning 
both the cultural foundation and practical application options, usually found in 
established standard operating procedures or practices, available to an Incident 
Commander. The user profile, therefore, is quite critical to ensuring the right support is 
offered to the decision making process. This again confirms the importance of moving 
towards being an organisation that recognises the interactive relationship between 
Incident Commander and his command team. Further reinforcement of this essential 
point comes from the knowledge that the cognitive task requirement used, in 
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battlefield/incident management, will involve a number of commanders, some of whom 
do not interact extensively with the comnand system although they are working within 
the operational activity area. 
It is contended that in the decision-making context of the fireground the Incident 
Commander's position is essentially similar. In many countries of the world the fire 
service is formally part of the military (e.g. China, Russia). This is a different argument 
to that of Nea1 5 who states that many emergency planners have an almost para-military 
approach to disaster management since they were appointed in the cold war era and 
have continued that style of command management. 
Ehrhart 6 again makes the point that the task profile is itself a key part of the decision 
making process which will hinge on the commander's awareness of the situation and 
assessment of the options generated. In this context it is essential that in the planning 
process there is a shared agreement, a key outcome for the organisation of what all the 
commanders see as the evolving battle plan and the components of information they all 
need to make the plan work. This is a process of empowerment that enables decisions, 
based upon established guidelines or frameworks, to be deviated if this is desirable 
following a communication system failure that requires the local commander to act 
independently. 
Translated into fire service operations and the various officers deployed, including the 
Incident Commander, the information requirements are shown to be significant. The 
command team functions have already been detailed and show a range of support 
activities, each having specific data needs. The Incident Commander and those 
involved in the strategic, tactical and operational decisions have further requirements, 
123 
especially relating to the dynamic environment of the incident's progress. Those active 
at operations, the firefighters, have an important role in these requirements for both 
supplying data [e.g. what is happening inside the risk area which can only be entered 
with personal protection] and using the data [e.g. identifying a risk room or an item of 
risk equipment]. Tacit and explicit data therefore has value. 
In developing models for decision-making, Perry and Moffat 7 argue that there is a 
taxonomy of decision-making analysis, which has at least two attributes. The first is an 
attempt to measure understanding of how the decision-making mental processes are 
used and this effectively follows Klein's 8 model of primed deciion-making. The 
second attribute includes consideration of the extent to which the decision-maker 
operates within a context similar to that in which he normally makes real life decisions, 
that is, does the decision-making process correspond to everyday activity? 
Perry and Moffat constructed a model of decision-making through a study of naval 
commanders taking combat decisions. They attempted to identify what information had 
value and whether different commanders who were all senior, experienced naval 
commanders would take the same decision when confronted with the same information. 
They found that the commanders would make significantly different decisions at critical 
points even when presented with the same information in the same operational context. 
Their studies revealed that it was the form of presentation of the information that most 
influenced the decisions taken, and that proper presentation enabled a balanced view to 
be taken by the commanders. Table 5.1 identified the key components of information 
that would be used by the Incident Commander under such circumstances. 
They also noted that in combat, decisions had to be taken in the absence of full 
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information, which is analogous to the situation as experienced on the fireground. They 
concluded that when information was available it was relied upon and was considered 
valuable to the decision making process. This, to them, confirmed the fact that just 
because the information was not available it did not detract from the fact that the 
information had value. The distinction being drawn was between essential and valuable 
information. Situational awareness in this situation is primarily a local stimulation and 
may be satisfied by heuristics and recognition primed decisions based on previous 
experience. 
This distinction is important. The Incident Commander will• heed the essential 
information and it must be supplied. Useful information is supportive but not essential 
to bringing the incident to a satisfactory conclusion. In any fire service information 
system the difference between the two must be apparent, so ensuring a data hierarchy 
and reliability for use in operational decision-making. 
Perry and Moffat 9 also attempted to explain that the variance in decisiori outcomes 
related to the variation between the decision-makers rather than in the information 
provided. Key components here, appear to be both an understanding of how the 
individual would operate, recognising which external decisions were important and then 
placing the whole process within a realistic scenario. 
Neal's' ° research identifies that systematic research for over four decades has indicated 
that rigid bureaucratic command and control approaches to emergency management 
generally lead to ineffective emergency response, control being procedural and 
relatively inflexible perhaps. He suggests that flexible organisational configurations are 
likely to give a more effective disaster response, so supporting the goals of a learning 
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organisation. This is based upon his observations that poor disaster response is not a 
necessary consequence of departure from standard procedures that have been laid down 
to manage the disaster, but is more likely to occur because of the rigidity of the response 
process itself. His argument is that while bureaucratic approaches to command and 
control have led to a massive amount of literature on disaster behaviour, this is ignored 
or misinterpreted. Similar arguments might be presented to demonstrate why Incident 
Commanders frequently do not use available operational or technical brigade orders. 
Neal argues that a plethora of disaster studies debunk traditional misconceptions about 
how responses occur, and yet command and control systems continue to subscribe to 
disaster myths regardless. The assertion is that this tight command and control 
approach relies on a small number of cases, which are often anecdotally based. His 
preference therefore is for a human resource model, such as that presented by the 
Disaster Research Centre of the University of Delaware". These findings confirm the 
necessity, outlined earlier, for ensuring that fire personnel are trained in accessing 
information and have access to suitable information systems. 
Perloff 12  considers video conferencing for command and control, arguing that complex 
communication tasks are made easier if the commanders use interactive graphics and 
share documentation. He particularly argues that new compression technologies for 
information transmission could make video conferencing for military command and 
control possible under battlefield conditions. Given the dynamic nature of fireground 
operations such an arrangement could improve co-ordination and performance 
particularly where resources are dispersed with delegated control. Increased integrated 
imagery and document transmission facilities would similarly allow intelligence images 
and interpretations to be widely circulated so drawing forward a stronger interactive 
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response, especially from remote commanders, who could confer quickly and answer 
questions about particular assignments. 
These broad conclusions do not reflect the more recent introduction of computerised 
reasoning systems that seek to offer best practice derived from analysis of case studies. 
Learning systems of this kind appear to be in their infancy in the fire service, only one 
European pilot was found to exist, but they do appear to offer real potential. Linked to 
competency based training simulators safety critical dectsion making could be 
improved. In the interim evaluation of effective and predictable logic trees that trace 
known practice suggests the construction of new paradigms may pr&ide a foundation to 
improved decision making. 
6.3 Decision-Making Models 
Klein et al 13  considered complex naval command and control environments. He 
identified the use of recognition prime decision (RPD) models, which enable 
commanders to determine achievable goals using relevant clues with actions that 
typically work. RPD' 4 is categorised as allowing the commander to: 
1. Focus on his assessment. 
2. Aim to meet the situation satisfactorily, not necessarily perfectly. 
3. Usually act on his first option only. 
4. Develop a series of action plans. 
5. Be able to check his plan using mental simulation. 
6. Be able to elaborate and improve the plan as the process moved forward. 
7. Recognise that action is the primary activity of the decision-maker. 
Using a RPD approach the Incident Commander implements a viable series of actions 
without lengthy deliberation. The process involves "situation awareness", a state of 
knowledge where there is a perception and comprehension of elements within the 
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operational environment and anticipation of their future status. It was found that 87% 
of decisions were developed through a feature matching processes; feature matching is a 
process where the situation is within the experience of the Incident Commander on the 
basis of the observed set of clues. 
Developing situation awareness is a RPD priority since it leads to identification of 
actions. This is an important point, particularly when applying RPD systems to 
firefighting t5 as operations in a time-constrained domain, when the firefighter may be 
forced to concentrate on action rather than situation assessment. 
The fire service decision-making process could also be considered with approaches that 
are categorised as naturalistic. Research in the US 16 has led to the development of the 
concept of Naturalist Decision-Making [NDM] and the conclusion that NDM is more 
suited to the complex nature of operational activities. NDM has now become accepted 
in the UK by commentators such as Flin, who view it as helpful to understanding 
operational decision-making' 7  where time constraints, lack of information and other 
pressures can create a highly stressful environment for the Incident Commander. 
Ten factors that are judged to characterise NDM: 
1. Lack of definition in the roles of the participants 
2. Uncertainty and loss of data 
3.  A rapidly changing situation 
4.  Shifting and competing goals 
5.  Action orientated responses 
6.  Stress 
7.  High loss stakes 
S. Multiple teams 
9.  Challenging organisational forms 
10.  Experienced decision-makers 
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The NDM concept suggests that mapping a present incident onto an Incident 
Commander's previous experience enables him to fill any gaps through a process of 
comparison. Fireground commanders interviewed frequently stressed that they were not 
making decisions or choices, but were solely reacting on the basis of their experience, 
moving their plan to meet the needs of the situation t8 . The commanders frequently 
found that it was not necessary to exercise options or to make choices in an optimal 
sense. Some argued that taking the time to consider issues was in itself an unnecessary 
stress. 
Reviewing NDM has led to the conclusion that it has value for fithground command. 
This is borne out by a study undertaken by Burke and Hendry in the London Fire 
Brigade in which simulation based assessments were broadened to attempt to identify, 
in a group of experienced commanders; the process by which they reached their 
decisions. The work was part of a study seeking to improve the selection of, and future 
for, fire commanders' 9 
The London study also confirmed the work of Klein in that 81% of fireground 
commanders perceived that they exercised little choice, worked on a response that was 
primed by prior knowledge and, like their American counterparts, did not consider 
alternatives when reaching their decision. They noted that the majority of commanders 
appeared to reach the decision point intuitively. Thus simulation clearly has merit in 
training when linked to RPD2° and NDM. 
This study also recognised that to the fireground commander visualisation played a key 
part in determining his final action plan. This is referred to later when considering the 
use of technology on the fireground. 
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Exploring these concepts is further aided by work by Crichton 21 , who summarises 
command skills from other authors [Flin et a!] as: 
• Decision-Making 







• Team Co-ordination 
• Stress Management 
Crichton further describes the relationship between situation awareness and decision 
making as a continuum in which decision making strategy options move from 
recognition primed to creative outcomes through stages that included rule based and 
analytical cognitive thinking. The continuum is inclusive of the impact of time and risk 
pressures adding stress to the overall process. 
Crichton also concludes that effective command requires: 
• Competent, skilled, adaptive, flexible and versatile Incident Commanders and 
Command Teams 
• Command strategies that move through the continuum mentioned from recognition 
primed to creative 
• Situation awareness that is time and risk sensitive 
• Simple and robust decision frameworks that are practised and reviewed. 
• Opportunities to test and train these arrangements in simulated environments. 
This contribution by Crichton is both recognised and supported. It draws on the 
examination of skills conducted by Flin and Arbuthnot and extensively reported in their 
jointly edited• publication. That study identified the gap in understanding between 
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academia and those that have observed and analysed the performance of Incident 
Commanders as practitioners. In the joint publication the functional exercise of 
command is set in context using six case studies, one contributed by the author. That is 
the incident related to the Associated Octel fire and explosion referred to in the Key 
Case Studies chapter. The use of case studies in this way is fundamental in aiding the 
understanding of why decision-making can appear at incidents to be intuitive. The main 
lessons being 
• Remaining focused on the desired outcome [often maximum safety or minimum 
cost] 
• Dynamic situational awareness [managing risk against success] -- 
• Effective communication and data analysis [control systems and information 
presentation] 
• Skilled interpretation and fluidity in the use of options [command team skills and 
confidence even to use novel decisions] 
The outcome therefore is far more likely to result from a sophisticated background of 
cultural, historical, managerial and operational understandings aquired personally, 
although not necessarily recognised by the individual, which are applied in the 
operational circumstances. Practising that application in the most routine of situations 
alongside a readily understood command and control framework is seen as most 
advantageous as it assists in reinforcing good practice without the stress of time 
pressured and complex situations. 
6.4 New Paradigm for Fire Service Decision-Making 
Essentially it is considered that NIDM has considerable value as a practical approach. 
Burke identified, the decisions made by many fire commanders appear to demonstrate a 
perception of very limited choice so far as the individual is concerned. Flin, Arbuthnot 
and Crichton all indicate how decision-making processes can vary between situations 
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using more or less cognitive skills. 
Observing what happens on the fireground it has been noted that visualisation is a key 
contributor to situational awareness and fireground decision-making. Equally command 
performance is improved if there is an organisational cultural background based on a 
learning organisation, which provides enhancement to the NDM approach. 
In the fire service the entire learning and training approach emphasises the need for all 
personnel to fully understand equipment and procedures, the rationale being that the 
operational scenario cannot be predicted. It assumes equipment deployments, tactics 
and procedures are utilised within a universally understood framework. Thus the multi-
skilled firefighter is expected to be capable of recognising omissions through situation 
signals or 'clues', whilst at the same time comprehending the inherent strengths of the 
equipment and essential safety procedureä. This provides an extremely flexible yet 
robust system for operational response, which can be activated under very stressful and 
time-constrained conditions where noise 22 , heat and/or humidity interferes with the 
mental reasoning or physical strength of the individual. 
This is essentially a form of two-phase working, using both analytical and RPD skills 
and which also places high importance on the communication requirement and primacy 
of the Incident Commander 23 . Central to situation awareness are the clues gained by 
observation. The sensory signals of sounds and smells, which the individual 
experiences greatly influences the responses he will make 24 . Visualisation in this sense 
is critical, and how it might be aided is described later. However, at many incidents the 
weakness and stresses in the decision-making by the Incident Commander 25 appear to 
be generated by the desired speed of response and lack of information available. 
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Encapsulating both defensive and responsive actions, the Incident Commander may 
integrate elements of response in a modular way. The whole process appears to try and 
act in equilibrium having prescriptive responses and flexibility whilst also avoiding 
being a simple repetition and imitation system, given that it may be confronted by 
complex changing situations that will create additional tensions and demands. The fire 
service officer will be operating using both a stability paradigm and one that sits outside 
the arrangement and is therefore conversely extremely unstable 26 
Simulation and visualisation are also used extensively in considering the best tactic to 
deploy. The cognitive ability to visualise the incident is a key component of operational 
command and, in some cases, the commander's own personal experience and skills may 
unduly influence the decision reached by for example short circuiting what should be an 
analytical process. Under these circumstances the balancing influence of the command 
team and the control system assumes a crucial role. 
Improving those skills is an outcome of learning and in this context the concept of a 
learning organisation, an organisation achieving continuous improvement in a climate 
free of blame and attuned towards positive progress, is relevant 27 . Audit processes, such 
as the incident debriefings that follow major incidents, reinforce this particular 
developmental process 28 . A participative culture is another part of the strategy that 
seeks to use positive criticism as a route to improved performance 29 . 
Operating in this way the Incident Commander derives benefits: 
• The IC will be better educated, more flexible and thus better able to accept and 
interpret information from a wide range of sources and interpret it more effectively 
• The organisation will be in a position to produce and provide more relevant 
information without the risk of information overload by assessing its value and priority 
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at a given incident. 
• The IC will operate in a culture that values all contributions and consequently be 
more inclined and confident in accepting and giving advice and instmctions. The 
culture should also speed up the communication of information on the fireground. 
It is suggested; therefore, that decision-making in the fire service should be interpreted 
as operating at two distinct levels, one action-centred and the other open to the wider 
environment. It is postulated that in the overwhelming majority of fireground 
operations the fire service involvement is a short-term highly action-orientated activity 
rather than a longer-term strategic management system. Exploration of the NDM 
approach is seen to have value, although it appears to emphasisë Only one aspect of 
operations on the fireground and does not fully recognise how the fire service manages. 
A provisional incident command and control system was developed within Cheshire 
Fire Brigade to encapsulate these ideas. This resulted in a new paradigm, Figure 6.1 
that was formulated to incorporate advisory documents, such as Dealing with 
Disasters 3° and the Fire Service Operating Procedure for Major Incidents 31 and the issues 
of simulation [situational awareness and anticipation] and repertoire [standard operating 
procedures]. It was after the Home Office published further guidance 32 slightly 
modified. The paradigm after implementation and review following operational use at 
many operations, including major incidents such as the Chester warehouse fire in 
1996, has demonstrated adaptability in use at a variety incidents and ease of 
understanding by personnel at all operational command levels. The model illustrates 
how the essential elements of information, resource commitment and an established 
repertoire of actions are employed in incident management. Remote observation to 
allow visual appraisal of the fireground whilst not generally available at the time of 
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development is suggested as an improvement and future key determinant leading to 
improvement in fire service decisions. 
FIGURE 6.1 PROPOSED DECISION PARADIGM FOR FIRE SERVICE 
COMMAND AT MAJOR INCIDENTS [DAVIS] 
Thus the approach portrayed utilises the known and observed practices previously 
discussed. Fundamentally the number of practical options is dictated by the repertoire 
of skills and equipment configurations available. Whilst the fire service role continues 
to expand this repertoire remains a definable input and hence predictable. What cannot 
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be defined or fully predicted is the actual operational environment in physical or 
emotional terms. Thus the environment may be mapped to a previous experience and 
recognisable or it may be novel. Likewise since prior or assumed knowledge may assist 
or mislead the importance of dynamic assessment is confirmed. 
Consequently there remains a constant and vital role for cognitive assessment to 
simulate and anticipate the impact and outcome of decision options. This simulation 
may be enhanced by actual observation and the ability to achieve observations is 
therefore highly relevant. Although technology can assist in this area current practice 
suggests little importance is placed upon this factor in decision making. Rather practice 
appears to invest in personal protective tools that continue the historical approach of 
placing firefighters into hazardous situations. 
It is postulated that more likely improvement in decision making to reduce personal risk 
will occur from investment in assembly and analysis of data from various sources and 
the synthesis and simulation of that information into operational options. Technology 
can provide that platform, a platform that can then be extended through the use of 
artificial intelligence and computerised simulation to provide interactive learning for 
potential commanders thus reducing their personal vulnerability to poor decisions and 
improving overall public safety. 
This initial paradigm is then refined still further producing the version outlined in 
Figure 6.2 
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FIGURE 6.2 CRISIS DECISION-MAKING PARADIGM [DAVIS] 
This paradigm accepts the central concepts behind the existing NDM models, 
particularly that the commander maps the present incident onto his previous experience 
and takes action deemed appropriate based on that experience, whilst also focuses 
upon two other important influences. The first relates to the cultural way an 
organisation uses information; the second raises the importance of enhancement of 
situational awareness through better visualisation using technology. 
Consequently this new paradigm envisages a wider integrated relationship than that 
currently accepted. The links between the command and control process; the use of a 
repertoire of practical task orientated responses; the availability of assets and logistical 
support; and the operational analysis and evaluation process, all remain. However 
greater emphasis is placed on having higher-level management for information and a 
new component that of dynamic simulation is introduced. 
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Consequentially anticipation of the developing situation combined with actual 
observation become integral in the decision-making process. This new paradigm 
therefore helps illustrate how excess poorly presented information [overload] and the 
inappropriate behaviour by senior remote commanders [decisions based by proxy on 
ground commanders using relayed images] could distort the decision process and 
represent a danger to achieving a successful operational outcome. 
Fire service culture, in changing to more participative organisátion styles, allows better 
cross-functional working and the creation and introduction of more open decision 
approaches. The author identified these initially as 'participative although they are 
now more widely described in management terms like 'continuous learning 
organisation'. They can be tailored to enhance fire service operational requirements 
and this process is described in the Cheshire Case Study Appendix. 
This organisational approach also challenges the previously held view that two distinct 
management decision styles, i.e. one on the fireground and one in the station, need to 
co-exist within the fire service and suggests that one encompassing decision culture is 
appropriate. Thus as the fire service moves towards greater empowerment of staff, it 
essentially establishes a more flexible organisation willing to seek out opportunities to 
use a wider range of management tools to analyse and assess available information. 
It is this conclusion that emphasises simulation and suggests extension to incorporate 
and enhance the importance of visualisation, which in turn requires improved technical 
and technological assistance. 
This paradigm, which has been tested under operational conditions, recognises that 
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equilibrium exists between intelligence and physical resources within an integrated 
communication network. It therefore suggests that the best use of resources will occur 
from greater use of information and predictive analysis. Practically the paradigm 
requires further incorporation of technology to help capture and use data in real time. 
Once captured this data could through case study analysis provide expert logic tree 
based computerised decision support systems, so helping reduce errors and improve 
decisions. Extending this process through computer assisted simulation could produce 
a safe learning environment for potential command officers. 
6.5 Transferring into Operational Practice 
However applying such novel concepts in practice demands significant communication. 
Incident Commanders, for example, may accept that a flexible approach will support 
their actions and provide good results, but-it may also leave them vulnerable if they act 
outside accepted practices and the advice given within instruction manuals or nationally 
recommended procedures. Indeed, failure to follow this guidance would, should an 
accident involving personal injury or loss occur, leave the individual Incident 
Commander vulnerable to a legal challenge that may include corporate responsibilities. 
That said firefighters and their commanders frequently take unorthodox approaches to 
achieve successful outcomes. 
Fire service response is inevitably equipment and procedure-based 34 and in a 
conventional UK fire brigade this will centre on the arrival of the first appliance with a 
crew of up to five firefighters. There may be up to thirty actions that could be followed 
by the arriving crews, each of them concentrated on a particular procedure or piece of 
apparatus or equipment. The on-scene 'clues' will suggest which of the possible actions 
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might be appropriate, dictating the actions to be taken by the Incident Commander. 
Visualisation of the situation occurs en-route, discussing tactics prior to arrival amongst 
crewmembers. The en-route analysis includes consideration of available risk 
information and how this information is presented affects its value. 
On arrival, the on-scene clues (noise, smells, and the actual scene unfolding in front of 
the arriving crew) will all suggest certain actions and options. If a crowd has formed it 
can influence priorities of action since rational, normal humth behaviour when applied 
in abnormal circumstances and at the wrong time can be confusing and inappropriate 35 , 
so posing a threat to efficient management of the incident. 
Information overload is also a risk during this critical phase so it is essential that data 
given to the Incident Commander needs to be precise, recognisable and appropriate 
allowing calm analysis. Unwitting supply or mis-information will create new, false 
priorities. For example, a common occurrence is for individuals to say that someone is 
trapped within a building when in fact everyone is safe, thus committing the responders 
to an unnecessary search and rescue task. 
In the action-orientated phase the Incident Commander is confronted by, perhaps, a 
confusing scene and yet is required to identify key factors and select options from the 
accepted repertoire of firefighting and rescue activities to meet that scenario. 
The description of events above reinforces the RPD approach and confirms the work of 
Burke and Hendry 36 . There is a clear recognition in those studies that the responses 
made by Incident Commanders are generally those which are so entrenched through 
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training or through procedural knowledge that they are used automatically and without a 
great deal of analysis. However, some incidents, such as those outlined in the Key Case 
Studies, are particularly challenging and present Incident Commanders with very 
difficult scenarios. These incidents may require the fire service to work with 
paramedics or trauma teams, whilst simultaneously conducting a rescue operation. 
Work of this nature can require a different form of approach. Although the operational 
skills and equipment may be well understood, the particular circumstances may be quite 
unique. It may require extensive periods of analysis before the rescue is actually 
conducted. 
In addition there are other incidents, typically rescues, where individuals are in such a 
position that they require the fire service equipment to be deployed in a completely 
novel way. There will also be situations where the personal injury risk to the firefighter 
is judged to be a significant factor, for example, silo or deep underground working. 
Such non-typical rescues are occurring on a more frequent basis, partly as technology in 
the manufacturing areas increases and partly as a direct result of human mobility and the 
increasing use of transport systems. The system of command and control used in the 
fire service has to recognise this operational environment. 
6.6 Summary 
The process of decision making on the fireground has been analysed, primarily outside 
the fire service and in the USA with complementary and overlapping models of RPD 
and NIDM. Both emphasise the importance of mapping the information obtained at the 
fireground onto the Incident Commander's previous experience, in order to pursue a 
plan of action. Even before these theoretical developments became more widely known 
UK brigades had empirically recognised that training and simulation were essential for 
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effective activity by firefighters on the fireground. 
The summary drawn is that the observed process may be improved still further using 
technological support, a point raised in Chapter 7. Enhancement may also occur 
through cultural change, which promotes the notion of modest risk taking, team based 
working and more interactive decision-making. 
The concepts and approach of being a learning organisatiôn help overcome those 
limitations that do arise when new methods of reaching better decisions are introduced. 
This is because an open culture of learning opens up the whole process of receiving, 
analysing and communicating information, so aiding clearer understanding in multi-
disciplined team working. The experience of introducing this type of change in the 
Cheshire Fire Brigade over a three-year period confirmed this approach did secure an 
enhancement and improvement of decision making and hence performance at 
operational incidents. 
Furthermore these cultural changes stimulate awareness of the wider contribution, 
offered by other agencies and technology, so encouraging an attitude of constructive 
challenge and broader participation by other contributors. The move from a more 
restrained traditional culture seeks to reinforce past practice with the added strength of 
the simple 'could this be done better' question so promoting continuous improvement in 
overall performance by better understanding learning outcomes from case studies. 
In the quoted examples used in this research it is apparent a higher level of safety could 
have ensued had the elements of greater situational awareness and access to sound data 
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been in place. None of the three case study events should however be regarded as a 
failure in terms of fire service intervention. What in fact occurred was that hazards 
capable of identification continued to threaten yet they could have been mitigated and in 
some instances even removed. Refining the decision making process along the lines 
outlined in the new decision paradigm can help achieve this worthwhile aim. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Using Technology To Enhance Decision-Making Systems 
7.1. Information Technology Overview 
The previous chapters have illustrated the value of well-presented information to the 
Incident commander and his team. That data needs to be captured, stored, retrieved and 
delivered in safe and robust ways if it is to be available for use on the fire ground. 
Chapter 5 indicated that any system provided to do this must be 'fit for purpose' and 
capable of meeting the demands of, and be compatible with, firelighting operations. 
The information delivered to the Incident Commander also needs to recognise the 
command decision process in which it is to be used. This process described in a new 
paradigm in Chapter 6 is most likely to include recognition primed responses and a 
higher-level situational awareness. Using a range of media that aids visualisation, either 
in real time or from archives or conventional text, is therefore an important feature. The 
essential information technology support system that offers the widest options in these 
circumstances is a computerised one, especially if immediately available in the first 
response appliance cab. Any mobile data system requires robust maintenance 
arrangements and will retain some reliance upon support, by radio and other 
information technology communication, to the fire brigade central control room 1 . 
Commercial software programmes provide numerous systems offering text and 
graphics2 some capable, with modification, of meeting fire service requirements. 
Fundamental to any requirement is the construction of cost-effective, robust central 
databases 3 . Whilst there have been serious failures of bespoke tailored systems 4 , 
present IT technology is judged 5 to be capable of operation in the vehicle cab 
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environment and able to withstand the physical treatment likely to be received on the 
fireground. Current working systems are evident in a number of IlK brigades and 
Vehicle Mounted Data Systems [VMTDS] are now in widespread operational use. 
The convergence of telecommunications technology; mobile computer hardware and 
software developments are especially valuable. The networking of mobile data is 
developing rapidly and to meet the needs identified in previous chapters, early research 
trials designed to test the applicability of information technology as required in the 
central hypothesis were initiated by the author between 1990-1996. These trials were 
directed and supervised by the author and consisted of the following trial evaluations. 
• 	 Investigations, using CCTV, to improve visualisation of an incident site for both 
local i.e. Incident Commander, and remote i.e. Fire Control, use; 
• 	 Provision of aerial observation; 
• 	 Consideration, through real incident use, of thermal imaging to identify fire 
development; 
• 	 Investigations, using a prototype robotic vehicle, of remote control and data 
gathering opportunities; 
• 	 Evaluation of a shared electronic data transfer system for incident management 
by different service users; 
• 	 Creation of a practical user's data package using media opportunities like three 
dimensional drawing, video and still photography, digital mapping and existing 
data stores, including risk information; 
• 	 Investigation and practical evaluation of vehicle mounted computers to store the 
user data package; and 
• 	 Consideration, following investigation, of the value of enhanced gas and vapour 
cloud modelling. 
7.2. Video Technology 
Visualisation is important to incident command and control and relaying video real time 
images to operational commanders using closed circuit television [CCTV] assists for 
example, at a complex site [enabling the Incident Commander to remain in a static 
command location]. CCTV as such is a valuable reconnaissance tool allowing, for 
example, monitoring of fire progression to improve tactical decisions without personal 
risk or assessment of the operational situation before deployments. Valuable additional 
information may be obtained by linking with thermal imaging. Integrating security 
CCTV, common in many town centres and industrial sites, is also a useful tool in 
extending the available information sources for the Incident Commanders. Digital 
compression techniques that have for example expanded this technology into mobile 
telephones illustrate the growing number of options that now exist. 
The early projects initiated placed CCTV images within a mobile command vehicle and 
relayed them to fire control. Whilst difficulties were found in interfacing CCTV into 
the fire brigade command and control facility these were ultimately resolved. As part of 
these trials, aerial apparatus routinely used by the fire service for fireground observation 
and which can operate under most climatic circumstances apart from the most severe 
wind conditions, was fitted with a CCTV camera to provide a 'bird's eye view'. 
Although in the early 1990s this was a new innovation, fitting the CCTV camera was 
not complex. The initial difficulties centred upon the fixing of the rotational guidance 
system and passing the relay cable, which was used rather than wireless, through the 
rotating 3600  base of the aerial apparatus. These difficulties were resolved in 1996 and 
the equipment remains fitted on Cheshire Fire Brigade's four aerial appliances. 
Using digitised wireless technology the captured visual scene was relayed to a mobile 
command vehicle working some distance away. This was the most flexible method of 
conveying the image using a radio signal since it avoided excessive cable lengths and 
the attendant risk of damage to the cable and degradation of the signal. It was found 
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that a radio system capable of operating remotely in adverse weather conditions would 
cost in 1996 approximately £10,000 for each apparatus. The practical investigations 
demonstrated that live data transmission using radio presented technical problems due 
to atmospheric and physical disruption. 
A draft specification, prepared for the project trial, identified desirable features as 
including: - 
1. A full colour visual image; 
2. An auto iris focusing lens to give best optimum view for variable light 
conditions; 	 -- 
3. Remote camera operation from ground level; 
4. Operation initially at the base of the aerial apparatus, but possibly much further 
afield; 
5. The camera to have a motorised zoom facility and wide-angle view. [14 to 1 
magnification was adopted with a 7.5mm to 105mm wide-angle zoom lens] 
6. A portable full colour supervision and viewing monitor; 
7. Videotaping of the image to permit critical audit of operations; 
8. All the equipment to operate in daylight and night conditions and in potentially 
extreme environments of high temperature, humidity, smoke, water and airborne 
chemical contaminants; 
9. The apparatus needed to be capable of being cleaned relatively quickly without 
specialist knowledge; 
10. The equipment to be constructed with reliability, maintainability, flexibility and 
portability as key requirements; and 
11. If radio transmission could not be used an operationally acceptable distance 
between the camera and its monitor had to be established [This was later 
confirmed as 500 metres and radio linkage was not used at the trial stage]. 
This initial specification was subsequently modified to require the camera to be 
intrinsically safe for operation in flammable gas clouds. 
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Security Design Centre supplied a prototype camera in the summer of 1996 and the 
system demonstrated in October 1996. The trials were a success and apparatus was 
taken into operational use in December 1996. 
7.3 Aerial Observation 
Liaison with Cheshire Constabulary identified the possibility of using their airborne 
reconnaissance aircraft. Whilst this aircraft is not available 24 hours a day, cannot fly 
under certain weather conditions, and cannot remain static over a specific site because 
of its fixed-wing design, it has demonstrated valuable visualisation support. 
Again it was proven using this technology a real opportunity exists to vastly improve 
the information sources available to firefi ghters on fire spread. Practical examples of 
the value of such facilities were seen in two incidents when a Police aircraft was able to 
advise the Incident Commander of fire progress. The first occurred at a major school, 
Brookvale Comprehensive, Runcorn 6 , where the fire spread from a central well, not 
obvious at ground level, was identified by an overflying police aircraft. The Incident 
Commander altered his tactics to help contain the spread in consequence of the 
information supplied by the police. The second incident was the 1996 Chester 
warehouse fire 7 . Again, the police aircraft was available and offered the Incident 
Commander confirmation of fire spread from the warehouse to adjoining buildings. 
7.4 Thermal Imaging Technology 
Thermal Imaging became accepted by the fire service in the 1990s. The fire service 
routinely uses hand held or helmet mounted cameras to provide a portable tool enabling 
firefighters to "see through smoke". They are used to locate casualties and identify "hot 
spots" of burning materials, concealed within walls and cavities. 
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Police aircraft are often fitted with thermal imaging technology and this can be of major 
assistance to the Incident Commander. In the Chester incident, which occurred in 
darkness, the aircraft had a thermal imaging camera and accurate information of fire 
spread inside roof spaces was given from the air when it was not obvious from the 
ground. The use of such information for prediction of fire movement and command 
decision-making is confirmed by the two cases cited here. One major limitation 
observed in both incidents was that of relaying information from the aircraft to the fire. 
service on the ground, due to interoperability difficulties between various radio systems 
and channel frequencies. It is intended that these difficulties will be resolved as part of 
a radio replacement strategy shortly to be undertaken that has one of the requirements to 
enable interoperability between all emergency services. 
The utilisation of thermal imaging in this way has yet to be fully investigated. The 
provision of this equipment, on fire service aerial appliances offers the advantage of 
high immediate availability, so adding considerably to the visualisation sources 
available. Thermal imaging equipment is both robust and reliable and has the potential 
to form one of the more important information strands. Combining the localised CCTV 
and aircraft transmitted images offers the capability of securing, under virtually all-
climatic conditions, aerial observation of an incident with extremely good clarity. 
7.5 Robotics 
Whilst this section is not a review of robot development, nor a review of robots 
available, it does provide a limited assessment of fireground robots as used by the 
Tokyo Fire Department and the joint development of a prototype fire service robot 
between the UK Defence Establishment Research Agency [DERA] and author. This is 
152 
because it is considered that fireground robots have a specific capability to access 
hazardous places and situations so avoiding firefighter risk. Equipped with video or 
thermal imaging devices they can gather information and with the right tools possibly 
firefight and operate in highly toxic environments. 
During an invited visit to Japan opportunity to examine the range of robots used by the 
Tokyo Fire Department [TED], which has invested substantially in the development of 
robotics 8 . Of particular note, and already in operational use,-as a wall-climbing robot, 
for ascending high-rise buildings, both to assist firefighting and to provide CCTV 
images. Other robots seen were for use in underwater situations, robotic vehicles for 
reconnaissance, recovery and firefighting. The TED was also investigating the 
possibilities of air strike capabilities from a helicopter. 
The TED has not published any figures on the costs of these units but they are thought 
to be substantial. It is also very difficult to estimate the impact that these robots have 
had upon firefighting in Japan, as there is no precedent or published audit measure. 
However, observations support the proposition that robots do offer a further safety 
potential. 
The trial project to develop a UK fire robot was undertaken by DERA in Cheshire Fire 
Brigade using a Ministry of Defence modified robot technology and expertise 
previously used with tracked robots used to handle explosives and frequently referred to 
as "wheelbarrows". Recognising these possibilities for functional fire service use, 
• Between 18 and 22 October 1994, the Tokyo Fire Department hosted a conference entitled "Fire Safety 
Frontier '94." This conference was unique; as it was the first time that the Tokyo Fire Department had 
illustrated its robotic capabilities to the world at large. The overall impression was of a technically highly 
advanced department. 
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especially for reconnaissance, discussions were held at the DERA laboratories' during 
the summer of 1995, initiating development of a prototype fire service robot. DERA 
had developed a small diesel driven 6 miles per hour robotic platform able to climb a 
step height of 0.3 metres with a 100kg payload. 
Subsequently, field evaluations of typical scenarios on an industrial site were conducted 
in Cheshire to evaluate performance. They included entry and remote control in a 
building containing pumping machines, movement through a rail tanker area, and the, 
projection of a foam jet onto a rail tanker. Approximately twenty experienced fire 
service observers then completed an evaluation sheet so assessing potential fire service 
use. The evaluation confirmed that the officers present considered the robot viable for 
fire service use, especially reconnaissance, obtaining environmental samples remotely, 
e.g. when toxicological, biological or radiation hazards were present. Improvements 
were also suggested such as including intrinsic safety requirements to allow operations 
within petro-chemical environments 9 . 
The trial project enabled a systematic evaluation and confirmed that was both feasible 
and practical to provide a small and affordable remote firefighting vehicle for use in 
highly hazardous operational environments. At present the study remains the only 
practical evaluation of small fire service working robots in the UK. [A larger tractor 
based firefighting unit is in service in the West Yorkshire Fire Brigade]. One 
outstanding unresolved question was that of radio frequency assignment' ° since the DTI 
and the Home Office have been unable to grant the necessary control channel". 
• Defence Establishment Research Agency, 2K T 16 DEE (Cobham Lane, Chertsey, Surrey) 
+ IntrinsicaLly safe electrical equipment is usually apparatus that either has sparking that is incapable of 
causing an ignition of any flammable gas or vapour or which contains such sparking, by its construction, 
to render it incapable of causing an ignition or explosion. 
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7.6 Electronic Data Interchange and Transfer 
The availability of information affects the accuracy of decision-making. Zorkoczy and 
Heap' 2  state that high-quality information enables the recipient to make sense of the 
environment and the more accurate information an Incident Commander can obtain, the 
better the decisions made. But in many cases it is equally important to secure necessary 
information at the right time. Electronic messaging overcomes this weakness and a 
messaging project was therefore undertaken. 
Central to major incident decision-making is data manipulation and transfer of critical 
data between the involved agencies, recognising each holds data, which may benefit the 
others. Investigations into inter-agency electronic mailing* initially focused upon th 
feasibility of using a conventional office system' 3 . While combined multi-agency 
systems of this type are not generally used for emergency management in the UK, many 
investi gators' 4  have identified the increasing importance of information and the use of 
information technology. 
The project defined requirements for a common multi-user system determined like a 
real-time on-line incident record format, the facility to retrieve and to browse existing or 
closed incidents, and a message creation facility for transmission to other agencies using 
the network. Thus three different but overlapping and simultaneous actions were 
envisaged; Electronic Data Interchange (EDI), Electronic Data Transfer (EDT) and 
Database Access (DA), the relative importance of each determined by the magnitude 
and type of incident. Joining the network activated the system and the generation, 
• That investigation related to the electronic mailing system used by Cheshire County Council, and 
referred to as Cheshirelink. This system links all County Council computer users and has the facility to 
extend its range throughout Cheshire to other agencies. 
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editing and sending of messages was menu driven with simple on screen icons since, 
during incidents, users would be entering the system at varying times with different 
stages of comprehension. Information was therefore rapidly distributed between crisis 
team members who could also work independently' 5 . The system, running a timed log 
based on the work done by a particular user, and with a continuous log detailing all 
transactions and all user identities would then provide a subsequent audit trail and 
method of debriefing to assist in future planning. 
A trial multi-user EDT system was constructed with modified software to confirm the 
practicality of inter-agency joint operability. This practical smalhscale operation in 
controlled conditions confirmed that the use of e-mail would be appropriate for some 
inter-service operations, though more complex data transfer would require other 
formats. The designated log and message requirements used a split screen with two 
working areas, with one side being used to convey the running log of the incident, 
whilst the other side contained all messages sent and received by the system in relation 
to the incident. These messages appear in chronological order, identifying the 
originator and text. The 'user side' of the screen contains a working area where 
messages were created, sent and received. The trial showed that a split screen or 
Windows style configuration was practicable in providing a multi-user information 
system. 
The Internet provides the least expensive messaging system. Although insecure this 
global medium makes use of software tools and methods that are widely standardised, 
increasingly understood and accessible to non-technical users 16 . The low costs and easy 
* Subsequent discussions noted an increase in reluctance to have an auditabte log following the trend to 
apportion blame for legal reasons. 
• Windows is the registered trademark of the Microsoft Corporation, USA. 
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accessibility are major advantages of Internet—based EDI and while there are no 
technical reasons that prevents EDI transactions from being sent over an Internet carrier, 
provided that prior to the incident, all the emergency services had reached agreement on 
the introduction of a common EDIIEDT 17.  Security and reliability issues preclude the 
emergency services from adopting this route at present. 
7.7 Mobile Data Trial 
Turban et a! 18 report an increasing importance being placd on information, and, 
recognise that simultaneously, there is increasing difficulty in processing that 
information due to the amount available and its complexity. These-authors agree with 
the conclusions reached earlier in that: 
1. Many decisions are made under time pressure. Frequently, it is not possible to 
manually process the required information quickly enough for it to be effective. 
2. Due to increased fluctuations and uncertainty in the decision environment, it is 
frequently necessary to conduct a sophisticated analysis to make an acceptable 
decision. Turban suggests such analysis usually requires the use of IT. 
These general points hold true for the fire service. There is a considerable volume of 
useful and essential information already in existence and whilst some is carried as hard 
copy it is clearly impractical to provide all such information on a firefighting 
appliance 19 , with a risk that harm to firefighters or poor incident management may 
result. Hence the fire service command and control centre becomes the central 
depository for operational information. Ideally, however, any information database 
should be directly accessible, in a user-friendly manner to the firefighter 2° 
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ACTIVITY COMMENT 
LOCATION Geographic footprint, vehicle route from fixed [fire station] and mobile 
[vehicle tracking] locations. 
ACCESS Best 	 point 	 of entry, 	 perimeter gates, 	 floors. 	 Photographic 	 or video 
assistance for difficult routes. 
SPECIFIC RISKS 1(1)(d) data, CAD and 3 dimensional layout drawings. Colour coded 
risks. 
HAZARDS Identification, action codes, inter-active hazardous material, equipment, 
resource availability, standard operational procedures databases 
ASSESSMENT Intelligent risk analysis diagnosis tools, resource deployment information,- 
personnel role, incident log of messages and actions. 
ACTIONS Access to extinguishing agents like water, geographic and demographic 
infra structure data, incident visualisation, diagnOsis tools for fire and 
damage spread, modelling of predicted actions, transport infra structure 
details, climatic data. 
FUNCTIONS Database 	 support 	 for 	 functional 	 staff, 	 e.g. 	 foam, 	 water, 	 breathing 
apparatus, etc. 	 - 
ENVIRONMENT Geographic 	 recognition 	 of 	 area 	 sensitivities 	 including 	 inter 	 active 
sampling and modelling. 
REFERENCE Best practice general guides on operational matters, e.g. Manuals of 
Firemanship, fire science, training notes. 
REVIEW Recording of actions for audit and debriefing purposes. 
TABLE 7.1 USER REQUIREMENTS 
The availability of fire service and allied information sources is significant and, prior to 
investigating the use of mobile computers, consideration was given to likely useful data 
and this is summarised in Table 7.1. The table identifies a range and examples of the 
data available but not the likely need at any specific incident. Defining use is therefore 
a significant part of any information process that envisages the use of mobile computers 
with users on a fire appliance. The requirements listed do help, however, identify the 
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data that can and is sometimes used at incidents and therefore provided a development 
template for a fire service hazard management system. 
Translating these issues into the working environment for firefighters that may be 
extremely stressful 2 ' and climatically harsh with little time available to follow through 
any complex cataloguing or index process it was concluded access should be of a simple 
menu type. Zuboff22 supports the earlier observation that the introduction of IT had to 
be accompanied by new intellectual skills. The simplicity of the retrieval process was 
therefore an important consideration and significant in determining which of the 
proposed systems to employ23 
The rapid and effective transfer of data to the fireground using voice radio or hard cop 
facsimile is tedious [some fire brigades have only one major radio channel in operation], 
which some argue that radio is inherently unreliable being hearing dependent with a 
repetitious checking process. The transmission of digitally coded information via the 
radio vastly improves this situation, as evidenced in mobile telephone texting, but it was 
judged that the best solution to large-scale data needs 24 was a portable computer, which 
could hold relevant headline information to guide initial actions. Other researchers 25 
have concentrated on identifying how the considerable amount of written and pictorial 
information used could be stored, in a user-friendly way, to support firefighting crews. 
In 1995, trials were initiated of an in-cab delivery system 26 supported by a central data 
system using a conventional laptop computer and commercial software programmes 
modified to integrate visual, pictorial and text data. One early outcome of the trial was 
the recognition that it would be helpful to display the information being viewed to the 
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whole crew and a slave screen in the rear cab would be beneficial. Trialing this 
technology enabled the initial firefighting users to tailor the information they required 
enabling a first attack at complex sites to be mounted successfully. 
The issues then remaining were whether a data link to the fire control database should 
be used or whether the in-cab computer holds its own database which is regularly 
updated using radio or a hard-wired connection, for example in the appliance room. 
Secondary issues include the software used to access this infoimation and the methods 
used to produce output under operational conditions. The trail was successful and 
contracts were issued for the supply of vehicle mounted data systems. VDMS, which 
this pilot project was a forerunner, is now widely accepted as the way forward although 
at the time it was regarded as an unnecessary complication to introduce technology of 
this kind into vehicles. 
7.8 Gas Plume Modelling and Vapour Release 
The importance of being able to model and predict the behaviour and consequences of 
accidental releases of gases and other contaminants has greatly increased as a 
consequence of public recognition that industrial plant, including that situated in the 
vicinity of dwellings, can no longer be assumed to be safe. Bhopal, Chernobyl and 
Flixborough are extreme examples of major accidents 
As a consequence detailed research was undertaken to assess the value of accessible 
plume modelling for fire service use. This research is detailed in the Appendix. The 
outcome drawn is that a considerable amount of equipment and computer aided 
software exists and there are therefore a number of predictive tools available. However, 
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matching these tools with skilled staff, remains currently problematic for the few 
occasions that this enhanced capability is needed. It is feasible to introduce and as 
concerns grow related to environmental pollution arising from fires generally then it is 
possible these tools will become more widespread in fire service use. In the interim it is 
suggested that existing 'rule of thumb' calculations be transferred onto VDMS laptops 
to provide a better predictive analysis. 
7.9 Geographic Information Systems 
Cartography has long been used within the fire service as a method of noting where risk 
premises are and obtaining good access routes to those premises. Keates 27 argues that at 
least three particular uses of maps may be considered. The first is seeking a named 
feature where little pre-knowledge is required and scale is unimportant. The second is 
highly selective searching within a limited area, its use is typically as a problem solver 
and the maps used will require detailed scales. The third use is to conduct an extensive 
search, perhaps across a whole area and here again the scale is not important. 
For some time, digitised maps have been available, and are now generally subsumed 
within the general title of geographic information systems (GIS). GIS provides a high 
quality map with the improvement of information overlays so permitting the reduction 
or increasing of the amount of information shown. It also enables customising for use 
such as that required by local authorities for highway or survey purposes. Digitising 
and developing maps has enabled three-dimensional terrain imagery to be undertaken. 
These are particularly useful when considering gas plume movement or, at a more local 
level, physical structures of buildings. Computers have the ability to create spatially 
related data sets with layers of inter-related information and this has permitted G1S 28 to 
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provide an information management system useful to the fire service 29 . This is not 
entirely new; work has previously been undertaken within the retail sector to use data in 
this way and the growing importance of integrated risk management increases the fire 
service use of the spatial data capabilities offered by GIS. 
The introduction in 1970, by Ordnance Survey [051, of the digital map system has 
greatly aided this process 30 . There are various types of maps from OS. Some using 
raster data produce overlays of 1-50,000 or the 1-10,000 in black and white. Vector 
mapping using bitmap computer projections and dot colouring permits 1-1,250 urban 
and 1-25,000 rural files to be created which can be held under licence for CAD and 
control and command systems. Consequentially digital maps are used as input for 
major incident management and planning, for example, the OS Land-Form 
PANORAMATM, ADDRESSPONTTM or OSCAR Route-Manager® series. Many of 
these digitised map systems are already used by utilities such as water, gas and pipeline 
companies for recording their information. Hydrological maps, from the Hydrological 
Survey, exist for drainage and ground waler risk assessment. 
Inter-related with the GIS system are those satellite navigation arrangements introduced 
by the US Department for the Defence Global Positioning System (GPS) 31 . This has 
relevance as mentioned under user requirements for improved vehicle tracking, and 
hence improved attendance times based upon identification of the nearest appliance. A 
very similar system was developed by the Russian military referred to as the Global 
Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS). Both these systems offer opportunities for 
fairly accurate ground fixing using low-cost hand held receivers. The accuracy is 
typically within ten metres although even closer positioning can be achieved with more 
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sophisticated equipment. The receivers are unaffected by rain, fog or other weather 
conditions provided that they can sight a number of satellites which are in fixed orbit 
around the earth. 
Typically the GPS satellite system requires six satellites in near circular orbits and a 
similar number of satellites are required in the GLONASS system. Both these satellite 
systems are around 20,000km above the earth's surface using very accurate atomic 
clocks and two carrier signals. Synchronisation is obtained by the hand-held receiver, 
which has a reference point to a land-based control station. The monitoring station for 
GPS is based in Colorado and for GLONASS near Moscow. 
Unfortunately GPS does have a selected availability deliberately introduced by the US 
military to prevent its misuse by other pQwers. Various options exist to counter this 
selective availability including commercially available correction services. The 
GLONASS system does not have selected availability and therefore offers the civilian a 
fairly regular real-time information system. To obtain a fix, it is necessary, as 
mentioned, to receive a signal from five or six satellites. This arrangement will allow 
vehicle tracking and equipment control in real-time. 
It will be seen from this very brief review of GIS and GPS that by placing the two 
systems together, a considerable computer-aided risk assessment and resource-layering 
system with geographic imagery is possible. It is also possible to create three-
dimensional models that will greatly aid visualisation of terrain or fixed objects. Inter-
linking of the resource data given by GPS or GLONASS into a 015 system will also 
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enable real time monitoring of plumes or the updating of displays through tracking 
systems as vehicles move towards particular risks. 
7.10 Summary 
The investigations and project trials undertaken indicate that there are clear possibilities 
of improving fire service decision making through data management by utilising 
information technology and associated equipment. It is concluded that there are 
sensible and pertinent arguments to proceed although this would need to be in a 
measured way so that the introduction of such technology onto the fireground did not 
jeopardise firefighter safety or operational effectiveness. It is desirable that the service 
moves in this direction sooner rather than later. 
Visualisation, a key component in operational command, could be improved with 
established equipment from other sectors. This is, however, not feasible for robotics, 
which require considerably further development if they are to be available at reasonable 
cost and usefulness. 
- The quantities of information handled and interaction with databases identified is also 
manageable, in a user-friendly format, using existing information technology operating 
systems and software. Most of the data required is already electronically stored and it is 
therefore utilisation and organisation of the present electronic storage systems that is 
desired. Also as cited earlier in this work organisations outside the fire service hold 
significant amounts of useful data and, as this chapter illustrates, accessing that data 
offers further potential opportunities to improve areas like visualisation, mapping and 
hazardous material handling. Individual premises hold some of that useful information, 
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on-site, in a number of formats and accessing the relevant areas of those systems is 
worthy of further exploration. 
The use of the data is compounded by the real time need for responsive action to match 
the dynamic nature of an incident. And as an incident progresses, so many new factors 
may become relevant, such as the release of materials into an airborne plume, rupture of 
a containment vessel, collapse of a building or wall and changes in the chemistry of 
products or materials stored. 
Features such as security and robustness become important, as does the ability of the 
storage system to expand and extend. Data sources also continue to grow in flexibly 
and scale making interface to their operating systems, some which include graphical 
interfaces, an area for further research. 
Since the fire service response itself is extremely mobile, any data storage and retrieval 
support system must match that mobility. There are difficulties in achieving a 
successful bearer system to link a central data bank to a mobile unit. This indicates that 
the short-term approach of providing the storage facility within responding fire 
appliances, where it would be directly accessible during the journey to the incident, is 
for the time perhaps the correct one. This does not remove the requirement for support 
by a more complex anangement. Rather, it suggests that in the interim, that is whilst 
better data transfer arrangements are investigated, there is considerable outstanding 
research to be done in organising and acquiring data. 
Plume modelling and GIS mapping are helpful and would improve the decision-making 
approach. 015 has already shown its value as a vehicle mounted resource. Plume 
modelling is more likely to be used as a central resource. However, considerable further 
development will be required before it becomes a viable inter-active fireground resource 
useful to the Incident Commander. 
Overall these technologies reduce personal and public risk by increasing knowledge in 
real time operational environments. The following matriii demonstrates areas of 
enhancement afforded by each technology. 
ENHANCEMENT - Z 
- 
.< 
Ct Ct (ID 
AFFORDEDBY - 
TECHNOLOGY 
General situational awareness 4 • • 
Improved inter agency response 4 ____ ____ - • • 
Improved assimilation of complex data 4 4 4 4 4 
Reduction in time imposed pressures 4 4 4 4 
Real time evaluation 4 4 4 4 4 
Improved anticipation and prediction • 4 • 4 
Reduction in personal risk to gather data • • 
TABLE 7.2 TECHNOLOGICAL ENHANCEMENTS ON DECISION-MAKING 
[DAVIS] 
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The overall outcome of this research is that decision making by the fire service at major 
incidents can be improved. To achieve that outcome requires the adoption of: 
1 	 Clearer understanding of how decisions are made and how that process may be 
advanced. To assist in this a new decision making paradigm for use in crisis 
situations is proposed. 
2 	 Cultural and organisational changes can also assist by 
Creating organisational values that are less hierarchical and incorporate a 
more positive learning culture 
Recognition that intelligence and information management must be given 
the same prominence at operations as physical resource management 
Using technology to reduce tolerance of personal risk to gain crucial 
observations and data 
Extending further the capabilities of integrated communication technology 
on the fireground and at central command locations to improve data 
handling, information presentation and inter and intra service 
communications 
3 	 A series of associated developments have also been derived during this research 
that aid the fire service. 
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8.2 General Observations 
This research has shown that fire service Incident Commanders face increasing 
challenges in their decision making. Reaching sound judgements requires assessment of 
a range of data, often under time pressure, in a systematic and prioritised way. Data 
may be offered in large volume and be incomplete, misleading or conflicting. 
Simplification would assist improved analysis and operational value. It is envisaged 
that data availability will continue to grow proportionally as technology advances in 
science, commerce and industry. 
The importance, therefore, of having an effective management information system, as 
part of the command system, is apparent from the key case studies outlined and the 
literature reviewed. What has also emerged is the importance of simulation [in this 
context situational awareness and the visualisation of the incident as a dynamic event] 
and this questions current protocols of fire service command and control. Current 
models of command decision making using recognition primed decisions are seen as a 
part, not the complete substance, of this process. 
These views are supported by the review of the three key case studies in Chapter 4 
where information gaps obviously existed and which concludes by detailing 20 
activities that have the potential to improve operational decision making. Using the 
improvement activities derived from the case studies a number of proposals are made to 
enhance the decision making system currently in use with specific emphasis on 
information management. 
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The importance of information management to the decision support system is outlined 
in Chapter 5 where improved approaches to capturing data prior to any incident Figure 
5.11, assembling data as system support components [Table 5.1] and then placing that 
data in the command process [Figure 5.3] whilst seeking to avoid inter service tension 
[Table 5.3] are explored and defined. The conclusion is that a more systematic 
approach [Figure5.6] would help. 
From this researched foundation the option is then outlined of a new decision paradigm 
[Figure 6.2] that places intelligence, the collective term used here to refer to data, 
management information systems, information synthesis and analysis and simulation or 
situational awareness, in equilibrium with physical resource management, the latter 
being generally very well rehearsed, frequently practiced and substantially funded. 
Finally, to meet the decision support requirements of the Incident Commander, it is 
argued that a core communication system is essential that does not concentrate upon 
spans of control, but rather focuses upon a progressively expanding information 
highway, which retains resilience and complements the fire service prioritisation of 
decision making by ensuring that all participants in the evolving major incident can 
contribute effectively. 
8.3 Improved Decision Making 
Investment in decision making systems is crucial if the overall process of managing fire 
service intervention is to improve. The acceptance that current practice cannot be 
improved is wrong and potentially harmful. Gains have been made from the substantial 
investigations made in understanding the conunand decision processes in military 
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organisanons. The fire service is not isolated or especially distinctive in terms of its 
operating environment that it cannot also benefit from the advantages now offered by 
these advancement of studies in other allied services. 
The rapid growth in computerised intelligent systems and simulation trainers and the 
general study of the factors influencing the choice of decision options in crisis situations 
all point towards possible improvements. This becomes more significant given the 
assertion that large loss incidents are diminishing and experiene in actual command at 
large or major incidents will become less common. Young inexperienced commanders 
will still need to learn how to operate and translating existing experience from case 
studies into practices that can be replicated and understood will have to receive highec 
priority. Likewise colleagues in the other agencies and emergency services need to 
understand the fire service decision process if they are to interact effectively. It is also 
proposed that there be less emergency command centres. This emphasises the 
requirement for common operating protocols to allow efficient mutual aid arrangements 
and again improved understanding of the decision process and all important data needs. 
The lessons of September 1 1" have profoundly affected crisis managers around the 
world as they seek to understand weaknesses in the response and develop more robust 
and resilient systems to cope with this type of exceptional scale event. Decisions made 
under such circumstances can affect many people and it is important that in the 
operational planning for these worst case and novel situations the previously assumed 
concept of escalating existing practices is thoroughly evaluated. This research has 
indicated that improvements remain to be made. 
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8.4 Organisational Culture 
The traditional values of the fire service exist, in part due to history [Chapter 21, but 
more importantly because they represent empirical knowledge often learned at a high 
human cost. Those values have also produced results in crisis situations, when the 
Incident Commander has achieved a satisfactory, if not necessarily the ideal conclusion. 
The fire service operates in a complex environment and is subject to a litigious society 
[Chapter 2] where risk control relates not only to physical harm but economic losses. - 
Risk assessment requires balanced judgement with recognition of these wider 
perceptions. Given these circumstances, it is understandable to lithit the immediate 
response in a crisis, to that which may be obtained from a known repertoire of skills and 
equipment, conforming only to the acceptable standard and best practice - the safe 
option. Such a repertoire gives the essential speed of action, safe practice and known 
outcome, without over-exposure of the individual firefighter to excessive risk of failure. 
In the review of fire service management system development and its comparison to 
some international fire service organisations [Chapter 31 it became apparent that the 
development of a culture, which is based around the values of a learning organisation, 
has positive values for operational, as well as routine resource management. 
These developments enhance analytical decision-making skills onto the fireground and 
are beneficial to the strategic function of command. Operating in this way represents, 
for some, a fundamental shift in overall fire service management affecting all levels of 
command, from the most junior to the most senior rank. Open cultures of this kind tend 
to be more resilient to the stress so frequently created by short timescales for action and 
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lack of information, which previously could only be resolved by utilising naturalistic or 
recognition primed decisions [Chapter 61. 
It is observed the Incident Commander utilises a range of options in a task-orientated 
manner and conducts analysis in a strategic way in the derivation of the necessary 
actions and tactics. The Incident Commander also uses political and humanistic skills to 
meet and obtain from individuals the necessary information needed to help 
communicate as necessary to others, including the public, so they might identify the 
best course of action. 
Information, either in complexity, adequacy, scarcity or volume, is identified as a key 
stressor. This likely harbinger of failure can, it is believed, be relieved by the utilisation 
of technology. Technology is explored in Chapter 7 and studies concerning hazardous 
materials and plume modelling for critical incidents is detailed in the appendices. 
Changing fire service organisational culture enables the individual to better adopt and 
adapt to this technology. Since technology can support operational decision making this 
"leap in the dark" can be undertaken with some confidence. 
8.5 Researched Allied Developments 
In addition to the research relating to the decision-making system, a number of new 
practices have been evaluated and in some cases implemented. Six examples include:- 
1. 	 Enhanced gas plume and fireball studies directly related to fire service use and 
risks derived from acts of sabotage or other catastrophic events. This study was 
undertaken following terrorist activity at a natural gas storage site. This work has 
revealed the significant implications for future disaster planning. 
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2. 	 Improved visualisation on the fireground using conventional CCTV equipment in 
new ways. The use of video media and possible interaction with existing 
security systems is also discussed as a method of providing visualisation for 
firefighters without personal risk. 
3. Early studies related to the designated use of cab based computers and similar 
trials using data transfer for inter-service collaboration were undertaken. Using 
conventional laptop computers, fireground data management was reviewed to 
illustrate the practical value and implications for information management. 
Commercial development in the area of VDMS has now overtaken the cab based 
systems but the issue of inter-service data exchange still remains to be exploited; 
4. Collaborative work with DERA followed by on-site trials produced a prototype 
robotic vehicle suitable for fire service operations. The trials suggested that it is 
both practical and economically viable to introduce robots into fire service 
operations, thereby reducing the threat posed to firefighter safety. 
5. In addition, as part of the analysis of the information needs at major incidents a 
study is reported that directly related to a large-scale public evacuation at a major 
fire, which has not previously been available in the public domain. This is a 
significant matter since information failures can lead to deaths [This was 
demonstrated in the Dusseldorf Airport fire when the wrong evacuation messages 
were relayed by the public address system with devastating consequences]. This 
study, amongst relatively few in the UK, (as studies are not undertaken routinely 
into public response) has highlighted how important it is that information flow is 
speedy and accurate to both the public and the emergency services. 
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6. 	 The introduction of a new policy approach that of using shelter as the best 
protection for the general public at some major accident situations rather than 
evacuation, is also described. This new approach was based on experience and 
empirical knowledge that fundamentally challenged previous public policy in 
this area. The shelter policy introduces a new and practical method of protection 
for the public whilst reducing resource demands upon the emergency services. 
8.6 Further Research 
Little real quantification was found to have been undertaken to identify the most reliable 
and applicable decision methods used at fire service operations. Existing empirical 
practice has therefore become the method. Whilst this undoubtedly has the strength that  
the practice reflects previous operations judged to be successful it carries a risk that 
better practice from other organisations is being ignored. Further detailed research into 
the effectiveness and psychology of the decision making process is therefore likely to 
have long-term benefits. Incorporating these outcomes into computerised or artificial 
intelligence systems with the associated links to simulation training is also likely to 
show benefit. 
Technology can also help. There are illUstrations throughout this research of areas in 
which modest technological investment aids the decision process and thereby reduces 
risk. Actual effectiveness, as exemplified in the key case studies in this work is still 
very reliant upon individuals at special risks taking the relevant actions at the time of 
the emergency, and upon the public authorities responding in an appropriate way. It 
would therefore appear sensible to separate out these special premises or areas of higher 
risk from the general response-planning processes and to have specific data stored, 
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relating only to such premises. A higher degree of detail of the manufacturing process, 
both diagrammatically and in text is necessary to aid understanding at the time of any 
emergency. Researching the wider use of media and interactive plume monitoring 
would be appropri ate in these circumstances. 
The data required by Incident Commanders is shown to be extensive, held in various 
locations and different formats. Creating a central, simplified, easily accessible 
database that can respond dynamically would greatly assist future development of fire 
service information systems. And, since a great deal of the information needed is 
already held available on electronic systems the continued integration of this data into a 
mobile data system is a key component to successful fire service operations. 
The quality of any judgement depends upãn all those holding information being able to 
contribute to the decision process. A universal and comprehensive network would 
provide a means of meeting this need and that requires further development. Similarly 
developing a system to supply information to the public through the news media would 
be helpful in reducing any over-burdening of the Incident Commander and advising a 
concerned public. 
Areas for further investigation also include relevant technologies, like video capture and 
robots that can reduce the risk of individual physical harm and provide insight into the 
outcomes of particular operational tactics. The robotic research mentioned is 
exceptional in fire service terms, even though it did not progress to full implementation. 
A communication highway, between the activity zone and logistical centre of the 
organisation, is critical to the success of a disaster or emergency-management process. 
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Sustaining the information highway, whilst trying to ensure that it enables access to 
source documentation, will considerably help to avoid overburdening emergency 
managers. The identification of common thinking between and across emergency 
services, both nationally and internationally, in this area also helps to clarify the real, as 
opposed to the assumed, information access needs. These objectives do form part of the 
current UK radio replacement strategy and so will hopefully be attended to in the near 
future. 
8.7 Summary 
This research has argued the hypothesis that the fire service, with its hitherto traditional 
hierarchical structure, is increasingly becoming a service that meets a very broad 
spectrum of operational demands with a dynamic and flexible open learning culture. 
That culture in turn enables better decision-making at operations by using the widest 
range of managerial techniques, tools and practices. 
In effecting what is therefore a transfer of skills, the fire service Incident Commander 
continues to grow as a sophisticated manager who is able to change his management 
style in an equally dynamic way to fit the working situation being confronted. 
However, the pressure will remain to ensure that any "best fit" action occurs within the 
shortest time scale. 
Information, the dominant factor in good decision-making, requires that those tools 
previously reserved for the safe working environment of the office be adapted for use on 
the fireground. Filling the remaining information gaps with user-friendly, reliable, 
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robust and secure data and improving visualisation equipment and systems, remains the 
ongoing challenge. 
If the approach proposed in this research were vigorously adopted it is highly likely that 
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The Future Fire Service 
During 2002 there was considerable unrest in the UK fire service that culminated with 
industrial action. The action involved members of the Fire Brigades Union seeking a 
substantially pay award in recognition of their perceived change in role and contribution 
to safety. Initially the Employers resisted this demand and a series of intermittent rather 
than continuous strike actions occurred. 
This action substantially affected the more urban areas of the UK where union 
membership was both strong and unified. In many rural areas existing fire cover 
continued although restrictions did apply around mutual aid and specialist support. 
Alternative emergency cover provided by the Military was therefore evident in most 
towns and limited specialist support for both serious structural firefighting and other 
rescues or involving hazardous materials existed 
In the weeks leading up to the first action period extreme efforts were made to avert any 
action and although action did occur these efforts prompted a wider reappraisal of the 
fire service role and contribution. As a direct result of this reappraisal and in part as an 
unsuccessful process to avert industrial action the UK Government at the request of the 
Employers instituted on the 20 September 2002 an independent review of the fire 
service under the chairmanship of Professor Sir George Bain assisted by Professor Sir 
Michael Lyons and Sir Anthony Young. The process of trying to avert action was 
unsuccessful in part because the Fire Brigades Union would not submit evidence to the 
inquiry team. This review group assembled evidence and reported in December 20021. 
Their conclusions were quiet fundamental in character and offered criticism of all the 
participants involved over many years in fire service matters. More importantly the 
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review group called for urgent action and suggested a new approach based upon risk 
reduction through prevention with new institutional structures and higher regard and 
greater expertise in human resource management. A range of proposals was made about 
pay with links to personal competency and comment on efficiencies and transitional 
funding. 
The report was generally well received although the union had published its own 
alternative report 2. The Government has consequentially published a White Paper 3 that 
spells out how it intends to take the accepted proposals of the independent inquiry 
forward. In Scotland an earlier White Paper 4 had been published with many 
complimentary features to the England and Wales paper. 
In addition the Employers and Fire Brigades Union have in 2003 concluded an 
agreement that allowed industrial action to cease and the emergency cover arrangements 
provided by the Military to be withdrawn. Referred to as the 'Heads Agreement' 5 this 
agreement binds both parties into an integrated modernisation process that has 
associated staged payments for the uniformed workforce between 7 November 2002 and 
1 July 2006. 
In England and Wales and in Scotland the Government has now clearly indicated that a 
legislative programme will be undertaken following consultation on proposals outlined 
in further papers. These intended legal steps are due to be introduced into the legislative 
programme during the 2003 2004 Parliamentary session. New arrangements will then 
be in place for the future. In the interim period action has been taken on a number of 
matters not requiring legal change, such as the introduction of risk management, the 
progression of the integrated personal development system and establishment of some 
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new institutional structures, so commencing an extensive modernisation process for the 
UK fire service. 
Its] 
Cultural Change-The Cheshire Case Study 
The process of cultural change referred to in Chapter Three resulted in a major initiative 
being instituted and managed by the author. After considering these issues, research was 
instituted into the practical impacts of changing the management culture in Cheshire 
Fire Brigade 6 . 
The aim was promoted that the service should not just accept :the commercial decision 
models that had evolved, but should seek to develop a decision process specific to the 
fire service. The rationale here being that operational command and normal working 
practice had already created a clear two-dimensional model, with station management 
being seen as distinctly separate from fireground operational management. The question 
that arose was whether one management approach could work as effectively in the fire 
station as it could upon the fireground. Evaluation of these current concepts of 
management approach led to the conclusion that a two-dimensional model, i.e. 
fireground and office, was unnecessary. It was considered practical to change the 
fireground 'command' management processes into one more aligned to everyday 
management processes without creating functional difficulties. The key was to retain the 
Incident Commander in a strict hierarchical management position on the fireground, 
even though in normal work the individual might be a specialist team member not be 
directly involved in operational planning. 
Two local debates occurred at the early stage, both apparently centred on protecting the 
existing fireground decision-making process and the functions of central command. The 
first argument focused upon the high operational risk involved in adopting untested new 
ideas. The second suggested it was essential to retain the structural line management 
system within the fire service, rather than the flexible models of industry. Again it was 
suggested that change might involve significant risk of failure to deliver at critical times 
if clear accountability and robust practices were not present. 
On further reviewing fire service managers at work, it was concluded that these risks 
were overstated. The fire service already had a relatively sophisticated management 
system and that the resistance to change was common to that found in most 
organisations i.e. individuals feeling threatened by possible loss of status and controt 
when confronted with a more flexible approach. 
One consequence was to indicate that a flexible model of management where the fire 
service manager could change his decision-making style rapidly to suit the working 
environment was more appropriate. The author describes this concept as 'participative 
and subsequently introduced a cultural shift in this direction into Cheshire Fire Brigade. 
To introduce this general empowerment philosophy senior staff reorganised the 
management process and structure so that it might reflect the general concept of 
participative management. In order to assist, describe and explain the new thinking and 
to argue, ultimately, for a structural change within the organisation, it was necessary to 
involve significant numbers of staff in discussions 7 . 
Information management was also identified as a key factor in enabling the devolution 
of responsibilities. Unfortunately there was insufficient existing infrastructure within 
the Fire Brigade's organisation to enable the right information, especially in such 
activities as budget management, to be placed in the hands of the responsible managers 
and enable them to discharge their accountabilities. This limitation created an urgent 
185 
desire by the Brigade's management to rapidly expand the existing management 
information systems. 
Teams of officers having similar responsibilities produced 'real world' objectives and 
common goals and performance measures were introduced to assess successful practices 
and procedures. This reflected the growing importance of benchmarking introduced into 
the fire service by bodies such as the Audit Commission. 
Part way through the change process a consultant conducted an independent diagnostic 
review designed to evaluate whether the new participative culture was effectively 
empowering the organisation or simply being absorbed and ignored. This diagnostic 
study revealed that despite the comprehensive nature of the change and the degree of 
stress created, there was a clear and demonstrable commitment, by those staff consulted, 
to the new style of management, it being seen as more effective in providing the desired 
public fire service. One identified weakness of the new approach was poor internal 
comnunication between working levels, an area where IT was likely to assist. 
This Brigade study was aimed deliberately to investigate the establishment of a new 
style of organisation, which constantly sought to learn 8 by measuring its delivered 
outcomes and so develop best practice and thereby continuously improve the 
organisation. It also paved the way for a structural review to enable any process 
introduced, to be placed within a better and more comfortable system of quality assured 
management9. The underpinning philosophy was the provision of a flexible 
management process, which reconciled the needs of operational command, functional 
objectives and was able to support management within the Brigade's operational 
geographic area, whilst ensuring a high quality of service. This created an integrated yet 
flexible organisation. 
Integration included responsibilities for overall corporate achievements linked to 
improved communications between all levels of management and management systems, 
utilising personal knowledge and experience. Functions and activities were integrated 
within overlapping elements designed to increase flexibility and meet changing 
demands, whilst avoiding depersonalisation and fragmentation. 
Considerable work was undertaken to create a learning organisation within Cheshire 
Fire Brigade since this was judged important in helping establish Incident Commanders 
who could challenge in a very constructive and analytical way any information upon 
which they would subsequently takp decisions. Approaching organisational 
management in this way also encouraged individual confidence in the use of 
information communication technologies, common in both daily fire service and 
business activities. Achieving and successfully embedding this new management 
culture was therefore an important step in progressing the overall concepts of improved 
operational decision making. 
Evidence that, as a consequence of the work undertaken, a change in culture was 
successfully achieved was demonstrated by the Cheshire Fire Brigade becoming the 
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first brigade to achieve the Investors in People Award, which recognised the cultural 
change, and achieve a Charter Mark 4 for its relationship to those it serves. 
The Process 
Fire, like all public services, needs periodically to review its approach to delivering its 
service to the public. Customer care, a common aim within industry and commerce has 
an equal relevance in public life even though the commodity sold or purchased belongs 
to the public and therefore the process is one of transfer or exchange of professional 
skills. As local authorities began to change their role of providing less direct services 
and sought to enable services to be obtained from other agents so the fire service, with 
its direct provision role, looked to see if it should change. All of local government must 
be accountable. The public rightly expects this both of the corporate 'Fire Brigade' body 
and of the individual officers. They also expect responsible attitudes to prevail rather 
than play a game of hide and seek to find the right responsible person. 
These simple ideas required cohesion to work. Fire service work is far more complex 
and decisions have to be reached quite often which involve a number of specialised 
persons combining their talents. It is critical however that the service did not become a 
red tape organisation - rather a blue ribbon was the aim. 
With these ideas in mind thought was been given to the future operating process, 
• Investors in People awards recognise employers who develop, train, recruit and evaluate employees to achieve 
the highest standards of business performance. A series of assessment indicators are used against a portfolio of 
evidence supplied by the applicant. The assessor, appointed by the local Training and Enterprise Council, reports 
to a Recognition Panel who make any award. The Government Department responsible is the Department of 
Education, Employment Skills and Enterprise Section. 
Charter Mark is the Government's award for organisations that provides an excellent service to the public. The 
criteria are designed to measure and improve service. Charter Mark awards requires evidence of performance 
standards to be judged and once awarded is valid for three years. The Cabinet Office is the responsible 
government department. 
management style and structure within the Cheshire organisation. At the first stage they 
were conceptual, since the idea was to forward plan, in what had become a more, rather 
than less, confused operating environment. The basic need was the bringing together of 
the skills of individuals, in a culture, which enabled each to contribute fully in decision 
making, which in turn was to be as near as possible to the point where the decision 
would have to be implemented. The commonly used phrase 'Closer to the Customer' 
summarises this part of the approach. 
The Brigade process at that time placed a great deal of decision making at the only point 
where resources, skills and information combine - Divisional Management. The 
suggestion was that this bridging point could move more closer towards local areas with 
the majority of day-to-day decisions being made and implemented at that level. 
To do this required a new structure, which enabled discussion and debate amongst 
groups of involved officers. It also required a change in culture to ensure accountability 
did not become a moving target with no individual holding true responsibility for the 
decision, or worse, avoiding a decision. 
If decisions were to be made closer to the local station ground there had also to be a 
supporting and review process of management, which facilitated and monitored 
decision-making. Policy direction and resource allocation remained the primary tasks of 
Brigade managers and therefore arrangements, to allow policies a degree of 
interpretation to reflect locally identified needs yet also capable of being monitored and 
supervised, had to be developed. 
The fire service has traditionally used a ranking system to control supervision and take 
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decisions. This emphasis needed to move and ranks, which it was accepted were totally 
essential for the operational firefighting and rescue function, had to become the value 
terms of recognition for contribution and responsibility. In other words there was 
recognition and acceptance of the essential difference in using rank in operational 
command and when using ranked posts to define the alternative responsibilities of 
technical and managerial duties. It was also accepted that to introduce change within 
any organisation and its staff fundamentally takes time. Training and education were 
considered and then undertaken in a change transformation period that lasted 3 years. 
The philosophy suggested did not envisage less managers, it actually suggested more 
but of different types. Decentralisation, when useful in economic terms and as an aid to 
the public and officer, was another aim. There was an attempt to bring together at the 
centre the key elements of strategy, resource allocation and ultimate responsibility for 
success or failure. Management support it was thought would be demonstrated in this 
way and leadership, team skills and individual contribution, which fundamentally make 
all things work, would have better processes, structures and cultures to improve 
performance still further. 
Structure 
The General Philosophy 
The designed structure provided a flexible management process to reconcile operational 
command, functional objectiveness and supportive management within a territorial 
environment, whilst ensuring quality of service. The structure aimed the following 
benefits: 
A fully integrated Brigade management team with more emphasis on the 
Brigade's corporate needs and less on the function of day-to-day management. 
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• Improved communications within and between each level of management. 
• Working based on participation, rather than rank. 
• Clear levels of authority and responsibility. 
• Equity in relation to workloads. 
• Sensible overlapping of functions or activities to avoid unnecessary 
segregation. 
• An increased flexibility to meet frequently changing demands. 
• A more personal approach. 
Three primary management levels were introduced: 
• Local 	 Customer based and action orientated 	 - 
• Territorial - 	 Interpretive, supportive to local management, area 
based 
• Brigade 	 Responsible for organisational strategy 
Operational Command was observed as a distinct management process and as such had 
separate, rank related and specific functional applications. 
General functional objectives were seen as assisting development and achievement by 
establishing performance measures, clarity of purpose, specific research and 
development and defined targets. Similarly they were not seen as exclusive but mutually 
compatible with each and between each function. Territories were seen to aid both staff 
and customers acting as the bridging point between all functions and the local and 
Brigade management systems. Actual territories for practical purposes were co-terminus 
with existing geographical references such as station grounds, District Council areas 
and the overall Brigade operating area. 
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Practices 
Effective management at a local level already existed and it was determined refinement 
might assist whereas wholesale change would not. Operational Command was also 
good. The appropriateness of Officer response had however sometimes been 
questionable and was therefore deemed worthy of review. Territorial management was 
widely dispersed and therefore in need of co-ordination. The questions that arose here 
were: 
• Was the current divisional territory appropriate, given the specialisms and range of 
activities? 
• Could the current structure meet the envisaged growth and frequency of change? - 
• Should an individual be expected to link so many activities and was it desirable that 
one communicator had to operate at such a sensitive and isolated position? 
Change therefore appeared inevitable if functional separation was to be avoided, to 
allow for greater flexibility and to develop the potential of staff to contribute to a quality 
service. 
At Brigade level the challenges were frequent and wide ranging. Areas of activity could 
not be effectively managed due to resource shortages of the right skilled staff. Activity 
increases and more management time were needed within finite resources. The 
translation of strategy into policies and action plans was becoming more complex as the 
activities increase. It was observed that it became more imperative to look forward to 
avoid crisis management. Communication between all groups had similarly become 
more demanding, with risk of isolation for groups at a time when integration is needed. 
Again, therefore, there was a need to reconcile structure. 
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Activity Review and Future Needs Analysis 
A review of current activities had clearly identified that some elements of Brigade 
activities received less attention than others. Whilst this had not been a great concern, 
there was always a doubt, that in some aspects of work, quality was not being delivered. 
An activities review showed areas of need as follows: 
Firetlghting 
Operational Planning, Operational Delivery, Despatch [Command and Control] and 
Communications 
Emergency Planning 
Planning and Technical Support 
Management Support 
Corporate Board Management, Finance, Personnel and Training, External Affairs, 
Technical Support, Performance Review and Property 
Fire Safety 
Inspectorate, Technical Support, External Affairs and Education 
Quality Management and Structure 
It was argued that the provision of any service should include a "level" or "standard of 
delivery" which whilst sometimes difficult to define, also needed to be immediately 
understood, for example "first class" and "high quality". Quantitative targets or 
indicators would wherever possible, support these statements. It was accepted that this 
cannot always be the case and therefore professional subjective judgments had to be 
made about the quality of service, for example, how to differentiate between a well-
performed operational activity and an excellent one. 
The concept of the quality circle, a small work-based group, or preferably a team of 
specialists working together, providing mutual support, developing performance 
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awareness, maintaining service integrity and quality of service, was used. This process 
in fire service terms needed to bring together the four identified functions viz 
firefighting, fire safety, emergency planning and management. Each quality circle, or 
team, needed a leader who acted as the essential communicator, forward planner and 
link with the local community. The leader had key responsibility and accountability for 
the overall quality of performance for the team. Additionally, in the new structure, the 
leader acted in the capacity of Area Manager within multi disciplined environment 
sharing decision-making and avoiding functionalism. In this role the leader acted as the 
convener [or facilitator] not a commander of the resources. 
It had been found that increasing demands for internal and external services had tended 
to be met by creating new specialist groupings closer the centre rather than the front line 
- service delivery points. Rather than centralise the quality team approach was used to 
reverse this trend and provide locally the ability to evaluate performance and monitor 
output in terms of quality of delivery to the public. The service then became output 
focused. 
There was also a desire to have managerial flexibility through generic job descriptions 
to reduce the inherent hierarchical structure created by grading by rank across the 
service. More importantly jobs had to be evaluated against tasks, responsibility, 
accountability and scale. Additionally, leadership, command and management activities 
were considered together with their individual consequences. Some officers need to be 
trained in leadership skills as well as in how to determine resource allocation for 
command purposes. However, both tasks are primarily about firefighting response albeit 
that leadership has an important team-building element in the management process. The 
primary business demanded a management activity, which was high on communication 
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and technical decision-making. There was therefore an element of transferable skills. 
The fact that the daily core business demanded different activities was not allowed to 
minimise the perception that daily management was less important than operational 
command - it simply affected the grade for primary firefighting purposes. This created 
the opportunity to use different ranks for the same generic job. 
A key issue was to avoid top-heavy management. No deputy posts were to exist except 
at the very top of the structure were it was considered essentiil that there should be no 
confusion at any time as to who was fulfilling the operational role of Brigade 
Commander. All the management process and structure re-evaluation was set against 
quality output - not status driven concepts that more senior ranks mean a more 
important post or Brigade. The emphasis was of all the workforce's contributions 
counting. Quantity, how many people there, did not matter so much but where those 
people where, what they were doing and how cost effective they were, thereby placing 
emphasis on quality. This objective resulted in placing support staff, firefighters and 
inspectors together where they did the real job and management "on costs" were 
minimised with decision-making moving closer to the public and the community. 
Identification of territorial decision-making teams was therefore critical. The objective 
was to allow decision and action to be as close to the public as possible. That required 
local managers with authority and the minimum local to centre communication about 
decision-making. A decision made closer to the public was accepted at some risk since 
policy precedents might be set but it was deemed an acceptable risk if local managers 
were to be clear about their authority in just the same way as the Chief Fire Officer. 
The size of the local territorial unit was also critical. It needed to be of sufficient size 
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and composition to be fully effective and economic - how else could the local firefighter 
match public need in a qualitative way but it was recognized equally that support "on 
costs" might become significant if the territorial or local unit chosen was too small. 
The proposition was therefore for: 
• Area teams to have responsibility for the quality of all day to day working 
Supportive managers leading and co-coordinating each area team 
• Interlinked groups of operational managers who had a review, forward 
planning and evaluation role with functional responsibilities. 
• A level of senior managers who had functional accountabilities and 
corporate responsibilities for strategic determination and resource 
allocation 
Impacts 
Generic job titles and descriptions were adopted in the well-understood areas of: 
Operations Manager 
	 Responsible for a corporate function 
Area Manager 	 The local quality team leader 
Team Manager 	 Responsible for delivery of a function at local level 
The relationship that emerged was one of strong local initiative and action, enabled and 
supported by a group of more senior managers who shared the responsibility of 




A quality assured system of management was seen as an approach, which would aid 
better service delivery, whilst ensuring that best value is extracted from the available 
resources. Its emphasis therefore was about placing decision-making close to the public 
and reducing management overheads. The cultural shift was significant with rank 
having less to do with day-to-day management and more operational role related. 
Adoption of critical post holders who did not wear uniform became widely accepted and 
organizational goals moved to an output focus rather than input and quantitative. By 
1994 the Brigade was experimenting in many managerial approaches and innovating 
practices with qualified risk-taking being corporately accepted. Economically in-year 
expenditure control performance improved as devolved budgeting was established and 
practical achievements in procurement activities continued despite tight financial 
restrictions. The participative style, whilst it made individuals feel they were 
responsible, did so in a positive atmosphere since they controlled the resources, 
influenced the policy and made the decisions. The organisation set out the direction, 
provided essential information and management networks and ensured the supply of 
skilled and competent staff. 
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SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 
The World Trade Center 
This catastrophic event caused the death of 2830 people. The north tower was hit by 
American Airlines, Flight 11, a Boeing 767-223ER, estimated to be carrying around 
34,000 litres of fuel and traveling at 470 miles per hour. The second aircraft United 
Airlines Flight 175, a Boeing 767-222, again estimated to be carrying 31,000 litres of 
fuel at about 590 miles per hour hit the south tower. The 767-200 series planes had an 
overall length of 48.5 m, a wingspan of 47.6m, a fuselage diameter of 5.3m, and a tail 
height of 15.8m. 
At 8:46 AM EST, the First plane, banking to the left, collided with the north tower very 
close to the center of the north face between floors 94 and 99. Exterior damage to the 
north extended over all six of these floors. At 9:03 AM, the collision of the second 
plane with the south face of the south tower took place, with damage between floors 78 
to 84. Each damage pattern resembled the outline of the Boeing 767 lying at nearly a 
30-degree angle. The World Trade Centre was a complex of major buildings of which 
the twin towers, 110 storeys high, were a prominent feature. There was partial or total 
collapse of 10 buildings within the complex, which resulted in one million tons of 
material falling on a relatively contained site. 
Each tower was 110 stories, with the north tower being 417 m and the south tower being 
415 m high. Each floor was approximately 3.66 high, with the ceiling height of 2.62 m 
and an intervening floor thickness of 1.04 m. Each tower was square with sides of 63.1 
m. Within each tower was a service core about 24 m by 42 m composed of 47 box-
section load-bearing columns. The core and facade columns constituted the load-
bearing structures for each tower, including the potentially high loads produced by 
IM 
winds. Along each exterior face, there were 59 box-section facade columns spaced at 
1.02 m centers. 
At 9.59 EST Tower 2 collapsed and Tower 1 at 10.29 EST. The collapse of Tower 2 
destroyed the Incident Command Post established in West Street forcing officers to find 
alternative command location and the Tower 1 collapse destroyed the Operations Post 
for that tower. The collapse of Tower 1 killed amongst other officers the Chief of 
Department who was the Incident Commander and it was not until 11.28 EST that he, 
was replaced. The loss of so many firefighters, emergency medial service personnel 
and police officers had a profound effect upon operations to evacuate and rescue the 
thousands of workers already in the World Trade Centre. 
Estimates' ° made using mathematical models based on preliminary assumptions and 
analysis suggest the aircraft collision and release of fuel, which resulted in a fireball and 
started fires in each tower, supplied energy from the fire to the plume of one gigawatt. 
Despite the collision and lire load damage resulting from the strikes of two Boeing 757 
aircraft these structures didn't collapse immediately enabling significant numbers to 
evacuate. It is postulated that the external steel frames and central utility cores suffered 
extensively from the fuel fires and may have weakened installed passive fire protection 
on the steelwork, which was then subjected to severe heat. The progressive failure of 
the steel frame part way up each tower subsequently resulted in the collapse as the 
considerable unsupported structural weight of each tower overcame the residual strength 
remaining in the unaffected parts of the towers. The speed of the final collapse gave 
little hope for those trapped inside either below or above the floors directly affected by 
both aircraft initial impacts. Fuller studies are being conducted in the USA and 
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elsewhere into the important features of building collapse and evacuation. These studies 
will provide important information to designers, civil and fire engineers. 
The scale of the subsequent rescue operation was unprecedented in a modern urban 
environment. A recall of all off-duty firefighters linked to local and government 
responses, made as part of the established mutual aid system and the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency scheme, was only one part of this operation. This 
operation subsequently became a recovery and criminal investigation of enormous-
proportions. A visit to the site in March 2002 indicated that the FDNY were still 
recovering their lost colleagues on a regular basis in a most dignified and appropriate 
way whilst simultaneously rebuilding their fire department and meeting the emergency 
service needs of New Yorkers. 
In addition, and as a result of the attacks, the United States Government has created a 
new strategy for homeland security. President George W Bush stated in Executive 
Order 13228, Section 2, October 8, 2001 that "The Mission of the Office (of Homeland 
Security) shall be to develop and co-ordinate the implementation of a comprehensive 
national strategy to secure the United States from terrorist threats of attacks." 
A key element of the strategy is to support the first responder community. That 
community includes over one million firefighters of which approximately 750,000 are 
volunteers. Other parts of the strategy relate to defence against biological terrorism, 
securing America's borders; using the defence capability of technology' improving 
aviation security; and other security based initiatives. 
The McKinsey Report' 1 and Chief Cruthers 12 reported that the New York State 
mandated command system, which has variations to the ICS processes described, did 
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function effectively. ICS strengths were common terminology, manageable spans of 
control, modulated organisation and integrated communications. Chief Cruthers 
believed the local variation of having one leader rather than unified command was 
preferable. Fire Department deployments on site were undertaken using magnetic 
boards and grease pencils, although the department is now experimenting with a 
prototype mggidised computer. 
Military assistance in logistics, communications and technology, like robots and 
geographic information systems, greatly aided operations. Aerial and thermal 
photography and use of global positioning systems also proved invaluable in the very 
extended post incident phase when identifying and accurately plotting locations on the 
extensively damaged and very large site, to support tasks such as recovery of human 
remains, was required. 
ICS was seen to need more institutionalisation within routine operations with better 
preparedness [training, preplanning, hazard assessments] and improved scalability 
[matching the dynamics of such large scale events by maintaining critical decision and 
safety systems]. The ability to conduct risk assessments in real time, matching 
personnel accountability, information management, incident communications [radio 
traffic, staff deployments, logistics] and inter-agency functionality [unified command, 
mutual aid, information sharing and inter communications], were crucial learning 
outcomes for the decision making processes. 
The McKinsey Report emphasises these communication difficulties concluding that 
they hindered the fire department's chief officers as they co-ordinated the response. 
Initially little reliable information was available and some portable radios failed to work 
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within the high rise structures due to repeater malfunctions [repeater systems amplify 
and rebroadcast the radio signal]. There was a lack of information to the chiefs on what 
was happening in and to the structures so, for example whilst television was 
broadcasting extensive coverage, some officers within World Trade Center 1 were 
unaware of the incident's progression. Consequently they had little precise background, 
such as the aircraft hitting the second tower leading to the fire and ultimate collapse of 
that tower, with which to manage their assignments. The complexity and quantity of 
information flows, compounded by the difficulties of inter-agency working [there was 
spasmodic police and fire communication and a significant uncoordinated response of 
volunteering mutual aid, for example], resulted in serious resource management 
problems. - 
The Fire Department's outcomes recognise that ICS use therefore needs expansion. 
This will target support for Incident Commanders so that crucial decision functions can 
be undertaken in a comprehensive, well-defined and flexible way. McKinsey also 
suggests that highly trained specialised teams may be needed to manage the larger and 
more complex type incidents with the Department's Operation Center being extended 
into a fully functioning emergency operations centre. Planning is also seen as an 
essential component and so are improvements in communications infrastructure and the 
deployment of technology. 
The Pentagon 
Arlington County is the smallest county in the United States with a population of 
around 190,000 people of which the Pentagon workforce alone is more than 23,000. 
Arlington County is located across the Potomac River from Washington, District of 
Columbia. American Airlines Flight 77, a Boeing 757 aircraft with 58 passengers and a 
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crew of 6, crashed into the Pentagon at 9.38 EST with a loss of 189 lives. Arlington 
County Fire Department (ACFD) responded to what eventually became a 10-day 
operation. 
The construction of the Pentagon, which somewhat ironically commenced on 
11 September 1941, involved a five-sided design [chosen primarily because of the 
existing road layout]. The building is essentially of a reinforced concrete construction 
having a floor area of 7 million square feet. The accommodation consists of 
5 continuous rings of offices each 5 storeys high. Contingency planning for the site 
rests with the Commanding General of the Military District of Washington. The 
aircraft's speed when it struck the west side was estimated at 400 miles per hour, with a 
mass of 270,000 pounds, and it penetrated three of the five rings of the of 5 storey 
offices. 
The After Action Report [AAR] 13 prepared on the response by Arlington County to the 
September11 terrorist attack on the Pentagon, as well as describing the activities of a 
number of agencies, identifies a number of learning points. Importantly Chief Plaugher 
of the Arlington County Fire Department [ACFD] reported' 4 and the AAR concurs that 
the ICS and unified command was understood, implemented effectively and operated 
successfully. This is notable given some participants, for example the military, were 
unfamiliar with ICS yet were able to work closely with the identified Incident 
Commander, who was then able to offer explicit information in support of an holistic 
response. 
However difficulties did emerge in communication support operations, central to ICS, 
in that the ACFD did not have a dedicated mobile command unit and, from initial 
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response to tactical operations, almost all aspects of communications were problematic. 
Cellular telephones and radio channels became saturated and even handheld portable 
radios were not interoperable [between fire departments and other emergency 
responders]. Logistically the scale of the event was overwhelming with short-term 
shortages occurring in critical high demand items like breathing apparatus. Mutual aid 
helped overcome these logistic issues as the incident progressed. 
Other areas worthy of improvement were found to be better control of those individuals 
or organisations who responded on their own initiative to the incident, improved 
physical facilities to harden and better equip control and communication centres to 
handle emergencies; better interoperability in field communications, stronger and more 
organised logistics management; and improved co-ordination in managing health related 
issues, including emergency medical services and receiving hospitals. 
It can be postulated that although these incidents, particularly in New York, had unique 
features there is clear evidence that the well-defined command decision-making process 
was essential in maintaining action impetus in what could have been chaotic and 
disestablishing situation for the fire service. What is also evident is the decision system 
is dependent upon an equally crucial and reliable information communication system. 
GAS DISPERSION MODELLING 
Introduction 
The importance of being able to model and predict the behaviour and consequences of 
accidental releases of gases and other contaminants has greatly increased as a 
consequence of public recognition that industrial plant situated in the vicinity of 
dwellings can no longer be assumed to be safe. Bhopal, Chernobyl and Flixborough are 
extreme examples but many other instances exist. Considerable quantities of flammable 
and toxic gases are being produced, stored and transported throughout the world and at 
every stage there is the risk, to a greater or lesser extent, of accidental release. 
When hazardous materials escape the usual case is that a gas or two-phase cloud is 
formed, either as direct release of gas into the atmosphere or vaporous media escaping 
as a two-phase mixture. Of course, liquidmay escape and form pools, which will then 
evaporate to form a cloud. Many of the gases of greatest interest, including the 
hydrocarbons such as natural gas, will be lighter than air and buoyant. Safety 
considerations necessitate the assessment of the hazards that could ensue from an 
accidental gas release usually through the modelling of the gas dispersion process. 
This appendix is concerned the practical response of firefighters and how they can be 
more effective if faster, more efficient models are available used to predict the likely 
patterns of dispersion of gaseous releases into the atmosphere. It is concerned with 
release of toxic contaminants, which pose a threat to health, and, in particular, the 
release of combustible clouds which may ignite to form a fireball exposing surrounding 
objects to a sudden heat radiation load. In this latter respect an analysis of the hazards 
of gas release from two low-pressure gasholders is reported. 
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lithe cloud is not combustible (a radiation leak, for example) or combustion does not 
take place the cloud will be dispersed in the atmosphere by the normally turbulent 
airflow (e.g. wind), spreading and diluting the materials and persons in its path may be 
exposed to a health damaging toxic load. 
There are possibly over a hundred computer models now being marketed for use in the 
calculation of the dispersion of hazardous chemicals released to the atmosphere. In the 
US the United States Environmental Protection Agency [EPA]' has developed 
numerous models that are accessible from the EPA Internet web site. Most are derived 
from its source programme ISC3 which is the industry standard as all commercial 
software packages seem to be derived from it, almost certainly because it is used as a 
regulatory requirement in the USA. A variety of commercial software uses ISC3 as 
basis, with a bespoke user interface to What is otherwise an 'unfriendly' program. 
These models provide an extensive range of useful pollution control models and 
information' . 
When hazardous materials escape, the usual case is that of a gas or two-phase cloud 
being formed, either as a direct release of gas into the atmosphere or a two-phase vapour 
mixture. Of course, liquid may escape and form pools, which will then evaporate to 
form a cloud although the fire service may be able to reduce the extent using water 
curtains. Research by Bara and Dusserre' 6 concluded that for heavier gases (ammonia 
was the gas studied) this was a quick and reliable method, accepting that the use of 
water with ammonia clouds may present an environmental problem. Many of the gases 
of greatest interest, including the hydrocarbons such as natural gas, will be lighter and 
'The EPA was established on 2 December 1970 to protect the nation's health and environment. It's role 
includes clean up and prevention of pollution, ensuring compliance with law, assisting efforts to protect, 
research and educate on environmental issues 
+ United States Environmental Protection Agency http:f/www.epa.gov.scram.0011E22.htm. 
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more buoyant than air. Safety considerations necessitate the assessment of the hazards 
that could ensue from an accidental gas release, usually through the modelling of the 
gas dispersion process, and a large number of pollution surveys over the years have 
been carried out in the power generating industries. For example, studies by Pasquill 
and Smith' 7 cite work by Culkowski, Munn and Cole who have shown that the height of 
a source above the surrounding ground can be disregarded for most practical purposes. 
Research in the United States has identified that many plume models have 
shortcomings, particularly where two-phase jet releases are involved' 8 . Similar 
problems exist with low wind speeds and current approaches fail to predict plume 
movement accurately in these circumstances being designed to give only a general 
overview. Indeed low wind speeds can make dispersal prediction difficult as the 
dispersal distance 19 increases. This does not diminish the value of such models to first 
attendance crews but it does for ongoing operations. 
The initial characterisation of a release is critical for estimating concentrations of gas in 
the cloud20. As a consequence, models that contain similar treatments of atmospheric 
dispersion and use the same meteorological parameters can differ in their predictions by 
orders of magnitude. A number of models of heavy gas cloud formation and dispersion 
have also been assessed by a consortium that contained representatives from British 
Gas, CEGB, HSE and a number of French organisations including Gaz de France, 
Electricite de France and the French Nuclear industry 21 . The assessment compared 
simulations using seven widely available models with controlled input parameters. It 
found that the differences between the model predictions of concentration and cloud 
width are, for "large" volume releases (> 2000 m 3), within a factor of 3 to 5, but that at 
207 
low wind-speeds and with increased surface roughness the factor could be an order of 
magnitude or more. 
For the Incident Commander there are two distinct areas where such modelling will be 
useful, or even critical, these are in the modelling of emission and dispersion. The 
properties of the substance released will have a direct bearing on both aspects, but 
external effects such as meteorology and topography are relevant only to dispersion. 
Significant factors relating to emission must be incorporated accurately into the model; 
otherwise, any subsequent dispersion model based on the release data will carry forward 
and may exacerbate errors incorporated in estimating the emission. It has to be 
remembered that however good the technology the primary requirement is for accurate 
and complete data. 
Work has been undertaken in the UK and two studies by Johnson 22 and Pettit 23 recorded 
relevant incidents attended by the fire service. These considered both liquid and 
gaseous releases and gave considerable attention to the Guassian and box models. 
Johnson concluded that the CHEMET*  scheme24 appeared to offer the best way forward 
and could be extremely valuable to the emergency services [The Meteorological Office 
has since made useful additions to the scheme in the form of guidance to meteorological 
forecasters 25 ]. 
The main difficulty Johnson noted was that an estimate of the area at risk could not be 
provided quickly enough for first attendance crews and did not account for dense gas or 
complex topographical situations. He believed that the best way forward would be to 
• CHEMET Service provided by the Meteorological Office, free at point of consumption to emergency 
services, to provide a service of expected weather conditions in a defined locality. 
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upgrade the CFIEMIET system by introducing something similar to the North American 
Emergency Response guidebook26 . 
Reviewing this earlier study it was concluded that any fire service prediction model is 
likely to be significantly different from those used generally by government agencies 
and industrial companies to predict likely consequences of accidental release of 
hazardous materials. Firstly, it has to be fast, and secondly it must be capable of 
producing - whether directly or interpreted through a handbodk - sufficiently accurate 
predictions for consequent actions to be confidently taken. It should also be capable of 
incorporating accurate local weather and other relevant data gathered by the fire service 
at the scene, including measurements of concentrations of pollutants. - 
Such a process requires careful review, as there are situations at major hazard 
installations where considerable volumes of dangerous materials are stored and the 
duration for release may be hours rather than minutes. The possibility therefore of 
improving the CFIEMET prediction system would be very attractive and provide an 
increased level of prediction with existing reliability. 
One major weakness with CHEMIET is the perception that pollution from fires is less of 
a problem than those of hazardous materials. This is very questionable as products of 
combustion are frequently very toxic and smoke paIls can be of long duration with large 
volumes of material 27 . Flammable gas clouds can also have a devastating impact as 
Unconfined Vapour Cloud Explosions (UVCE5) and the obvious case of fireballs 
(Diffusion flame) shows. Here the main parameters necessary for hazard prediction are; 
the fire ball diameter, fireball duration, thermal flux at the fireball surface, heat radiation 
from the fireball at different distances, and the proximity of humans and property 28 . 
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Over the past fifty years there have been at least two fireball or UVCE incidents every 
year in which the damage occasioned by the blast was the major concern 29 . 
The most prestigious and widely used source of information on the prediction of likely 
physical effects resulting from the release of hazardous materials was the so-called 
"Yellow Book" prepared by TNO in the Netherlands for the Committee for the 
Prevention of Disaster with the support and approval of the Directors General of 
Labour, Environmental Protection, Transport, Public Order and Security and published 
in 197930.  However, rapid advances were made in the modelling of the escape and 
dispersion of gases and the "Yellow Book" was extensively re-written by 1988 with a 
substantially revised second edition published in 1992. Within its remit this remains the 
generally accepted guide for engineering solutions for sources at or close to the ground, 
but it was by no means comprehensive, lacking a section on the dispersion of heavy 
gases which was to be dealt with in a later edition, and weak on how the concentrations 
of the cloud fluctuated as it progressed through the atmosphere. 
As mentioned significant work has been undertaken in the United Kingdom by the Fire 
Research and Development Group, a department of the Home Office responsible for fire 
service research, to identify gas dispersion modelling and predication systems which 
might be capable of use by first attendance appliance crews. Primary amongst this work 
are two studies by Johnson 3 ' and Pittit 32 , which recorded the general range of incidents 
attended by the fire service and considered both liquid and gaseous releases. 
These authors noted that various standard models had been developed for liquid and gas 
spills together with jet releases and those arising from pool evaporation or flashing 
fractions from particular leakage. The authors also played considerable attention to the 
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Guassian model (see below) and box models created for specific research work. 
Johnson concluded that having reviewed the models he found that the CHEMIET " 
which is the scheme provided by the UK Met Office, appeared to offer the best way 
forward and could be extremely valuable to the emergency services. 
The difficulties he noted was that the estimate of the area at risk could not really be 
provided quickly enough for first attendance crews and did not account for dense gas or 
complex topographical situations. The difficulty here was twdfold. CHEMET is a free 
service offered to the emergency services and no funding exists for an improved service. 
Secondly the service is delivered from Regional Met. Offices using wide area forecasts 
and so cannot take account of local microclimates. In addition there were at the time of 
its adoption few public sector systems and to date it remains the only system supported 
24 hours per day by professional meteorologists. Johnson believes that the best way 
forward would be to upgrade the model by introducing something similar to the North 
American Emergency Response Guide Book 34 [NAER'96 Guide], which was then 
available in French, Spanish and English. 
The NAER'96 Guide is specifically related to transport emergencies and although the 
guidance given is generally quite comprehensive for a very wide range of chemicals the 
difficulty is that there are a significant number of incidents which arise in chemical and 
other fixed plants with specific problems. Even though an overspill or leak may not 
have a volume in excess of that likely to be transported in a tank, the duration of the 
leak itself that creates specific difficulties. In addition the topography of the site 
(adjacent buildings, other hazards in the vicinity) may pose serious risks both to humans 
and to other plant processes. 
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The prediction model that the fire service requires is significantly different from those 
used generally by government agencies and industrial companies to predict likely 
consequences of accidental release of hazardous materials. First it has to be fast, the 
incident commander on site has a responsibility to protect life and property and in an 
incident the time for decision-making can be the order of minutes. Secondly it must be 
capable of producing - whether directly or interpreted through a handbook, sufficiently 
accurate predictions for consequent actions to be confidently taken. It should also, of 
course, be capable of incorporating weather and other relevant data both unknown and 
available. But importantly, the fire service has a capability of gathering local 
information on wind speed, direction and other relevant data at the scene, including 
measurements of concentrations of pollutants to allow a continuous updating of the 
model. 
Such a scenario, if it could be applied through a defined model or template, would offer 
better prediction than that currently available within the NAER Guidebook. 
This consideration requires careful review, as there are situations at major hazard 
installations where considerable volumes of dangerous materials are stored and the 
duration for release may be hours rather than minutes. This is particularly relevant with 
regards to CFIEMET the service supplied free to emergency services by the 
Meteorological Office. CHEMET regards releases from fires as less of a problem than 
those of hazardous materials but this is doubtful as products of combustion are 
frequently very toxic and are not destroyed in the heat of combustion. 
The CFIEMET scheme is operated by the police or fire service telephoning the 
appropriate regional meteorological office and ensures that a short-term forecast is 
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given which will help predict the plume behaviour. Recent work has been carried out to 
improve the nature of the information provided on the standard reporting system. 
One similarity between the CFIEMIET approach and NAER Guide is that of defined area 
at risk which, in order to allow for a meandering plume from a ground source, adopts a 
300 spread on either side of the source point. 
This wide variation in spread, in an urbanised area, could create considerable difficulties, 
requiring the police and fire service to give serious operational consideration to the 
evacuation of large numbers of the public if this leak was to continue for any extended 
period. 
The possibility therefore of improving the CHEMET prediction system so offering an 
improved way forward might be very acceptable and provide an increased reliability in 
the overall output parameters achieved. 
FUMMMENTALS OF ATMOSPHERIC DISPERSION. 
General 
It is important for responsible persons in the fire service to understand the fundamentals 
of atmospheric dispersion and of the processes used for modelling it. The fire service 
perspective includes not only concern about the spatial and temporal distribution of 
releases of flammable gases, but also smoke or toxic cloud movements and the 
possibility of the long-term harm that toxicological products could create for individuals 
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The pollutant concentrations in any atmosphere can vary considerably and for any 
individual pollutant those variations are invariably determined predominantly by 
meteorological factors. They are also related to the type of source; the ground contours; 
the physical or chemical properties of the particular pollutant; the geography of a 
particular area; and can vary considerably throughout the seasons of the year. It is the 
physical and chemical features that determine the actual distribution of the pollutant in 
the given atmospheric conditions, the two characteristics, of density and reactivity, 
being particularly important for cloud behaviour and dispersion. 
The density of any gas is used to categorise the meteorological circumstances according 
to the corresponding particular atmospheric conditions. Gases that are described as 
passive are regarded as having a density that is equal to the prevailing air density and so 
would generally follow the ambient air movement without any major disturbance. 
Equally, there are gases that are lighter than surrounding air and these will clearly 
disperse a great deal easier moving rapidly upwards in the atmospheric layer. Gases are 
also able to be transformed very easily if they are reactive, that is they can react with 
other pollutants within the atmosphere or with atmospheric components, such as 
moisture or solar radiation, which will effect how the pollutant moves forward as a 
cloud. 
There are also gases regarded as heavy where the gas collapses to the ground and 




When undertaking an assessment of the consequences and dispersal of an accidental 
release of a given hazardous substance two of the most important parameters are wind 
speed and direction. The wind speed is particularly important when considering the 
dispersion of toxic or flammable substances in the atmosphere and will have an 
important effect on the hazard ranges associated with the scenario. The majority of 
dispersion models use the wind speed as a key input but it is generally accepted 35 that 
for wind speeds lower than about 2 ms 1 , available models are insufficiently detailed or 
accurate. This is somewhat surprising since the mean wind speed at Manchester 
Ringway for the decade 1983 to 1992 was recorded as 1.5 ms 1 for about 20% of the  
time. 
Meteorological Office wind speed data is almost always collected at a standard height 
of 10 m. But those releases within or adjacent to, urban areas (which are of greatest 
concern) will often be at, or close to the ground. Wind speeds for the lowest levels 
have, therefore, to be estimated. 
Both Pettit and Johnson identified that the duration of releases, and the general gas 
density were significant factors in determining the likely down wind distances at which 
pollution could be significant. 
These consequences of wind are also affected by physical location, particularly in a 
country like the UK, surrounded by seas. For low wind speeds sea breezes can be 
important. On a fine summer's day these will start at about 10.00 am and may penetrate 
inland by as much as 90 km by sunset. For stable conditions, with little convection the 
215 
sea breeze will remain local to the coast. In the UK a sea breeze in the daytime can be 
seen to come in from the sea as the landmass becomes warm from the sun and the 
colder air moves in off the sea to replace the warm air. This air then rises to the lower 
layers in the atmosphere. In the evening this breeze process is often reversed as the land 
cools and the winds move out towards the warmer more stable temperature of the sea. 
Local wind systems may be set up within valleys. Anabatic winds occur where the air 
flows up slopes that have been warmed by solar heating. The vertical profile of wind 
speed will not follow the normal boundary layer conditions and maximum wind speeds 
will occur within a few metres of the surface of the slope. The situation is reversed 
during nocturnal cooling, giving katabatic winds. Where there is no external forcing the 
valley will experience significant diurnal variation in both wind speed and direction - 
Simple conditions are those such as the change that occurs between day and night. 
During the day warm air when heated moves off the ground and causes thermal 
turbulence. In the colder nighttime air unstable conditions are created and create 
atmospheric influences. Conversely there can be very unstable conditions where 
pollutants either readily mix or may accept moisture, which then primarily affects 
dispersion creating different dispersion characteristics. 
Amongst these conditions different forms of approach to modelling that have developed 
are lacking in accuracy for wind speeds of less than about 2 ms-i. This is important 
because most transport phenomena of interest to the brigade officer commanding an 
incident are on a meteorological micro scale, in the order of km rather than hundreds of 
km. The transport behaviour of, say, plumes from accidents are normally within the 
Atmospheric Boundary Layer, the lowest 500 to 1000 m of the earth's atmosphere. 
Dispersion of pollutants within this layer will depend strongly on loca] wind effects and 
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stratification. Depending upon the local conditions the plume could be brought down to 
ground level within a few kms or remain aloft for many tens of kms. 
Air Temperature 
An important property of the atmosphere is stability. This is primarily a function of the 
temperature variation in the lowest part of the atmosphere, and given an indication of 
the tendency of vertically displaced parcels of air to move within the atmosphere. In 
neutral conditions, which generally occur for moderate to high wind speeds, th& 
temperature lapse is adiabatic (in practice this is about 1 °C/100 m), if a vertically 
displaced parcel of air moves up or down. The air temperature then adjusts to its 
surroundings and it will neither rise nor fall any further. Such conditions result in 
strong mechanical mixing with negligible convective effects. 
In very stable conditions the temperature may actually increase with height. This 
results in the tendency for any displaced parcel of air to return to its original position 
and reduced mixing occurs. In very unstable conditions the lapse rate is supra adiabatic 
causing any vertically displaced air to continue its movement setting up large 
convective cells and enhancing mixing. 
Temperature differences likewise create major air movements, being particularly 
important in terms of cloud movements where inversion characteristics may arise. This 
inversion process often restricts the depth of any pollutant layer almost putting a lid on 
the atmosphere and at night time, when ground cooling has occurred, can produce quite 
static and clearly defined layer conditions. The envelope of air surrounding the earth, 
the troposphere, is where the majority of the weather is formed. The top part of this is 
about 5 miles high over the poles and 11 miles over the equator and varies in 
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temperature quite significantly. Within this area its temperature determines the density 
of the air. Warm air is less dense than that of cold and will always therefore tend to be 
forced upwards by the surrounding colder air. The temperature is derived in one of two 
ways. The first is by contact with a surface having a different temperature; 
consequently air that lays on hot surfaces warms by conduction becomes less dense, and 
then rises. The whole process has to be in balance so as soon as warm air rises cooler 
air moves into the vacuum created and the series of vertical up currents or thermals are 
consequently replaced or balanced by compensating down currents with the whole 
process of convection then being underway. 
Equally air that is in contact with any colder surface is cooled by conduction, gains 
density and if it is the ground that is cold then the air would tend to settle and cool still 
further. In this way cold air can remain very close to the ground for long periods, the 
fog of the winter being an obvious example. 
Temperature may also be affected by pressure, independent of any outside source, since 
air like any gas warms on compression and cools on expansion. In the atmosphere, 
where pressure is exerted by the column of air overhead, then a transfer process will 
begin to work and becomes inter related with the warm air of conduction rising. The 
cool air of reduced pressure enters from the atmosphere and when the cold air travels 
down to the ground it starts to warm and the entire process becomes repeated. 
A very important part of this process in the study of cloud movement arising from fires 
or toxic leaks is that of inversion where the temperature acts, as already mentioned, as a 
lid on the thermal of rising air as soon as it reaches surroundings warmer than itself and 
ceases to be buoyant. A good practical example of this is in the stillness of the winter 
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when smoke from a garden bonfire can quite clearly be seen to rise, reach the inversion 
point after rising rapidly on the thermals created by the fire but then spreads out 
horizontally. 
Pressure differences created by thermals are important and have to be recognised as do 
local weather conditions which may create their own distinct features of high and low 
pressure zones which will directly affect the movement of any smoke plume. The UK 
typically has westerly winds which are the depressions moving east across the Atlantic 
clashing with the higher pressure that usually exist over the landmass. It is worth being 
aware that whilst these conditions generally are static, in the sense they will not change 
rapidly during the duration of an incident, they are totally dependant upon the local 
processes already touched upon. Likewise thermals, arising from fires can convey 
products considerable distances upward into the atmosphere before they disperse and 
will often deepen on sunny days but as the sun sets it is usual to expect that the 
dispersion will conversely slow. This occurs since the joint effect of the sun and the fire 
will cease. 
These thermals are particularly important to the fire service officer and as a general rule 
the height of the axis of any plume of hazardous material the more the dilution by the 
vertical and cross winds spreading which must occur before any effect is noticed at 
ground level. 
Practical Impacts 
Smoke pails can create major health hazards and the ability to predict the likely spread 
due to atmospheric temperatures and wind conditions can be an extremely important 
part of determining suitable responses for public evacuation. Local winds play a 
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significant part in the understanding of fireground effects. Winds such as zephyrs, 
moving from cool areas into warm ones, are not particularly strong but will have some 
impact around the fireground. The most significant observed fire phenomena in this 
regard were the firestorms created at Dresden during the Second World War. Large 
numbers of the population suffered death, apparently not from direct burning but from 
air movement created as these zephyrs intensified and moved into the thermals created 
by the massive fires. Subsequently insufficient oxygen was left in the surrounding areas 
unaffected by fire leading to a loss of human lives. 
Whilst this is a worse case scenario, similar effects can occur particularly where large 
areas of cool air may exist close by the fire scene. 
The temperature ranges that occur in urban areas may also be important. Urban areas 
are measurably different to those in open country; certainly urban temperatures reach 
significantly values than those of any surrounding rural district. The range can move 
from a few tenths of degrees Celsius to several degrees. The maximum effect of this 
can often be found on calm clear nights in the summer when a heat sink effect occurs 
within the city or urban area. These impacts are quite important in that the balancing 
processes already mentioned created by radiation, have to be satisfied by conduction 
and turbulence transfers occurring between the two areas. 
Surface temperatures may also reach an appreciably higher value in towns and cities 
arising from man-made heat. Consequently open country effects, such as the deep 
frosts of a clear winter night, may not be seen within the urban environment where 
boundary layers can change and create inversions. This may become important when 
fires create thermal plumes. 
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Topography 
Dense concentrations are inversely related to the speed of any ground level release. 
Wind direction will directly affect any dispersion and the direction is also related to any 
ground contours, or what might be termed surface roughness, which will cause collapse 
or conversely rapid movement of any clouds. Most industrial sites from which gas 
dispersion could be expected will contain a number of buildings and other structures. 
These will vary in height and will significantly affect the airflow at, say, head height 
(approx. 2m above ground level). Channelling and sheltering effects will be present, 
significantly altering airflow patterns at lower levels in a non-predictable way. In 
addition there are likely to be heat sources and differences in ground cover (tarmac, 
grass, etc.), which will ensure a distribution of temperatures that may drive significant 
local convection currents. Little has been done to quantify such effects 36 . 
For the built environment within urban cities these contours may well be created by 
high rise buildings or factories forcing the air to move through passages which may be 
narrower and therefore increase the speed and the concentrations of any toxic products. 
Buildings can significantly affect atmospheric dispersion 37 
There are an infinite number of possible configurations of release and obstacle 
arrangements and no general theory exists to predict the dispersion of gas releases for 
all conditions. Wind tunnel data reported by Duijm and Webber is confined to street 
canyons consisting of simple cubed shapes with the wind parallel to the two lines of 
cubes and the source midway between the lines. No validated simple methods exist that 
describe dispersion around arbitrary arrangements of two or more obstacles, but the 
general approach (where the cloud depth is much greater than the height of the 
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individual obstacles) is to use a roughness length appropriate to the obstacle 
arrangement. 
Within the physical environment there is also the need to consider the impact of any 
ground contours, which may include contours created by buildings that introduce high 
wind speeds or turbulence in localised areas. The opposite of these wind speeds can be 
almost stagnant conditions where buildings act like the walls of a valley restricting any 
real dispersion within the valley area. 
As with all these natural phenomena considerable variations can -arise due to local 
geography. Ground contours will clearly distort any wind patterns in a very similar way 
to how they would disturb water if it were flowing across similar ground contours. 
Humidity 
From a firefighting point of view there is also the need to consider humidity, as air, 
which contains high amounts of vapour, will again introduce conditions that directly 
affect the ability to disperse any products. Saturated air, that is air which is containing 
the maximum amount possible of any vapour, will create special conditions which if 
such air meets any absorbent materials used in building constructions or outside goods 
storage areas could produce circumstances which rapidly increase concentrations of any 
product. This is important in fireground conditions where harmful products entering the 
air stream may have already been subjected to high levels of water used in the 
firefighting and example here may be the use of water sprays on ammonia leaks. 
Consequently if this polluted saturated air finds itself in a situation below dew point, 
that is where the temperature is just below the saturation point, some droplets will 
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inevitably occur. A practical example here may be droplets of a high level pollutant 
falling some distance away from a fire creating possible harm to pets or animals but 
more likely corrosion or similar problems to vehicles and paintwork of buildings. 
This sort of condensation is very important since it can almost reach the stage of 
creating a fog very similar to the natural fog of condensation. Fog exists until either a 
temperature rise lifts the air and clears it away or an increase in wind speed creates 
sufficient movement to disperse the fog. Under fireground cohditions the condensation 
fog at ground level could contain very high level pollutants and the consequence of risk 
to the population. In the winter there is also the possibility that real fog may be 
combined with the fire process and liquid droplets again at low temperatures might 
occur creating quite difficult conditions. 
One particular fog, advection, could pose particular difficulties as it arises from warm 
air being cooled on a cold area. If the fog happens to contain harmful levels of 
condensate, which do not clear easily, dew point and saturation become quite important, 
especially in the cold winter temperatures of the UK, and it is worth being aware of 
such difficult conditions. 
There is also the possibility of such specialised conditions occurring with clouds of gas 
or smoke that become dominant around particular geographic features such as large 
hills. The natural phenomenon involved is referred to as an orographic cloud, but 
effectively results in a cloud forming and evaporating over the relatively humid part of a 
hilltop. 
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These natural phenomena would normally be seen as the cloud that becomes stuck on 
the top of a hill or to the rear of a particular high point but it has the ability to cause 
deep concentrations, which is more interesting to the fire service officer. 
INDUSTRIAL EXPERIENCE 
Studies into effluents from industrial processes generally use the simple model that 
ground level concentration from a source of a fixed height is inversely proportional to 
that height. This in turn means that considerable importance is attached to the height of 
the source of a plume centre line since this will be the result of any buoyancy created in 
the process. 
However the physics of the problem are not so simple and studies into gaseous 
effluents, such as those coming from power stations, has been seen to be a complex 
process domihated first by the rise and influence induced in any plume, as a 
consequence of its upward movement and secondly, the buoyancy, which is subjected to 
the natural dispersive actions of the atmosphere. 
These complexities have resulted in a large number of surveys over the years 
particularly by those involved in the power generating industries and studies. Pasquill 
and Smith cite work by Culkowski, Munn and Cole who have for example identified 
that the height of a source can be disregarded for most practical purposes 38 . 
Consequently these studies have generally shown that despite these complexities it is 
still a reasonable policy to use a ground level source as the input to any calculation and 
prediction of safe estimates of concentration. This is particularly relevant to the fire 
service who have a capability and capacity to measure ground level dispersion but little 
expertise in the utilisation of complex modelling data. 
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It has already been mentioned the general degree of aerodynamic roughness of any area 
could create distinct problems predicting the transfer with any source gas. The work by 
Culkowski cited by Pasquill and Smith has also indicated, that for practical purposes of 
estimating likely down wind concentrations it is quite often adequate to calculate an 
upper limit by neglecting the elevation of the source and any initial rapid down stream 
dispersion caused by aerodynamics. 
Some of the areas identified that are important have been fridicated in an idealised 
representation for a continuous leak or smoke plume. Variations in the position and 
magnitude of the concentrations that might cause difficulty arise from changes in wind 
direction and the rates of vertical spread. Variations therefore in concentration relating 
to a fixed point source may be considerable and this has to be borne in mind when 
trying to create 
Modelling or plume approaches capable of interpretation for the fire service. An 
idealised plume developed from studies into environmental pollution would typically 
show features where the cross and down wind isopleths are indicated as powers of 10 
when normalised as proportions of apparent cross and down wind values. 
OPERATIONAL RESPONSE 
Translating some of this more generalised information into practical conclusions for the 
fire service is particularly difficult. Recent research conducted at the Home Office into 
gas release systems by the Fire Research and Development Group has focused 
extensively upon the North American Emergency Response Guide Book previously 
mentioned. This is a guidebook produced for first responders during the initial phase of 
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hazardous materials and dangerous goods incidents and relates particularly to those 
products rather than to general harm caused by smoke. 
The guide seeks to help identify dangerous materials and provide advice upon how best 
to approach them. It does however also include particular guidance on the identification 
of zoned areas, which may present harm to individuals. Guidance has been collated 
from Canada, the United States of America and Mexico and represents the conclusion of 
work undertaken by a group of representatives who provide The transport emergency 
response within these countries. 
The NAER Guidebook was therefore a development of the Transport Department of 
Canada, the US Department of Transportation and the Secretariat of Communications 
and Transportation in Mexico and is specifically designed for use by fire-fighters. The 
document contains a particular reference to what is described as a table of initial 
isolation and protective action distances. This table suggests distances useful for the 
protection of people from vapours resulting from spills of dangerous goods that are 
considered poisonous or toxic by inhalation. It is designed to give consideration for the 
first 30 minutes after any material has been spilled and recognises that changes could 
occur and increase risk with time. 
The guide defines an initial isolation zone as an area immediately surrounding the 
incident in which persons may be exposed to dangerous and life threatening 
concentrations where the dangerous conditions which are life threatening exist both up 
and down wind of the source. A protective action zone is then defined as an area, which 
is downwind from the incident where any person may become incapacitated or unable 
to take protective action and could 
226 
incur serious or irreversible health effect. 
The table provides specific guidance for small and large spills occurring during the day 
and night periods. It recognises that some adjustment for distances for a specific 
incident may be required with independent variables that should be made by personnel 
technically qualified to make any such adjustments. 
Factors that are particularly identified as needing to change the protective action, 
distances are clearly those relating to the nature of the material especially where it 
becomes involved in fire. Similarly if a spill involves more than one or two vessels then 
the tables may need to be extended and increased. Also recognised are materials that 
may be identified as requiring protective action distance up to 7 miles or 11 kilometres 
under certain atmospheric conditions. These in turn may have to be extended quite 
considerably or if a dangerous vapour plume is channelled down a valley or between 
high buildings. Spills in regions where there is strong inversion, which often occurs in 
the countries mentioned, through snow near to the source centre with steady winds, may 
also demand similar changes. 
Materials reacting with water are also touched upon as being particularly difficult and of 
course could influence environmental requirements for protection. All these various 
factors have to be considered alongside the protective action decision factors that relate 
to the protective options that may be available. Evacuation, which is one possible 
protective action, is frequently not available and persons may be required to remain in a 
shelter condition rather than being placed at particular risk from dangerous goods. The 
sort of influences that need to be considered, apart from the volume and rate of release 
are the actual degree of risk to health and the speed of vaporisation. 
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Similarly under evacuation conditions the location and number of people involved will 
influence how long it may take to evacuate or conversely how short the dispersion may 
take offering the option that it may be better to shelter people. The ability to control 
and move people and the availability of shelter and specific risks such as those of health 
care premises also need to be considered. 
The model produced defines the initial isolation zone with its core being the spill with 
the protection action zone placed in a downwind configuration with the outer limits of 
the spill generally seen to be half the downwind distance to allow for a meandering 
plume. 
The practical impact of the guidance given is that it requires tremendous isolation areas 
and whilst it does seem to offer significant potential linked to the table of various 
conditions great care is needed in its application. 
Using the table for a practical example of a chlorine spill the initial isolation zone 
diameter is 20 metres or 200 feet for a small spill and 185 metres or 600 feet for a large 
spill. The downwind protection zone during the day extends to 0.2 miles or 0.3 
kilometres from the source with 0.5 mile or 0.8 kilometre at night for a small spill. A 
large spill requires a 0.5mile daytime distance with a 1.9-mile night-time limit. 
It must be realised that this work has been produced for the North American Continent 
using average temperatures from 61 US cities. The average temperature recorded was 
350C considerably above the UK average. The definition of a small spill relates directly 
to the US 55 gallon or 0.lkgs storage drum. A large spill is 3kgs. By using the 
downwind distance and halving it for the outer parameter, what is in effect being 
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created is a 30 0C spread on either side of the initial isolation zone with everyone 
regarded at risk within this particular zone. 
The UK temperatures are considerably different with a 25 0C day and a 150C night 
temperature. Humidity within the UK is often at 70% and when UK consultants 
considered this matter they used stable weather as classified by Pasquill that is with 
winds below 5 metres per second. They also assumed a surface roughness of 0.12 the 
equivalent of a wooded area. To illustrate the practical circuthtances involved at actuaP 
incidents the following case study based on a chemical release attended by the author is 
included for reference. 
CASE STUDY INCIDENT 
13 June 1987 At The ICI Rocksavage Works Runcorn 
This incident provides a case study of a toxic gas release. The incident commenced 
about 1030 a.m. on the chlorine distillation plant when it was noted that there was a 
problem on a mild steel condenser. The condenser was used to condense chlorine that 
had been boiled off from the brine process as a method of removing any bromine, which 
is an impurity within the brine process of gathering chlorine. 
The chlorine bromine mix is placed within the condenser and operations are at around 
10-bar pressure. Chlorine derived in this way from brine is known to carry other 
impurities and on occasions a chlorine iron fire can occur. That is what is believed did 
occur and caused corrosion on the condenser, which eventually allowed chlorine to 
penetrate through the internal jacket into the water contained within the outer jacket. 
This water in turn then went to the cooling towers where, in the process of air stripping, 
a chlorine release into the atmosphere inevitably arose. 
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The ultimate impact was that a chlorine iron fire also became established within the 
condenser jacket that ultimately penetrated the outer condenser wall and allowed what 
was then relatively hot stock chlorine to be vented into the atmosphere through what 
was now the weakest point within the condenser. It is estimated the internal 
temperatures caused by the chlorine iron fire were around 1400 0C within the condenser. 
Serious conditions were noted at around noon on the 13 June and when it is believed the 
chlorine-bromine-ferric chloride mixture was actually emitted through the body of an 
inlet carrying water flow from the condenser water control valve. The estimates of the 
released quantities were between 0.5 and 1.8 tonne. This was based upon estimates of 
the remaining inventory within the condenser system and the increased weight of the 
chlorine bromine dump tank, which was isolated at the start of the emission. 
Eyewitnesses at the time saw flames by the condenser and a large amount of ferric 
chloride was subsequently found following investigation. The water exit on the pipe 
work was estimated to be very hot with analysis of paint subsequently indicating that 
over 2000C temperatures must have been prevalent around the pipe work. 
The release to the atmosphere was probably made at around 9 - 12 bar pressure at a 
temperature around 48 0C and as part of the reaction a chlorine hydrate was developed 
that subsequently would break up thereby increasing temperature. Other reactions 
might arise forming iron chloride and in an exothermic reaction hydrochloric acid and 
hydrogen. Again these reactions would be exothermic. 
Ultimately all the chemistry possibilities were examined. The possibility of a chlorine- 
hydrogen explosion could not be discounted since there was a violent pressure stage at 
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the time of the gaseous chlorine emission. This was however probably due to a high 
temperature vaporisation from the condenser water jacket. The condenser had been in a 
static condition i.e. not circulating for around 90 minutes before the incident. 
What is also interesting about this incident is that there was, in the area outside the 
condenser plant and some distance away, a qualified chemist working as an 
environmentalist. He was able to provide an eye witness account which demonstrated 
that white and a pale brown fume cloud rose to a height to between 300 - 400 feet and 
also formed a dense brown and white cloud which rolled away from the plant. He also 
noted the developing cloud stayed very low and started to move at a different angle to 
the initial puff release that formed the high cloud. Wind speed and direction were 
consistent with the cloud formation since the direction the low cloud took followed the 
wind direction and the rolling nature of the cloud was consistent with the wind speed 
that was estimated to be calm with very low ground speeds. The outcome was a two-
stage plume with the two elements of a high and a low cloud moving in differing 
directions at different speeds. 
What is interesting from this case study is that if a conventional isopleth had been 
utilised to predict a cloud of chlorine bromine it is most likely that it would have 
predicted a low cloud movement but not the high cloud that moved in a different 
direction. 
Wind strength and direction also changed during the incident, an important point when 
it is realised some children were directly in line with the cloud. The duration of the 
incident lasted several hours following the noon release. The ability to track the cloud 
accurately, in the way the qualified eye- witness observed, would have been beneficial. 
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It would both have allowed a wide area to be returned too normal [in this case the 
motorway was closed for a protracted period even though it was unaffected]. And it 
would have better informed the site operator and fire service of the effectiveness of their 
combined onsite actions designed to control the release. [The fire service did have large 
volumes of water for cooling and water curtain spray purposes during the emission from 
the chlorine distillations plant]. 
Previous research in the United States has identified that many plume models have 
shortcomings particularly where two jet releases are involved and this case indicates the 
type of variability's involved in actual events39 40 
Both the current CFIEMIET and NAERG approaches would have failed to predict 
accurately in these circumstances both being too broad in their overview. This does not 
diminish their value to first attendance crews but it does for ongoing operations. Useful 
additions to the basic CHEMIET scheme are included in the guidance given to 
meteorological forecasters but this is not available to the fire service at the scene 41 . 
FUTURE DEVELOPMENT 
CHEMET has been used by the fire service on a number of occasions. A more recent 
quoted example is that for a Napha leak in Cleveland on the 4 May 199742.  CFIEMIET 
was able to provide a series of predictions to match changes in wind direction as the 
wind moved its direction significantly during the period of the toxic leak. What was 
important however was that the cloud did not move as predicted throughout the period 
even though the three-quarter cloud cover that existed and the neutral stability of the 
atmosphere was correctly classified suggesting again, as at the Runcorn incident local 
factors were more influential. 
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The defined areas of risk for very urbanised areas are significant, in terms of the size of 
the population affected. Although general policies such as that of "shelter" may be 
adopted (i.e. people stay indoors and close all doors and windows) it was nevertheless 
necessary to expend considerable energy to maintain accurate identification of the 
physical levels of contaminant present due to the leak. 
In this case for example it was necessary on a number of occasions to disrupt road 
traffic to ensure safety, and this is an element of incident mahagement that creates, for 
the fire service particularly, serious difficulties. 
Minimising disruption to road or rail traffic and the effected population demands that 
plume prediction should be as accurate as possible. Improved accuracy would be 
achieved if wind speed and direction obtained at the scene, together with on site 
measurement of down-wind concentrations occurring during the incident, were fed back 
into the model to give enhanced accuracy. The overall impact would be to improve the 
standard of prediction and so enable the predicted area at risk to become more closely 
realigned to that threatened by the actual leak. The basis of the process would remain 
the current CHEMET system with the 15 pre-determined idealised plume templates 
designed to estimate typical emission events across a range of anticipated atmospheric 
conditions. 
As an example the use of diffusion tubes used to obtain pollutant densities tubes tend to 
over-estimate concentrations when compared to more chemically based analysers. 
Consequently models usually only permit general assessment rather than any 
particularly accurate assumption. They are nevertheless useful and can be, if accurate 
data is supplied, relatively precise. The difficulty is obtaining the right level of 
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accuracy given that critical decisions will often have to be made within short time scales 
based upon those conclusions. 
The Met. Office has consistently refined its CFIEMIET system. Detailed notes exist to 
allow identification of wind speed and direction, stability and the depth of any mixing 
layer in which the gas may occur. 
This information approach now requires the fire service, or Other user, to supply in a 
systemised way detailed weather and product data, which is then used by the forecaster. 
The result is often a facsimile plume prediction supplied direct to the requesting 
organisation within a period of less than 30 minutes. In each of these considerations the 
gas is considered neutrally buoyant and this is an important part of the prediction 
process. Further research conducted by the Met Office also enables calculations to be 
made upon the air projectory utilising standard models evolved over considerable time. 
This is linked to the depth of the mixed layer, generally established as day, a stable 
night or a deep convection period, has enabled a nomogram to be developed. The 
nomogram provides an estimate of the mixed layer utilising wind speed, integrated heat 
from the dawn and the amount of cloud cover [measured in Oktasj. In addition the Met 
Office has developed its own defined Pasquill stability index and again converted it into 
a simple flow chart for use by their forecasters. 
The quality of the forecast produced by the Met Office, it is argued, has been refiied but 
remains highly dependent upon the quality of the input information. Improvement 
might be gained by ensuring that real local data, e.g. actual wind speed and direction is 
input into the model. This would apply particularly, for example, to a major chemical 
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complex closely positioned to the sea where local winds are very likely to be at variance 
to those forecasted by the Meteorological Office. It is argued therefore that if a degree 
of improved information could be supplied by the fire service to the forecasters, then 
this in turn could improve the prediction available through 
Extending the use of the templates to all engaged agencies would enable all the 
responding emergency services to apply the agreed appropriate standard template. 
Adopted for any specific event, the template, allows independent use so helping define 
actions appropriate to their service whilst ensuring all agencies had the same "at risk 
area". - 
NATURAL GAS RELEASES 
A separate and a distinct area of concern to fire brigades are the risk created when 
flammable gas is released into the atmosphere. Dispersal patterns, under these 
circumstances, place the gas within its flammable limits. This can pose serious risks for 
those in its vicinity, and is considered here as a separate activity in gas dispersion 
models. This research is based on post event studies relating to two gasholders that 
were subjected to terrorist attack using explosives and is the major element of this 
report. 
Work conducted with two low-pressure gasholders helps indicate the risks. Both 
gasholders are typical of many to be found in current use, and are water-sealed (water 
tanks are below the ground) containing natural gas (NO) at ambient temperature. 
The first gasholder is column-guided and consists of two annular sleeves, known as 
lifts; the upper of these is roofed with steel plates to form the crown of the holder. 
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Average thickness of the walls is 5 - 8 mm. The lifts move telescopically so that the 
height of gasholder varies with the actual quantity of NG within it. Gas pressure within 
the gasholder depends on gas quantity and is determined by total weight of the lifts that 
are above the ground at any one time. Total gas capacity of the column-guided 
gasholder is 12,687 m 3 ; internal pressure corresponding to first lift being moved to its 
full height is 16.2 mbar, whilst when the full height of the holder is reached, the 
pressure is 19.9 mbar. 
The second gasholder is spiral-guided and consists of three lifts. Total capacity of this 
holder is 16,935 m3 ; pressures corresponding to moving to the full height of the first, 
the second and the third lifts are 16.2, 21.2 and 28.6 mbar respectively. 
Natural gas consists mostly of methane and is lighter than air due to its lower molecular 
weight [see Table Al below]. The critical temperature of methane is 820C  hence at 
normal conditions methane cannot be liquefied by pressurisation. 
Molecular weight, [g/mole] 16.9 - 19.0 mean: 17.18 
Lower flammability limit (LFL) XLPL' 1% vol] 5.0 
Upper flammability limit (UFL) XIJFL  [% vol] 15.0 
Boiling temperature, [K] 109 
Critical temperature, [K] 191 
Heat of combustion, [kJ/kg] 50,010 
TABLE Al PROPERTIES OF THE NATURAL GAS 
Maximum total masses of NG in gasholders at an ambient temperature of, say 15 °C, can 
be calculated using the maximum pressure corresponding to the maximum volume of 
the gasholder. System parameters are summarised in Table A2. 
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Gasholder 1 2 
Type of construction Column-guided Spiral-guided 
Diameter of the gasholder, [m] 31.4 31.1 
Maximum height of the gasholder, [m] 16.5 25.6 
Maximum Volume, [m3] 12,687 16,935 
Maximum excess pressure, [mbarl 19.9 28.6 
Maximum mass of NO (at 15 C), [kg] 9,390 12,530 
Total mass of NO, [kg] 21,920 
Minimum distance between the gasholders, [m] 10 
TABLE A2. PARAMETERS OF THE LOW PRESSURE GASHOLDERS 
SCENARIOS OF EVENTS AFTER DAMAGE/DESTRUCTION OF 
GASHOLDER 
Before considering possible scenarios of an accidental breach causedby a rupture of the 
gasholders and analysing the consequences of such an accident, some reasonable 
assumptions have to be made. A whole variety of physical and chemical phenomena 
could be expected to occur depending on damage characteristics. Among these events 
the most serious (i.e., leading to the most hazardous effects) need to be chosen for 
analysis. Below probable scenarios are developed based on particular features of low-
pressure gasholders. The following restriction is imposed: the accident is assumed to be 
sufficient to cause breaches in gasholder walls but small enough so that the main danger 
could be expected from the combustion or explosion of the gas released. 
Both column-guided and spiral-guided gasholders are designed so that the lifts are 
supported only by the pressure difference between the holder interior and ambient air. 
Characteristic feature of this type of gasholder is relatively low values of excess 
pressure (about 0.02-0.03 bar). Since the internal gas pressure is linked with the 
mechanical behaviour of the gasholder construction, possible consequences of gasholder 
depressurisation after a breach in the wall or roof will also significantly depend on 
whether the lifts are still able to move telescopically as the gasholder deflates, or are 
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locked tightly. Consideration is given only the case of the major hazard where the lifts 
are free to move so that the maximum volume of flammable gas enters the atmosphere 
mixing with surrounding air to form an explosive or combustible cloud outside the 
gasholder. 
Depending on the characteristic size of the breach and on the quantity of the gas stored 
in the holder at the moment of depressurisation, different sequences of events may 
follow. If the breach is relatively small, the gas will be released into the atmosphere 
over a period, which is much longer than characteristic mixing time, and a quasi-steady-
state jet will emerge and a jet fire will occur. However, if the breach is large enough 
and this is the scenario examined here, the release time is about or less than the mixing 
time scale, and the gas will form a cloud that can burn after immediate ignition as a 
fireball or disperse in the atmosphere giving rise to flash fire or (at least, potentially) 
vapour explosion in the case of delayed ignition. 
The critical breach size is defined so that if an actual breach has size, which exceeds it, 
a rapid escape of the gas into the atmosphere might be expected, while in the case where 
the actual breach size is less than the critical, jet outflow occurs. If the fuel gas is 
released quickly enough into the atmosphere, it forms a cloud in which the 
concentration of the gas will exceed the upper flammability limit (UFL). Some layer of 
combustible mixture in which the gas is diluted so that its concentration falls between 
the upper and lower flammability limits will surround this cloud. After immediate 
ignition the fuel-rich core of the cloud will burn as a fireball. The volume of the gas in 
the fuel-rich mixture corresponding to the critical breach diameter can be assessed as 
this value can be considered as a minimum mass of the NO that can burn as a fireball. 
Thus, in case of a large enough breach, the mass of the fuel in the fireball can be 
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assessed as 0.3 - 1.0 of the total mass of NG stored in the gasholder. Critical values of 
the breach diameter, area and the volume and mass of the fuel corresponding to them 
were calculated for the first and the second gasholders and are presented in Table A3 
together with the total likely outflow time. 
Gasholder 1 2 
Maximum total volume, [m3] 12,687 16,935 
Critical diameter of the breach d., [m] 4.7 5.1 
Total area of the critical breach S., [m2] 16.3 19.8 
Critical volume of the gas V., [m3l 6,090 8,130 
Critical mass of fuel Al., [kg] 2,820 3,765 
Total outflow time for critical breach tr 	 [s] 15.6 17.1 
TABLE A3. PARAMETERS OF THE CRITICAL BREACH 
If the gasholder deflates completely, all the stored gas escapes into the atmosphere. The 
maximum mass of methane is released if the gasholder is filled to its full capacity 
before the breach. If the breach size exceeds about 5 m (which is about 3% of the roof 
area), the fuel gas will form a large cloud in period less than 15 - 17 seconds. After 
immediate ignition at least half of the released mass of methane will burn to form the 
fireball. The main hazards are associated with heat radiation effects 
Fireball 
If the vapour cloud is ignited immediately, it may burn as a rising sphere, usually 
referred to as a "fireball". Rapid combustion of vapour clouds as fireballs has been 
observed in a number of incidents. The fireball is usually formed if the flammable 
cloud is fuel-rich, so those non-premixed regions of it burn in a diffusion regime. The 
main parameters to be predicted for assessment of hazards from a fireball are: 
• Fireball diameter 
• Fireball duration 
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• Thermal flux at the fireball surface 
• Heat radiation from fireball at different distances 
• Hazardous zones corresponding to various thermal fluxes 
The following cases were chosen for analysis with the gasholder supposed to be filled to 
its full capacity before the accident, after which it telescopes down until all the gas is 
released into the atmosphere: 
• Case 1. Fireball with total fuel mass of 5 tonnes. ThIs case corresponds very 
approximately to the lower limit of possible flammable fuel quantity after the 
rapid release. 
• Case 2. Fireball with total fuel mass of 10 tonnes. This case corresponds to 
severe damage to either of the two gasholders so that all the fuel is released from 
the damaged gasholder into the atmosphere. 
• Case 3. Fireball with total fuel mass of 20 tonnes. This is the worst possible case 
when both gasholders are damaged simultaneously. The separation between the 
gasholders is small compared to the typical fireball diameter (about 100 m), so it 
is supposed that fuel clouds escaping from both gasholders form a single fireball 
after ignition. 
Characteristics of the fireball are summarised in Table A4. It can be seen that in all 
cases the fireball diameter exceeds lOOm and fireball duration is about 10 s. 
Case 1 2 3 
Mass of NG, [kg] 5,000 10,000 20,000 
Maximum fireball diameter, [m] 103 129 162 
Total fireball duration, [s] 7.5 9.0 11.0 
Height of the fireball centre, [m] 77 97 121 
TABLE A4. PARAMETERS OF THE FIREBALLS IN CASES 1-3 
Heat flux from the fireball diminishes with distance as shown in Fig.3. The more 
powerful the fireball is, the larger is the radiation flux at any given point and the longer 
is the exposure time. 
Boundaries of hazardous zones can be obtained by comparing the calculated heat 
radiation flux with experimental data, which relate the radiation intensity and exposure 
time to damage caused 43 . The probit method can be used to determine the heat radiation 
causing various levels of lethality. It should be noted that actual consequences of heat' 
radiation are determined by heat flux being absorbed by the target. This flux can be less 
than the incident radiation flux (calculated above) because some fraction of radiation 
can be reflected and the target surface may not be oriented square on to the incident 
radiation. Since these factors diminishing the received heat flux are often uncertain, 
analysis of the consequences of heat radiation is widely performed assuming that the 
received heat flux is equal to incident flux, (i.e., the target is assumed to be a black body 
normal to the radiation direction). 
This approach gives the conservative (worst-case) estimate of the radiation effects and 
is adopted in the current study. The data obtained are summarised in Table A5 as eight 
hazardous zones corresponding to diverse effects of the heat radiation. For each zone 
the distance to its boundary is given. The heat flux at the boundary of each zone is also 
indicated in parenthesis. 
These data show that the fireball constitutes a very serious hazard because its thermal 
radiation can be dangerous for people at distances of up to 160 - 350 m's'. Radiation-
induced ignition of wood can occur at distances of up to 90 - 155 m. 
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1 Wood ignition 91(26.7) 118 (26.6) 155 (26.4) 
2 75% lethality - - 35 (69.3) 
3 50% lethality - 31(65.1) 65 (57.2) 
4 25% lethality 23 (63.3) 54 (53.7) 90 (46.5) 
5 10% lethality 43 (51.6) 72 (44.6) 109 (39.4) 
6 1% lethality 66 (38.0) 99 (33.0) 144 (28.9) 
7 First degree bums 126 (16.9) 179 (14.5) 252 (12.4) 




250 (8.5) 345 (7.0) 
TABLE AS HAZARDOUS ZONES SUMMARY FOR NATURAL GAS 
FIREBALLS 
UNCONFINED VAPOUR CLOUD EXPLOSIONS [UVCE] 
If a gasholder is breached it is possible that escaping gas will be ignited immediatel9 
and this case is covered above. Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness the case of 
delayed ignition of the gas cloud from the gasholder is considered here. The principal 
hazards from a vapour cloud in the case of delayed ignition are: 
• Flash fire and thermal radiation effects 
. Unconfined vapour cloud explosion (UVCE) and blast wave effects 
For flash fire to occur, the cloud (or some part of it) must mix with ambient air so that 
the fuel is within the flammability limits. Also, a source of ignition is necessary. Fuel 
combustion in a natural gas flash fire is blast-free and the main hazards are associated 
with possible flame engulfment. The most significant factors determining the evolution 
of a natural gas cloud are atmospheric turbulence and the buoyancy caused by the 
difference in molecular weights of NO and air. The low molecular weight of natural gas 
causes the released cloud to rise rather than to flow down along the ground surface (as 
in the case of heavy gases). This diminishes the hazards of NO clouds substantially. To 
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estimate the main features of evolution of the gas cloud after escape from the gasholder, 
it is necessary to consider cloud dilution by atmospheric diffusion together with 
buoyancy forces. 
Bull and Elsworth in their work on the susceptibility of gaseous methane/ethane 
mixtures to detonate in air have shown that neutral and/or stable weather conditions the 
distance the cloud must travel to be diluted with sufficient ambient air to reach the UIEL 
is about 100 - 200 m, and the time necessary to reach this diàtance is about 1 min for' 
wind speed 2 m/s, and 0.5 min for the wind speed 5 mIs". It follows that fast dilution 
in the zone near to the gasholder is probable only if atmospheric stratification is very 
unstable, which is the case on sunny, windy days. Thus it is likely that in average 
weather conditions the cloud has to drift about 50 - 100 m before it can become 
flammable. 
Positive buoyancy of the cloud results in its relatively rapid (at least for the first few 
seconds) ascent above the site, possibly to a height of several dozen metres. If this 
combined with the absence of, say, tall buildings near the gasholder site then the 
probability of delayed cloud ignition very low. Even in the case of the ascending cloud 
being ignited, its burning is expected to be blast-free, i.e., deflagration regime of 
combustion will follow. There is now considerable evidence that vapour clouds of 
methane at normal temperature burn but do not explode. Experiments have been carried 
out in which attempts have been made to initiate explosion in methane clouds with quite 
strong ignition sources, but without success 45 
Summarising the above, it can be stated that delayed ignition of NG cloud constitutes 
much less hazards than immediate ignition after damage to the gasholder. British Gas 
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experiments simulating accidental release of LNG into the atmosphere concluded that 
releases of natural gas in open terrain, if ignited would not give rise to a Vapour Cloud 
Explosion due to the low reactivity of the gas/air mixture. The types of event occurring 
would be either a burning plume or fireball depending upon the nature of the release 46 
Unconfined vapour cloud explosions [UVCE] are particularly hazardous and are often 
linked to aerial explosions. They arise when both fuel and air [or oxygen] are present in 
a gaseous form and may be either pre-mixed or not. Mists or droplets can form siniila( 
clouds and offer similar characteristics to UVCEs involving gases. The UVCE has the 
ability to create very high temperatures and significant increases in volume with the 
consequence of expansion forces capable of creating considerable damage. 
The closer the gas is through premixing to the perfect or stoichiometric proportion the 
hotter the flame. This stoichiometrjc mixture is well documented for most common 
gases and considerable research has been done into all 'normal' gases. Of course all 
gases do not burn especially if they are towards their upper or lower flammability levels 
and again these levels are well defined using apparatus developed by the US Bureau of 
Mines. Turbulence or increased ambient temperature can enhance the impact of 
UVCEs and therefore the impact of the weather becomes important. Increases in 
ambient pressure also have an effect; gases such as methane have a slightly higher 
burning velocity with decrease in pressure. 
Typically the vast majority of UVCEs will involve liquefied petroleum gas or at least its 
derivatives propane and butane. Hydrocarbons, initially at normal temperature and 
pressure will produce temperatures on combustion of between 1800 and 20002  C. 
UVCEs are particular hazardous because of the up to eight fold increase that may occur 
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in volume and atmospheric pressure. With any actively moving flame speed it is 
normal for explosions to occur within confined areas. JJVCEs by definition will occur 
in an unconfined space although there may be some physical limitations applied through 
the presence of buildings or chemical plant. 
It is generally accepted that UVCEs are subjected to the normal deflagration flame and 
are not detonations. Nevertheless the standard measure of damage created by the blast 
waves is linked to that created by detonations. The standard link therefore is to 
explosives and conventionally trinitrotoluene [TNT]. TNT detonations are the method 
used for recording likely impacts of UVCE and the kinetic energy developed by such 
blast waves goes far beyond the boundaries of any thermal damage. It is necessary for 
mixing to occur prior to any significant UVCE Studies identifying incidence have 
observed that over the past 50 years there have been at least two fireball or UVCE 
incidents every year. 
It therefore becomes extremely important in considering the weather to note its impact 
upon clouds likely to generate this phenomenon. In charting the fifty incidents quoted 
UCVEs killed over 700 people, quite frequently through the blast rather than through 
thermal injury. The primary weather influences on UVCEs are those of wind and 
temperature. Rainfall, atmospheric pressure and humidity tend not to have any major 
impacts although they can create situations, particularly where the density of the gas 
may be confined, which enables the gas to force its way against wind flows, because the 
cloud of gas is stabilised by the weather condition. In any study it is important for the 
fire service that the hazards of UVCEs be recognised in a similar way to that of fire 
balls and that the likely impacts as the down wind area be considered. 
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EMERGENCY ACTION PROCEDURES 
Emergency Action Code 
The principle UK method of marking hazardous materials is with an Emergency Action 
Code derived through the Hazchem system 47 . The transportation of hazardous materials 
in the European Union relies upon designation through the agreement relating to the 
carriage of dangerous goods by road 48 . Essentially the difference between the two 
systems is the UK EAC and the ADR primary hazard reference, since both systems, 
include the United Nations substance number. The UK system effectively relies upon a 
routinely published Hazchem list that is a derivative of both United Nations and 
European classifications. These latter sources, whilst providing a very useful database, 
are not primary sources. These remain the observed and recorded physical and 
chemical properties of the individual chemical, substance or mixture, which are not 
open to misinterpretation. Information is also often available in schedules attached to 
enforced national regulations. 
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The Hazchem system therefore remains an EAC based system, not a risk assessment 
code, and the UK Hazchem List an advisory document without legal obligation, albeit 
derived from the Approved Carriage List 1996 which is a legally enforced document, 
i.e., clothing codes or extinguishing agents. Translating the EAC into action is simply 
managed through the issue to every firefighter of an EAC card; Figure Al illustrates a 
commercial example. 
It is re-emphasised that accurate primary data is required, particularly for chemical and 
hazardous material incidents. This transposition of data activity is not without its faults, 
as will be shown; yet it is crucial to ensuring the Incident Commander is provided with 
accurate information. Errors can occur in transposing any data from its primary source, 
e.g. typing and miss spelling, and such errors are not solely in the preserve of the local 
operator but also occur in national databases or legislation. 
Computer transposition, whilst reducing simple mistakes will not necessarily prevent, 
and may magnify, the propagation of errors. 
The secondary data often used in working systems is sometimes derived using specific 
decision criteria. Validation of the decision criteria is important since this determines 
the quality of the working data. In this context, understanding why certain criteria have 
been chosen, who the selected end user is and how the data has been validated become 
essential questions. The UK Hazchem system is very good example of this process of 
data system construction with the fire service, as the selected end user, making 
operational decisions at hazardous material incidents. 
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FIGURE A2 AUSTRALIAN DANGEROUS GOODS CODE 4 
DECISION TREE FOR CONTAIN OR DILUTE? 
Notes to Figure A2 
1 	 The letters used indicate the precautions to be taken in the event of a fire or spillage, in this tree 
whether to contain or dilute any material. The letter 'E' is added when a neighbourhood evacuation 
should be considered. The letters are shown on the placard and firefighter's card [Figure 11 
2 	 The references *8  to *14 refer to the notes contained in the Australian Dangerous Goods Code 
Appendix 4 page 271. Note *8  for example reminds the user that a substance coded '4'must be kept dry 
and should not be diluted, Note *9  that compressed non liquefied gases can be dispersed quickly using 
water spray, Note *10  clarifies that a substance exerting less than 1 atmosphere absolute at ambient 
temperature is treated as a liquid or solid and Note *14  highlights the danger of flammable or toxic 
vapours in sewers. This flow diagram is one in a series of 5 the others covering Which Medium to use, 
Personal Protection, risk of Violent Reaction and the need to Consider Evacuation. 
The Hazchem system has developed extensively over several years to provide the 
firefighter with the EAC. The EAC, printed on a placard attached to a container 
transporting hazardous material, defines the essential immediate actions that should be 
taken to secure safety both for the public and the firefighter, and also provides 
information as to how to handle any spill or fire that has occurred. Placarding of road 
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and rail vehicles originating in the UK is a legal requirement under national and 
international legislation 49 . 
The decisions as to which extinguishing medium to use; whether to dilute or contain a 
substance; which type of personal protective clothing is appropriate; whether a violent 
reaction might be anticipated; or should public evacuation be carried out, are 
determined by using decision trees, based upon information used to formulate the 
EACs. A full description of the current EACs and the guidance used to derive an 
appropriate code for a specific chemical substance, developed by the UK Home Office 
Hazchem Technical Subcommittee, is not published in the UK although it is to be found 
in the current Australian Dangerous Goods Code Book 50. As an example the decision 
tree for determining whether to contain or dilute a spillage of a hazardous substance is 
shown in Figure A2. 
Ambiguities in Published Information on Hazardous Materials 
It is important to avoid any ambiguities that can lead to operational confusion. 
However, such events do occur and two examples follow: - 
Double Entries 
As mentioned the Hazchem List, issued periodically by the Home Office, contains vital 
information for the fire service. However some duplication necessarily occurs as the 
properties of various forms of the same substance may pose different threats, each 
requiring a distinct EAC. 
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The example taken from the Hazchem List Number 10 5 ' illustrates that using the UN 
identity number, as done by Fire Control, results in the same EAC thereby creating 
confusion as to the level of Personal Protection unless the ADR code is also known. 
UN Proper Shipping Name EAC APP HIN1 HIN2 ADR 
2996 ORGANOCHLORINE 2X B - 
- 66 
PESTICIDE, LIQUID, TOXIC  
2996 ORGANOCHLORINE 2X - - 
- 60 
PESTICIDE, LIQUID, TOXIC  
TABLE A6 DOUBLE ENTRIES 5 
Notes to Table A6 
EAC Emergency Action Code, 2X Fine spray and may react violently, APP Advice on Personal 
Protection, B Gastight suit, HIN Hazard Identification Number, ADR International Transportation-risk 
identification of primary hazard-60 Toxic, 66 Very Toxic. - 
The fire service would identify the substance at an incident by the UN Number but 
under current UK domestic legislative controls would not necessarily have the ADR 
code. The immediate problem for the fire service is whether gas tight clothing should 
be worn [as shown by the B in Additional Personal Protection column], since without 
access to the ADR code they would be unclear as to which substance they were 
handling. There are particular difficulties of mobility and comfort in using gas tight 
protection at a fire or under high ambient temperatures. 
Dual Classifications of Explosive Substances 
Some explosive substances appear in the Hazchem List with a UN number greater than 
the originating number of 1001, which is where the 'normal' list of dangerous 
substances starts. The same substance may also appear with a number less than 1000, 
so being classified as explosive. The only difference in chemical composition between 
the two substances is the amount of water or other diluent present. Such a substance 
could clearly present a serious operational risk to firefighters if it were to be in close 
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location to a source of heat, as might occur at a vehicle fire. Table A7 illustrates this 
point with the substances ammonium picrate and barium azide. 
UN Proper Shipping Name EAC APP HIN1 HIN2 ADR 
Number 
0004 AMMONII.JM PICRATE 1.313 
Dry or wetted with less than 10% 
water, by mass 
1310 AMMONIUMPICRATE 1W - 4.1 
Dry or wetted with more than 10% 
water, by mass 
0224 BARIUM AZIDE 1.1A 
Dry or wetted with less than 50% 
water, by mass 
1571 BARiUM AZJDE lx - 4.1 6.1 
Wetted with not less than 50% water, 
by mass 
TABLE A7 DUAL CLASSIFICATION 5 
The possible confusion could have serious operational consequences for firefighters. A 
substance classified as 1.1A is a primary detonating explosive, whilst a deflagration risk 
is classified as 1.3. A product search based on the chemical name only would not 
reveal this significant risk variation. Explosives also do not currently feature in the lists 
available to the UK fire service, although they do form part of the UN list 8 . 
Inconsistencies in Published Information on Hazardous Materials 
It is important to avoid inconsistencies of classification, especially between related 
chemical compounds, which could lead to increased operational risks. Isocyanates are a 
useful example in helping to illustrate this point and appear in the following three tables 
and chart. Isocyanates are commonly used in the plastics industry and are widely 
transported emphasising the need to reduce or eliminate such inconsistencies as shown 




Proper Shipping Name EAC APP HIN1 HIN2 ADR 
2480 METHYL ISOCYANATE *3\\E B 6.1 3 - 
2481 ETHYL ISOCYANATE *3\k/E - 3 6.1 - 
2482 n-PROPYL ISOCYANATE *3WE B 6.1 3 663 
2483 ISOPROPYL ISOCYANATE *3WE - 3 6.1 336 
2484 Tert-BIJ1TYL ISOCYANATE *3WE B 6.1 3 663 
2485 1 n-BUTYL ISOCYANATE *3WE B 6.1 1 3 1 663 
2486 ISOBUTYL ISOCYANATE *3WE - 3 6.1 336 
2487 PHENYL ISOCYANATE *3W B 6.1 3 663 
2488 CYLOHEXYL 
ISOCYANATE  
*3W B 6.1 3 663 
TABLE A8 ISOCYANATES WITH EAC AND HAZARD IDENTIFICATION 5 
In Table 3 there are clear inconsistencies in that, despite all the substances listed having 
a high toxic risk, only some show the need for a corresponding level of personal 
protection. The APP [Personal Protection] code 'B' requires gas tight protection yet 
three of the isocyanates are listed as not requiring this level of protection, despite all of 
the substances shown having an occupational exposure limit 52 of 0.02 mg. m 3 or 0.07 
mg. m 3 for short term [15 minutes] exposure. Such materials may cause sensitisation, 
so placing individuals at considerable future risk from very low-level exposures, as the 
trachea becomes hyper responsive and respiratory symptoms increase. Avoiding 
inconsistencies is not impracticable although at the planning stage information may be 
found using the US Chemical Abstract Service Registry Number [CAS RN or CAS 
Number]. This is a substance specific number and allows access to physical and 
toxicological information that is primary information, therefore providing some 
certainty upon which planning might proceed. The use of the CAS number also enables 
searches to be made of the considerable number of existing databases now available on 
the Internet. Accessing data in this way will help overcome the errors likely to arise 
from using generic or UN number based substance data, recognising there remains some 
caution always about the completeness of any list. 
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In Table 3 UN 2480, for example, is not registered as having an ADR classification, that 
is products posing a personal risk requiring gas tight protection for firefighters do not, 
apparently, require consideration of public evacuation, although responsible for the 
Bhopal disaster of 1985 k . This latter point is further illustrated in Table A9 extracted 
from the North American Emergency Response Guide, where considerable evacuation 
distances are advised for UN 2480. 
As can be seen from the table, UN 2487 and UN 2488 require large safety distances,, 
which in a UK context of urban communities would pose serious operational 
management issues. The practical arrangements necessary to evacuate established 
populations of many thousands of people, sometimes under adverse or inclement 
weather conditions and who might require physical and health support, illustrate this 
point. Considerations of this kind, for what might be short-lived events such as toxic 
gas releases, resulted in a review within Cheshire Fire Brigade of safety strategies and 
ultimately the adoption of a 'shelter' philosophy. This is reported upon later in this 
thesis. 
Physical properties, as shown in the following Table AlO, help illustrate how primary, 
uncorrupted, data can help remove the ambiguity, inconsistencies and duplication of 
error possibilities in the area of dangerous goods transportation. Unfortunately 
collecting and translating into practical use this data is not widely undertaken within the 
fire service and the ambiguities and inconsistencies outlined do therefore occur. The 
resources needed to undertake this level of work are extensive and it is therefore 
• 40 tonnes of the toxic substance Methyl Isocyanate was accidentally released at Bhopal, India on 3 
December 1985 from the Union Carbide plant with the consequential loss of over 800 lives and 500,000 
injuries. The Bhopal Gas Peedit Mahila Udlyog Sangathan estimate over 16,000 deaths have since 
occurred.. The US Chemical Safety Board estimate that in the US each year there are 60,000 incidents 
and 250 deaths directly related to hazardous materials. 
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perhaps understandable why this activity has not already been accomplished. These 
important physical factors show there are relationships, which can help with planning 
and interpretation. Boiling points for example show a definite relationship to 
evacuation distance with the more volatile substances requiring progressively less 
distance. Figure A3 is an interpretation, by the author, to show a clear relationship 





Evacuation Distances (metres) 
Small Spills Large Spills 
Isolat 
e 
Day Night Isolat 
 e  
Day Night 
2480 METHYL ISOCYANATE 95 800 2700 490 4800 9800 
2481 ETHYL ISOCYANATE 215 1900 4300 915 11 k 11 k - 
2482 n-PROPYL ISOCYANATE 125 1100 2400 765 6300 10.6k 
2483 ISOPROPYL 
ISOCYANATE 
185 1800 3900 430 4200 7400 
2484 tert-BUTYLISOCYANATE 125 1000 2400 550 5300 10.3k 
2485 n-BUTYLISOCYANATE 95 800 1600 335 3100 6300 
2486 ISOBUTYL ISOCYANATE 60 600 1400 155 1600 3200 
2487 P1-IENYL ISOCYANATE 30 300 800 155 1300 2600 
2488 CYLOHEXYL 
ISOCYANATE 
30 200 300 95 800 1400 
TABLE A9 NORTH AMERICAN EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDE 53 
EVACUATION DISTANCES (metres) FOR ISOCYANATES 
Notes to Table A9. 
1. A small spill involves a single, small package up to 208 litres, a small cylinder, or a small leak from a 
large container. A large spill involves a larger package or multiple spills from small packages. 
2. Day is anytime after sunrise and before sunset. 
3. The isolation distance is the initial immediate evacuation area for all non-essential and unprotected 
individuals. 
4. The Day and Night figures represent a Protective Action Zone distance, in metres, on the downwind 
side of the spill. This is a zone in which persons are at risk from harmful exposure. The spill centre forms 
the point of origin of the zone distance given in the table. 
5. The width of the zone is the same distance, so forming a downwind square, with the risk area equally 
dispersed on either side of the direction of spill centre line. 
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2480 METHYL ISOCYANATE 39 -17.8 
2481 ETHYL ISOCYANATE 60 -10 
2482 n-PROPYL ISOCYANATE 83 -5 
2483 ISOPROPYL ISOCYANATE 74 -3 
2484 Tert-BUTYL ISOCYANATE 85 11 
2485 n-BUTYL ISOCYANATE 115 11 
2486 ISOBUTYL ISOCYANATE 106 22.5 
2487 PHENYL ISOCYANATE 163 41.3 
2488 CYCLOHEXYL ISOCYANATE 172 53 





night time 6 
large spill 4 
2 
0 
39 	 60 	 83 	 74 	 85 	 115 	 106 	 163 	 172 
Boiling Point °C 
FIGURE A3 EVACUATION DISTANCE AGAINST BOILING POINT [DAVIS] 
Data acquisition is not without difficulties, as Klein and Franklin, both involved in 
providing advice to the fire service have explained following exploration of the issues 
of validation and verification arising from the current UK approach 55 . This reinforces 
the very important point that there is frequently, within the legislative requirements, 
both a framework and prescriptive information base regarding harmful effects that can 
be usefully applied by the fire service as part of an overall database. For example, 
limits imposed to avoid harmful ionising radiation contained in UK regulations, derive 
from values allocated by the International Convention for Radiological Protection 
[ICRPI. 
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This approach has benefits. The legislation detailing substances, levels or limits to 
prevent illness or harm, or concerned with monitoring and updating requirements, 
provides a ready source of incident management information. From legislation in most 
countries, four groups may be readily identified i.e. Chemical Substances, Explosives, 
Biological Hazards, and Jonising Radiations and Radioactive Isotopes. 
With each of these classified groups information relating to containment, classification, 
marking, surveillance, explosive limitations, transport etc. is either prescribed or, 
through guidance and advice or reporting requirements, monitored and controlled. In 
some areas of activity, the fire service is a consultee and may even be the regulator. 
Building upon the existing framework is, therefore, an effective method of meeting 
some incident management information requirements. In addition, procedural practice 
may reflect risk avoidance. Thus the wearing of breathing apparatus to prevent possible 
ingestion, for example, becomes essential in clearing-up operations at premises where 
asbestos or ionising radiation risks are known to exist. Allowing contents to burn in a 
controlled manner may be the preferred tactic at a biological laboratory or agricultural 
store to protect the wider environment from possible bacteriological contamination. 
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STUDY INTO EVACUATION OF RESIDENTS FOLLOWING A 
SERIOUS FIRE AT LIGHTFOOT STREET, CHESTER, 
CHESHIRE, 25 OCTOBER 1996 
Introduction 
The purpose of this study is to try and identify the behaviour of residents, since there are 
very few published reports following such incidents. The approach has been to try and 
identify at what time residents became aware of the incident and how they reacted 
initially. Linked to this is an understanding of their knowledge of fire safety and the 
local risk, which was involved, prior to the actual fire. 
In addition, residents were asked to indicate how they were made aware of the incident. 
The survey method itself revolves around the use of personal calls conducted by 
firefighters who were involved with the actual fire. One outcome of the survey has been 
the positive statement made by residents and firefighters alike that discussing the 
incident has helped to come to terms with what was a truly traumatic event. 
The structure of the twenty-one questions has been used to seek understanding in a 
number of broad areas. The questions themselves have been simplified to allow 
collation and to aid compilation, so that any lessons may be used in the future to 
improve the quality of the emergency services' response, especially by the fire service. 
The survey results are quantified under a series of headings. The first, effectively 
groups people by their age, occupation, health and language. The second seeks to 
understand their prior fire safety knowledge and any local knowledge in terms of the 
building involved. Central then to the questioning is how individuals were alerted and 
what their first actions were. Finally, their considered opinion is requested regarding 
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their own reaction and those of the emergency services and the opportunity is also given 
to suggest improvements. 
It would have been impossible to conduct this survey without the willing participation 
both of the residents involved and of the firefighters of Red Watch who had been 
involved on the night of the fire. What is in strong evidence, as one considers the 
responses, is that essentially the community sought first to help itself, with a great deal 
of time and effort being placed into alerting others. Secondl, there is a clear wish to 
help improve the circumstances for others who may find themselves in similar traumatic 
events. 
THE INCIDENT 
At 01:30 hours on Friday 25 October 1996 Cheshire Fire Brigade Control received an 
automatic fire alarm call from the Chubb Control Centre in Manchester. Chubb are a 
Company handling automatic fire alarm calls. 
Figure A4 Chester Warehouse Fire 
The call stated there was an alarm operating at a Pickfords Furniture Depository at 
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Hook Bridge, Chester. Attendances were made from Chester Fire Station to what 
subsequently became a serious incident involving eighteen appliances. The nature of 
the fire was that following an extremely rapid fire development in the warehouse, which 
was built in the early 1960s as a railway locomotive shed, a series of properties in 
Lightfoot Street were directly affected by fire spread. These properties were some 18 
metres away from the main fire area. The large storage facility, containing possessions 
and furniture within the warehouse, created a significant fire in a building measuring 
100 by 30 metres. 
The building was located behind a solid brick perimeter wall and constructed from 
corrugated cement asbestos sheeting over a steel frame with a lower section of block 
work. It was not protected by a sprinkler system. The Lightfoot Street housing, which 
subsequently became involved in the fire, consisted of Victorian two storey terraced 
properties built around 1900 of traditional construction. A number of houses had been 
upgraded both internally and externally and in particular PVC rainwater goods and 
windows had been used. 
To the rear of the terraced property was a communal passageway. The construction of 
the houses in a continuous terrace was subsequently found to have a significant effect 
on fire spread in that the roof void in a number of cases had been breached. 
The incident development, following the arrival of the first appliances, was that despite 
an immediate check on site, no obvious fire was observed. However within a very short 
period of twenty minutes, a major fire had broken through the roof of the warehouse 
and was already seriously threatening the occupiers within Lightfoot Street. The first 
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call indicating that residents were directly affected was made at 01:48 hours and was 
subsequently followed with over 100 calls. 
METHODOLOGY 
The survey was carried out, as mentioned, by firefighters and 29 questionnaires were 
returned. At the time of the incident it was estimated 50 residents were actually 
evacuated. 29 questionnaires have been from those directly affected in Lightfoot Street. 
There is no way of knowing whether an individual has feturned more than one 
questionnaire, although I feel this has been avoided. This has particular relevance 
concerning children, since some may have been counted twice. Table All 
demonstrates the gender and age of the respondent. It will be seen that 55% were in the 
30 - 60 age group. There were 17 children and the majority of occupants were female. 
Question 2 sought the occupation of the respondent, not necessarily the 'head' of the 
household. Two thirds of those responding were actually employed, the others being. 
retired or unemployed. 
Question 3 indicated the majority of residents were in good health and Question 4 that 
all used English as their first language. It will be seen, therefore, that the majority of 
residents were within the middle age group, female and English speaking 
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Age No % Gender No Health No 
16-20 5 17 Females 17 Good 29 
20-30 5 17 Families with 
Children 
11 Visually impaired 0 
30-40 3 10 Hearing impaired 0 
40-50 6 21 Males 12 Physically impaired 0 
50-60 7 24 Children present 17 Pregnant 0 
60-70 2 7 Employment Status Sleeping medication 1 
70-80 0 0 Working 21 Primary Language 
80-90 1 4 Retired 4 English speaking 29 
Totals 29 100 Unemployed 4 Other language 
Table All- Demography of Respondents 
Question 5 sought to identify where the residents had gained their fire safety knowledge 
and the results are shown in Table Al2. The influence of television and local 
newspaper articles is seen as particularly relevant, as is the influence of those at work. 
What is more noticeable is the lack of information gained from local radio and this is 
perhaps an area which could be developed given that it is known, from other surveys, a 
significant number of the population listen routinely to local radio stations. 
At work 14 TV advertisements 8 
From child at school 1 Always known 1 
Local newspaper articles 4 Other 3 
Radio advertisements 0 None 1 
Table Al2- Source of Fire Safety Knowledge (Question 5) 
Question 6 sought to identify whether or not the population in Lightfoot Street was 
transient or static. The respondents generally had over six years occupation and 
therefore were very knowledgeable about their street and local community (Table A13). 
However when considering the Pickfords building, it is clear that the vast majority of 
respondents had little knowledge of the building at all, with only four illustrating the 
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most basic knowledge of the interior (Table A14). This raises the general question as to 
how informed communities should be of particular premises in their neighbourhood and 
how relevant it would be for the Fire Service to generally try and increase peoples 
knowledge about particular premises. 
0-2 years 5 12-14 years 4 
2-4 years 2 14-16 years 3 
4-6 years 0 16-18 years 1 
6-8 years 2 18-20 years 2 
8-10 years 0 >20 years 9 
10-12 years 0 Visitors 1 
Table A13 Length of Residence in Lightfoot Street (Question 6) 
	 - 
Detailed knowledge of the interior 0 
Basic knowledgeof the interior 4 
No knowledge 25 
Table A14 Knowledge of the Pickfords Building (Question 7) 
In this case it has to be said, it would have been doubtful under current arrangements for 
any specific advice to be given about this particular premises. However, given the 
outcome of the fire, there has to be a question as to whether local communities should 
have a better knowledge of premises that may present them with a risk from fire. 
The next series of questions sought to identify how residents were alerted and at what 
time this awareness occurred. It also sought to identify whether in the initial alerting 
process they were able to gain sufficient information to assess the nature of the 
occurrence and the threat to their own circumstances. It is very evident from the 
responses to Question 8 that noise was the principal method of alert, combined with 
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light (Table A15). These two methods appear to have been the primary alerting process 
for the early callers. Noise in particular in this case was especially relevant, given that 
the asbestos sheet cladding was fragmenting quite violently, creating a series of loud 
cracking noises. The light of the fire would also be quite intense. The role of the 
emergency services in providing the alert was relatively modest in comparison to these 
two other physical methods. There is clearly an indication here that for an alert to be 
effective, the use of noise and light, in the emergency services case perhaps the 
sounding of warning horns at night would be a particularly effective method. 
Method of Alert No. % 
Noise 16 55 
Smoke 0 0 
Heat 0 0 
Police 3 10 
Fire Brigade 1 3.4 
Sensed movement 2 6.9 
Family member 3 10 
Boyfriend/other occupant 2 6.9 
Light of fire 2 6.9 
Neighbour 1 3.4 
One respondent ticked two categories 
Table A15 Method of Alert to Fire (Question 8) 
Turning to the time that people became aware of the circumstances Question 9 
illustrates that within fifteen minutes of the occurrence the vast majority of people 
became aware. There is then a pause of some fifteen minutes before the final group 
were alerted. It is judged that this gap related to the time at which firefighters 
conducted a final evacuation search of Lightfoot Street to ensure that all residents had 
indeed left their premises. The importance of such a search is borne out by the 
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respondents, which illustrate that five people were still in their premises at 2 am even 
though there was an extremely serious fire affecting the front of the building. 
Time of Alert No. 
1.30 am 7 24 
1.35 am 3 10 
140am 11 38 
1.45 am 3 10 
1.SOam 0 0 
1.55am 0 0 
2.00 am 5 17 
Table A16 Time to Realisation. (Question 9) 
Question 10 demonstrates that the vast majority of people were asleep or at least in bed 
with no recorded persons being active and awake. Their understanding of the situation, 
as illustrated in Question 11, was that most people sensed that there was a serious 
situation underway with 43% of the residents recording it as extremely serious. 
Location No. 
In bed awake 5 17 
In bed asleep 24 83 
Awake and active 0 0 
Table A17 Location at time of Alert (Question 10) 
Understanding No. 
Not serious 3 10 % 
Slightly serious 7 23 % 
Moderately serious 6 21 % 
Extremely serious 13 45 % 
Table A18 Initial Understanding of Situation (Question 11) 
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Answers to Question 12 —What was your first course of action? - Show that the first 
action of the majority of people was to alert others and commence an evacuation (Table 
A19). This form of response tends to support the notion identified by the United 
Nations studies that under extreme circumstances the first action of many evacuees is to 
actually assist and help themselves rather than to seek help from others. 
Action No. % 
Tried to determine what was happening 2 6.9 
Prepared to leave the house 8 28 
Evacuated 10 34 
Alerted others 12 41 
Helped others 3 10 
Sought help 1 3.4 
Waited 1 3.4 
Sought protection from the fire in the house 0 0 
Move car 1 3.4 
Other 2 6.9 
Respondents ticked more than one category 
Table A19 First Course of Action (Question 12) 
The community of Lightfoot Street demonstrated this human behaviour in a very 
focused way with over 40% of their actions directly related to alerting others. The 
results of Question 14 demonstrates that this included making emergency calls, alerting 
neighbours and friends either by telephone or directly and waking other occupants 
within the building (Table A21) while those to Question 13 supports the response made 
to Question 8 that the majority of respondents did indeed hear the fire rather than 
identify any other indication that a fire was underway (Table A20). 
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First Indication of Fire No. 
Saw smoke 2 6.9 
Smelled smoke 1 3.4 
Told by others 2 6.9 
Saw firefighters 1 3.4 
Opened the front door 1 3.4 
Heard the fire 15 52 
Saw flames 2 6.9 
Heard alarms ringing 0 0 
Noise 2 6.9 
Saw fire 6 21 
Other 0 0 
Respondents ticked more than one category 
Table A20 First Indication of Fire (Question 13) 
During these initial actions the vast majority of people evacuated although as Question 
15 illustrates two remained inside their house believing it was safer (Table A22). The 
two that stayed watched the fire progress until they too thought it was necessary to leave 
(Table A23). In leaving their homes, residents predominantly entered the street and 
vacated, either to the public house or the church hail (Table A24). 
Method of Raising Alarm No. 
Dialled 999 8 28 
Dialled a neighbour/friend 2 6.9 
Alerted neighbours 8 28 
Alerted other occupants 6 21 
Table A21- (Question 14) 
Reason for Staying in House No. 
I was too frightened 0 
It was too smoky 0 
I was too hot 0 
I felt safer inside 2 
I was not sure what to do 0 
Other 0 
Table A22 Reason for Staying in House Rather Than Evacuating (Question 15) 
Action in House No. 
Got dressed 	 - 0 
Closed all doors 0 
Moved to the rear of the house 0 
Watched out of the window 2 
Gathered personal items 0 
Other 0 
Table A23 What Did You Do If You Stayed In The House? (Question 16) 
Action No, 
A friend's house 5 17 
Other family member's house 3 10 
Into the street 20 69 
Tothepub 15 52 
To the Church hall 6 21 
To the car to leave the area 1 3.4 
Just ran 0 0 
Northgate Arena 3 10 
Other - went to own home 1 3.4 
Respondents went to more than one evacuation centre 
Table A24 Evacuation Destination (Question 17) 
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Whilst it may seem unusual to state the role of the public house fulfilled as a natural 
focus for evacuation and assembly it is something the emergency services should 
seriously note. This is not the first time in the Author's experience that 'the pub' has 
served as the focus and focal point for a community at times of stress and indeed many 
publicans, because of their involvement with the community, naturally offer support and 
shelter to those who are distressed. Such buildings invariably are warm, well known 
and at prominent accessible positions. 
Moving towards the response it will be seen from Question 18 that the role of police 
and fire service officers, in providing information and announcements is important 
(Table A25). 33% of the respondents heard nothing and had to take their own course of 
action. This suggests that at every emergency where an evacuation is needed the most 
careful consideration has to be given to providing direction to the evacuees. Where this 
is likely to occur without support then the simple precaution of placing notices for the 
public informing them of where to assemble or find information is something that needs 
to be taken into account 
Advice From No. 
The Police/Fire Officers 13 50 
From other residents 2 7.7 
Heard nothing and took my own course of action 10 38 
Other - family member 1 3.8 
Table A25 Source of Advice (Question 18) 
Question 19 provides a clear illustration of how the Lightfoot Street residents felt at the 
time (Table A26). It is to their immense credit that whilst they were anxious the 
majority felt in control of the situation or calm and able to function. It is also important 
to realise that three individuals were seriously confused by the situation and therefore in 
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need of direct personal help. This is a very important point, which needs further 
consideration. 
Feeling No. 
I was anxious, but in control 17 59 
I panicked and felt confused 3 10 
I felt calm 8 28 
I was unable to think 0 0 
Other - no problem 1 3.4 
Table A26 Feelings at the time of the fire (Question 19) 
Question 20 was answered despite the loss that occurred to the individual and could 
therefore be seen as an extremely satisfactory performance by the emergency services 
The response of the emergency services is generally seen as satisfactory or extremely 
so. But the emergency services no doubt can draw some satisfaction from this 
comment. 
Satisfaction Level No. 
Extremely satisfied 12 40 
Very satisfied 8 27 
Satisfied 6 20 
Dissatisfied 0 0 
Very dissatisfied 0 0 
Table A27- Level of Satisfaction with Response of Emergency Services (Question 20) 
The responses to two further questions about 'how could we help in future' and 'what 
could we do better' illustrated that there is room for improvement. The responses are 
not included in this paper. 
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To summarise, they appear to indicate that the concern over the loss might have been 
less had better provision existed in the first place. There is also a clear message about 
recognising the dignity of the individual and the need for more information. Practical 
support to help relieve the pressure created by bureaucracy in dealing with paper work 
and at meeting individual needs following such a stressful situation are also shown. 
CONCLUSION 
This survey has clearly illustrated, that at times of immense stress, the general reaction 
of the public is far better than the myths often associated with such evacuations tend to 
lead us to believe. On this occasion, despite an extremely frightening fire, the first 
actions of the majority of residents were to ensure their neighbours and family were 
alerted and that they were all moving to a place of relative safety. The majority did this 
by their own unaided efforts operating through a system of community understanding. 
The role of public information in such circumstances is amply reinforced by the 
indications that further information would have been helpful and was needed. 
There is also an illustration of a need to be aware of local circumstances and to improve 
general knowledge on fire safety issues through local media. The residents of Lightfoot 
Street have, by simply responding to the questionnaire and study, provided a very rare 
insight into how people feel and react under such circumstances. 
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